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CAPTIVE OR FREE?

GILBERT REID


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
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CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE

CHINA,
CAPTIVE OR FREE?

A Study of China's Entanglements

BY

REV. GILBERT REID, A.M., D.D.
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PREFACE

"Now it can be told"—not because the facts have not been known or because any censor has forbidden their publication, but because the temper of the reading public has not yet escaped the bias of war and resumed the calmness, poise, fairness and broad-mindedness of days before the war. America by entering the war and through glory of achievement has not suffered militarily, but morally. Not until one reaches the lofty idealism of "being just to those to whom we wish to be just, and just to those to whom we do not wish to be just," will he read with patience such a book as this.

The author primarily is an advocate of justice the world over, but, to be intelligently just, there comes the task of accommodating thinking to the process of discrimination. In times of war, and under the behests of war, conscience must be set to sleep, and loyalty must shape itself by current opinion, loftily proclaimed, that one's own nation and all her associates are of necessity immaculate, and the opposing group without any virtue which Heaven or man may recognize. When peace dawns, and reconstruction is undertaken—undertaken on the basis of real re-conciliation —then policies and systems, customs and governments must be discriminated from peoples and the individual, and even in the individual one must learn to see both good and evil.

So far as peoples are concerned, and not the character of their dominating, governmental policies, the author acknowledges that as a resident in China of nearly four decades, he is pro-Chinese, rather than pro-Japanese or even pro-American, but, even so, the views presented are

not altogether the Chinese view; they are his own views. His views are based on a knowledge of existing facts, such as the average person does not generally see, and the expression of these views is made with the intent of being fair, undetermined by prejudice for or against any particular people. In being loyal to the truth and true to the facts, the author does not gainsay that other fact, that he is, and has been, and will continue to be, supremely interested in the welfare of the Chinese people and of China as a nation.

As to the treatment meted out to China by other nations, or, more specifically, other governments, the reader will observe that Japan at certain stages *vis-à-vis* China is severely criticized, but after all no worse than the criticism of Great Britain and no worse as to Great Britain than the criticism of the author's own government, or the policy pursued towards China by the Wilson Administration during the delirium of war. Other readers who read here and there a line will refuse to face the facts as they reveal favourably the German temper of mind on the eastern outskirts of Asia, far removed from the real seat of the awful conflict in arms. All that the author asks for in the way of indulgence is a patient study of the facts. He acknowledges that as to the comparative relationship of Allies and Central Powers to China during the last few years, and as to the policy pursued and their general demeanour, he may be classed more as pro-German than pro-Ally, but here again the reader is asked to study the facts. At bottom, the worst that can be said is that by the behests of President Wilson he has had, and still has, "friendship and sympathy for the German people," and has refused to discard his friendship because certain governments were determined on war.

A certain amount of respect may be accorded the author, if it be known that for adhering to his convictions and out

of love for China he was made to suffer not only *for* China, but *with* China, and underwent some tragic, amusing and puerile persecution from the great diplomats of four Legations, British, French, Japanese and even American. The U. S. Constitution, like the Sermon on the Mount, both "slumbered and slept."

Out of supreme interest in the permanency and well-being of China, he foregoes the personal factor, and calls on all peoples to give China a chance and to help her defend her rights.

Let the reader—and may there be many in many lands—"read, learn, and inwardly digest" the facts as here told and the truth at which the author has aimed.

GILBERT REID.

February, 1921.

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CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE

CHINA, CAPTIVE OR FREE?

CHAPTER I

A BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS

THE contact of European civilization with the peoples of Asia and Africa, and the American continents, makes sad reading for the man of justice. As to the one country of China, with a long record of civilization, statecraft, philosophy, art and religion, the question arises, "Has China been blessed or cursed by Western civilization?"

The seriousness of China's international relations began in the early eighties in the growing rivalry and conflict between China and Japan, with Korea as a centre. Before that time, Great Britain, France and Russia were the chief countries in the forceful opening of China to the trade, missions and diplomacy of the rest of the world, accompanied by minor acts of encroachment, interference and seizure of territory under the legal guise of treaties. Looking at the sad havoc of the years, Japan may well claim that she is no worse than European nations in their treatment of China. From China's standpoint all outsiders are bad, with no sign of repentance. I mention a few outstanding facts.

Great Britain began her aggressive policy with the "Opium War," ending in the treaty of 1842, whereby the island of Hongkong became an English crown colony.

Justin McCarthy, speaking of ways to justify British action, says:

> But no considerations of this kind can now hide from our eyes the fact that in the beginning and the very origin of the quarrel

we were distinctly in the wrong. We asserted, or at least acted on the assertion of, a claim so unreasonable and even monstrous that it never could have been made upon any action strong enough to render its assertion a matter of serious responsibility.[1]

France seconded the war operations of the British and directed her efforts henceforth to the religious task of being Protector of Catholic Missions, and indirectly of Chinese converts. It is hence easy to understand the desire once expressed by Prince Kung that China might be free of "opium and missionaries." Opium from 1842 spread more and more throughout China, while missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, harassed the Chinese Government by so-called "difficulties," dependent for settlement on the frequent application of the "gun-boat policy."

Concerning the view that China presented "a vast field of lucrative opportunities for British merchants," J. O. P. Bland writes:[2]

> The wars of 1842 and 1858 were deliberately undertaken for the development and protection of that field, at a time when Englishmen had no reason to anticipate serious rivalry in the reaping of its harvests.

Russia during these years had encroached from the north on the Amur region of Manchuria, and from the northwest on Chinese Turkestan. China more and more realized that Russia was the "Big Bear."

The general policy of the United States to China as to Japan was that of generosity, made conspicuous by Caleb Cushing and Anson Burlingame.

In 1883 and 1884 hostilities arose between China and France, resulting in China's losing the suzerainty of Annam and Tongking, which passed to the control of

[1] "A History of Our Own Times," p. 166.
[2] "Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 256.

France as part of her colonial empire. France became the menacing factor on China's southern frontier, as Russia was on the north.

About the same time—actually in 1882—after Great Britain and the United States had induced Korea to make with them commercial treaties, thus impairing China's suzerainty of Korea, the Chinese Government dispatched to Korea a young officer, Yuan Shih-kai, with a small force of 3,000 men, to maintain China's rights and prestige. Friction between Chinese and Japanese ambitions grew more intense. This young Chinese was viewed by Japan as an antagonist and became still more so, some twenty years later, when as President he was the "strong man" of China. Russia, too, in the early eighties, entered upon the scene, and was looked at askance by Japan even more than by China. Korea was already the centre of international intrigue.

The question of Korea, whether or not to be attached to China as to a suzerain Power, was an object of interest to Japan. Out of this question has sprung Japan's ever-expanding ambition—or, in another phraseology, has become a progressive nation like those of the West. Japan's "peaceful expansion" on the Asiatic continent goes by the decade and in terms of war: first, 1894, in war with China; second, 1904, in war with Russia; and third, 1914, in war with Germany. By 1924 will it be war with Britain, or the United States, or a decadent white race?

It was 1894 when Japan found a sufficiently plausible reason for announcing a *casus belli* against China. In the conflict the Chinese navy, trained by British officers, fell into the hands of Japan. The Chinese army, mostly of the old style, was defeated, retreating from Korea and Manchuria. Peking, the national capital, was threatened. The Chinese Government sued for peace. China was humiliated in the eyes of the world. Japan of a sudden rose to a

commanding position among the Great Western Powers—the only strong Eastern Power in all Asia.

The man to make peace on the Chinese side was the great Oriental diplomat, Li Hung-chang, aided by an American, John W. Foster. The Japanese diplomat was Count Ito, already known to Li Hung-chang, and more sure of success because his diplomacy was backed by military conquest. All that China had to do was to submit.

In the first article of the treaty the responsibility was laid on China to "recognize definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea," a captivating phrase. As for Japan, she made no declaration to this effect.

Besides an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels (about 40,000,000 pounds sterling) which Japan demanded of China, there was also the cession of the island of Formosa, of the Pescadores group, and of the peninsula of Liaotung at the southern end of Manchuria. This latter comprised Port Arthur, China's strongest fortification. It was in reference to the latter cession that Li Hung-chang displayed his skill as an Oriental diplomat. Before leaving Peking for peace negotiations at Shimonoseki, he came to an understanding with the Russian Minister to intervene on China's behalf. Thus, no sooner was the treaty signed, than the Russian Government, backed by France and Germany, "recommended" to Japan the retrocession of Liaotung, in lieu of a further indemnity of 7,500,000 pounds sterling. The joint advice was in these words:

> Such territorial acquisition constitutes a menace against the capital of China, renders Korea's independence merely nominal, and jeopardizes the perpetual peace in the Far East.

Concerning this act of finesse, H. B. Morse writes:

> Mr. Foster declares that he first heard of the demand during his stay in Peking, April 24th to May 2nd, and that "Li Hung-

Chang waited anxiously for some indication from Russia, but none was received by him till we reached Tientsin on our return." This disposes of the possibility of any direct assurance having been given; but none the less, the viceroy must have had a reasonable expectation that the action would be taken.[1]

In this connection, as bearing on Japan's future policy of expansion, John W. Foster writes:

I have reason to believe that the demand for territory on the mainland of China was contrary to the better judgment of Marquis Ito. . . . In my conversations with Count Mutsu, I told him I was satisfied Russia would not permit Japan to occupy the mainland so threateningly near to Peking, and that it was not good policy to insist upon it.[2]

The war, and then the peace settlement, of China and Japan in 1894 and 1895, have had serious, unexpected, and far-reaching bearings, all linked up in one way or another with the political manœuvers of the present war.

(1) First of all, the way was open for Russia to push her interests in Manchuria as China's "true friend," and to find at last an outlet to the sea.

(2) The policy of China's dependence on loans from European Powers was initiated for meeting at once the indebtedness to Japan. France and Russia made a joint loan of 400,000,000 francs, and British and German bankers advanced jointly two loans of 16,000,000 pounds sterling each. The British required of the Chinese that as the maritime customs was to be the security, the Inspector General of the customs should be a Britisher so long as Britain held the preponderance of foreign trade. This arrangement now spurs on the Japanese to be preponderant

[1] "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. III, p. 47.
[2] "Diplomatic Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 153.

in China, both politically and commercially, in place of Britain.

(3) More serious for the political integrity of China was the policy adopted in 1898 of acquiring in the name of lease small sections of Chinese territory and some of China's most important harbours, capable of fortification. The country responsible for the first move was Germany, a new factor in China's international relations. Germany's ambitions to have a place in the sun, as it shines in old Cathay, succeeded those of Great Britain, France, Russia, the United States, and Japan. The impelling cause of Germany's action, so calamitous to China, was these two following facts:—(a) Two Catholic missionaries of German nationality, and connected with a new diocese in western Shantung under a German bishop, were killed by a Chinese mob near the close of 1897. A fitting penalty, in line with the long-established policy of Force, was demanded. Reparation had in fact been made prior to the ingenious proposal—no part of the reparation—that Germany have a port of her own. This policy, along with the circumstances that gave rise to it, I criticized then, and criticize still more strongly today. (b) Still more important was the fact that Russia had already begun the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, and was advancing to a position of dominating influence, if not territorial acquisition, at Port Arthur, at the harbour of Dalny, and in Liaotung, which only two years before had been retroceded by Japan to China. Russia was also reported as having been assured by China of a concession in Shantung of Kiaochow Bay and harbour. Moreover, a memorial had been presented to Lord Salisbury in 1896, by one who had investigated the region, that the British Government take steps to get control of this undeveloped port.[1]

Amid such a clash of powerful rivals, China preferred

[1] I saw the memorial while living in Peking at the time.

Germany to both Russia and Great Britain, who already had won a dominating influence. By admitting Germany, a check could be placed on Russia and Britain, just as Russia, France and Germany had been a check to Japan. It had always been the diplomacy of Li Hung-chang (and successful it had proved to be) to play one nation against another. This meant equilibrium for China, and national security.

The German Government, conscious that German interests were deprived of the special advantages which Britain, France, Russia and even Japan had acquired, negotiated with the Chinese Government for the leasehold of Kiaochow. This included the harbour and hamlet of Tsingtao, as yet undeveloped. The treaty was signed March 6, 1898. The lease was made out for ninety-nine years.

March 27, following the example of Germany, a Convention was signed by China and Russia, leasing Port Arthur and Talien-wan (Dairen) to Russia for a term of twenty-five years. Russia thus secured the strongest fortification on the China coast. She acquired that which was objected to in the case of Japan three years before, but it is well to remember that Japan's stipulation was for permanent cession, while that of Russia was for a lease during a short period of years.

April 3, Great Britain insisted on a Convention with China, and, July 1, signed the Convention, leasing Weihaiwei in the province of Shantung to Great Britain "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia." This port, together with the island of Liukungtao, was opposite to Port Arthur, on the other side of the Gulf of Pehchihli, and opposite to Tsingtao, on the other side of the Shantung peninsula. Next to Port Arthur it was China's most important naval base and land fortress.

France, too, had her demands. May 27, France and China signed a Convention leasing to France a harbour on

the southern coast of Canton province (Kuang-tung), known as Kuang-chow-wan, for a period of ninety-nine years.

It is interesting here to note that in this same year, 1898, though after the forced lease of territory to the four European Powers, there came, under the leadership of Emperor Kuang-hsü, the hundred days of reform, succeeded by the *coup d'état* of the Empress Dowager and her reactionary measures. Yuan Shih-kai, back from Korea, was conspicuous in bringing on the coup. This was an internal blow at China's well-being.

(4) Another intrusion on China's sovereign position was the adoption of the policy of spheres of interest, sometimes called spheres of influence. The latter is more a political term, leading gradually to China's dismemberment. Concerning a sphere of interest, T. W. Overlach says:

> Its essential element is a negative one: namely, the term expresses the principle that no other power except the one in whose favour the "sphere of interest" exists shall be permitted to acquire concessions or to exert any control or influence whatsoever—not to speak about military occupation—at the same time giving the privileged power a monopoly of the right to seek concessions.[1]

The root of this dubious policy was in the special demands made by France, after the hostilities of 1883 and 1884, with reference to Chinese provinces bordering on Annam. The southwestern province of Yunnan was especially affected. After the China-Japan war, the French extended their sphere to the provinces of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, where was located the leased territory of Kwang-Chou-wan. Great Britain, however, managed to secure counter concessions both in Kuang-tung and Yunnan, as a check on

[1] "Foreign Financial Control in China," p. v.

France. Most important of all, as a counterbalance to the French Indo-China empire, Great Britain, July 24, 1886, arranged with China that Burma should pass from the suzerainty of China to the complete control of Great Britain.

Recognition of the Russian sphere of interest in the three provinces of Manchuria, leading up to the acquired lease of the Liaotung peninsula in 1898, succeeded that of France in the southern provinces, and was also contrary to the original desires of the British Government as represented by Lord Salisbury. Russia's insistence on her right to make her own arrangement with the Chinese Government led finally to Britain's acquiescence.

Germany's sphere of interest was a part of the momentous transactions pertaining to Kiaochow in 1898. Lord Salisbury did not like the trend of events, but in true diplomatic style yielded to Germany's wishes to avoid all danger of a clash. H. B. Morse says:

> England had no desire to see the "break-up" of China, of which these successive cessions (of 1898) seemed to be the beginning; and, acting on her unvarying policy in China, her one wish was to maintain the equality of opportunity which had existed up to that time.[1]

Japan also had her sphere of interest in Fukien province, as a natural corollary of the cession in 1895 of the island of Formosa.

Great Britain, in this nice political game of tit for tat, brought forward the claim, to which she has held to the present time, that the whole Yang-tsze valley, even including the western province of Szechuan, must be the British sphere of interest. The British Government, however, has

[1] "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. III, p. 113.

found it no easy task to exclude other nationals from acts of exploitation in the Yang-tsze basin.

As between Britain and Russia, an arrangement was reached in April, 1899, that Britishers were not to seek railway or mining concessions north of the Great Wall, and Russians were not to seek similar concessions in the Yang-tsze valley.

As between Britain and France, each has had the habit of intruding on the "preserve" of the other, France generally making use of Belgium to soothe British susceptibilities.

As between Britain and Japan, the former has never wounded the Japanese sense of honour as related to prior position in Fukien, though reciprocity has been made impossible through Japanese ambitions along the Yang-tsze river.

As between Britain and Germany, the lease of Weihaiwei to Britain was viewed by Germany as an infringement of the German "preserve." Friction, however, was avoided by Britain disclaiming any desire to obstruct. Notice the official statement:

> The British Government, in view of the approaching occupation of Weihaiwei, has spontaneously intimated to the German Government that it has not the intention of injuring or calling into question German rights or interests in the province of Shantung, or of creating any difficulties for the German Government in that province.[1]

(5) A final circumstance in the international relationship of China was the battle for commercial concessions. All nations took part in the scramble. Americans, disapproving of the other forms of encroachment, appeared as active concessionaires, acquiring the concession for railway

[1] Rockhill, "Treaties with China," p. 180.

between Hankow and Canton. The Russians were pushing the great Chinese Eastern Railway system, crossing Manchuria from the Amur to Port Arthur. The French began to build a line through Tongking into Yunnan. The Germans were building the first line in the sacred province of the Sages, across Shantung from Tsingtao to Tsinan-fu, the provincial capital.

The British had rather the preponderance of first claim in mines and railways. The Peking Syndicate acquired control of the vast coal area in the northern provinces of Shanse and Honan, and as to railways J. O. P. Bland writes:

> In 1898, with the acute development of the "spheres of influence" *régime* and the assertion by Great Britain of special rights in the Yangtsze Valley, five exclusively British railway concessions in that region were extracted from China under severe diplomatic pressure by the British Minister.[1]

These five phases of outside intrusion into Chinese life, and often of unjust encroachment and inconsiderate interference, helped to bring on the Boxer uprising of 1899 and 1900.

This uprising, resulting in the siege of the Legations, was disastrous to China. The Protocol, signed by all, and forced on the Chinese, was from first to last punitive. In the midst of much that was harsh, inconsiderate, and, as seen today, unfair, there were two favourable circumstances, one the preservation of Chinese autonomy through adherence to the equitable policy of spheres of interest, linked with the Hay policy of the open door in matters of ordinary trade, missions and residence, and the other the preservation of the Manchu monarchy with protection accorded to the old Empress Dowager, who was in many respects the most guilty person in the whole anti-foreign uprising.

[1] "Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 270.

When, ten years after the China-Japan war, the war arose in 1904 between Japan and Russia, Japan had her second great opportunity to establish herself in China, not so much on an equality with Western nations as in a position *ahead* of them.

This war had also certain effects on Chinese political life:—(1) In waging the war the Chinese Government was induced to give up its neutrality by granting a war zone in Manchuria for both belligerents. As for Russia and Japan, they both infringed on China's neutral territory.

(2) Russian rights and privileges in southern Manchuria, including the retroceded Liaotung peninsula, were ceded by the Portsmouth treaty to Japan. This established Japanese influence not only in the south, in Fukien, but in the north, in Manchuria.

(3) The arrangements made were first between Russia and Japan and then between them and China. A clause was introduced into the Sino-Japanese Convention, giving Japan an exclusive position in southern Manchuria.

(4) Japan more than ever acquired a position in Korea to the exclusion of both China and Russia.

(5) Japan, by her military operations, greatly enhanced her prestige among the nations of the world.

Following close upon Japan's gain, if not complete victory, in the war with Russia, came the gradual absorption of Korea. In the Portsmouth treaty of 1905 the independence of Korea is not mentioned, but it states that Japan "possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical interests." By 1906 Japan had a Resident-General in Seoul, in the person of Count Ito. Then followed complete control of Korea's affairs, in the name of a protectorate, and finally, in a very diplomatic way, the absorption of Korea into Japan's national life in 1910. This, along with the rights acquired from Russia in Manchuria, gave a preponderance to Japan in affairs of the Far East. It

remained for Japan to make her power a menace or a help to China.

A further move on the part of Japan for establishing her leadership, and for having it recognized, was to make Conventions concerning China with Great Britain, first in 1902, then in 1905, and then in 1911; with Russia in 1907; with France in the same year; and with the United States in 1908. These conventions recognized, if they did not guarantee, "the independence and territorial integrity of China." This was much like the policy in Europe of strong Powers neutralizing smaller States. The insult to China was in the fact that outside nations proceeded, under Japan's initiative, to negotiate about China, without negotiating *with* China, or doing it at *China's* request. China was ignored in her own affairs.

These conventions also stipulated "equal opportunities for the trade and industries of all nations," a splendid theory if meant to be carried out, whether in peace or in war.

There has never been anything sentimental in the foreign policy of Japan, and her statesmen have from the first displayed a thorough appreciation of the fact that Treaties and Conventions between the great Powers may serve to conceal, but not to hinder, the processes of geographical gravitation and the ulterior purposes of statesmen.[1]

In a general way, there were two groups of concession-hunters and financial exploiters. The one group was French and Russian, with whom Belgium generally associated. The other group was British and German, with whom Americans and Japanese were more apt to join, as the stronger combination. As early as 1895 the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation made an agreement

[1] J. O. P. Bland, "Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 293.

with the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank to share all business acquired from the Chinese Government. This co-operation extended with only a slight break down to the Great War. There were exceptional acts in this general grouping, as when Belgians joined with British and Americans in concessionary schemes, or British and French formed a Company for joint exploitation.

It should not be overlooked that after the Boxer uprising, the Germans, acting on business principles, rather than under orders from German officialdom, adopted an attitude to the Chinese that was conciliatory, friendly, adaptable and co-operative. By this change Germans won great success in matters of trade in China. The terms of the agreement made with the Germans for building the railway between Tientsin and Nanking (Pukou) were more generous to the Chinese than in all previous concessions, and when the British were admitted to the arrangement for building the southern half, they had to agree to the same liberal terms. In proportion as Germans succeeded, others became jealous and plotted ruin.

The last great event prior to the World War was the first revolution which took place in 1911, bringing about the abdication of the Manchu House in 1912. In this revolution as also in the second revolution of 1913, Japan had the peculiar opportunity, if she cared to utilize it, of helping to keep China weak by keeping her in turmoil. The Japanese Government, as was natural, was more in sympathy with the Manchu monarchy, while radical Japanese were ready to give aid to the revolutionary party under Dr. Sun Yat-sen. On the other hand, when Yuan Shih-kai became President, he had but little support from any faction in Japan, owing to the old disagreements when he was Chinese-Resident in Korea, prior to the China-Japan war.

In the main, then, through the last two decades, Great

Britain's preponderating influence was passing to Japan. To both, Germany was the great competitor, and next came the United States, with Russia and France receding in matters of trade, but still busy in matters political. These rivalries with threatening collisions encircled China. J. O. P. Bland says of Japan's steady advance:

> By virtue of her geographical situation and her new military prestige, Japan could not only assert preponderant political claims at Peking, but she could hope to push her trade and industries throughout China in successful competition with the European Powers, her ally included.[1]

China's unfortunate position today, and the new crisis in her political existence, are involved in the events of previous years, wherein China was made to bend to the will of stronger Powers. China may give thanks to High Heaven, but to no one else. If she survives, it will be by a Providential interposition, and not by the favour of men.

[1] "Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 294.

CHAPTER II

GERMANY'S MENACE TO CHINA AND GERMANY'S RIGHTS

IN nothing is it more difficult to exercise discrimination of judgment, which is essential to being just, than concerning Germany's position in China. The first disclosure of German designs as a political factor, though coming after the movements of Britain, France and Russia, and even of Japan, did not increase the reputation of Germany. Other countries made inroads after waging a war; Germany threatened a war and then marched forward. The Chinese, like the rest of civilized peoples, can never forget the threat of the "mailed fist." It was a bad way to seek acquaintance.

But, to be fair, Germany's strong action in 1897 and 1898 was no worse than the encroaching policy of other Powers. The only great Power that was free from high-handedness and territorial aggrandizement was, up to that time, the United States.

Moreover, the forced lease of Chinese ports for exclusive foreign control, and the insistent demand for concessionary rights, as pursued in 1898 by Germany, Russia, Great Britain and France, were all on a par.

The one to complain or to censure was China alone, and the four great military Powers of Europe were equally at fault, if fault there was.

It is well to remember that Germany's menace to China was not during the period of a World War or since, but sixteen years before. If menace there has been in these latter years it has not been to China, but rather to the commercial ambitions of rival nations.

Even in the year 1898, when the action of Germany for gaining a foothold in China is open to condemnation, a clear-cut, discriminatory analysis is incumbent, in the interests of the law of righteousness. The treaty as to Kiaochow made between the two governments of Germany and China was not the reprehensible part of their inter-relations, was in no wise an act of duress, but where the Germans are open to censure was in the settlement previously reached for the massacre of two German missionaries. The treaty, as a matter of fact, was subsequent to the use of force and to what, after the event, may be called a harsh settlement. At that time the general feeling among foreigners in China was that Germany aided all other governments in insisting that Chinese officials give proper protection to missionaries. Riots had arisen in different parts of China, and the British, French and American Legations were wont to use pretty strong language to bring the Chinese Foreign Office to terms. Let me quote from a dispatch of Sir Claude McDonald, the British Minister, to Lord Salisbury under date of December 1, 1897, as it appears in the Parliamentary Papers:[1]

During the summer there were prevalent in this province rumours of the kidnapping of children of foreigners, which produced much excitement, and placed the missionaries in the interior in great danger. The Governor, in spite of much pressure, did nothing to suppress these rumours, and even by his attitude gave them tacit encouragement. After repeatedly calling the Yamen's attention to his conduct, I was at last obliged to desire them to warn him that if any serious incident occurred as a result of his anti-foreign spirit, he would find himself in jeopardy. This I did in a note so long ago as the 27th of July and the result was, according to a report from His Majesty's consul at Chefoo, that active measures were at length taken to check the rumours and the ferment thereupon subsided.

[1] See A. H. Snow's article in the *Nation*, September 20, 1919.

It is not possible at present to ascertain whether this agitation has indirectly led to the present outrage, but the Governor's attitude has been such as to induce full approval of the German demand for his dismissal.

Sir Claude writes thus of the dispatch of three small German cruisers to Kiaochow Bay, on the massacre of two German Catholic missionaries:

If the German occupation of Kiaochow is only used as a leverage for obtaining satisfactory reparation . . . for the murder of German missionaries, the effect on the security of our own people will be of the best.

If, on the other hand, the German object is to secure Kiaochow as a naval station under cover of their demands for reparation, it is by no means clear that their acquisition of it will prejudice our interests.

Mr. Snow, from whom I derive these valuable citations, sums up in this admirable fashion:

The terms of the reparation settlement were agreed upon about two months before the treaty was signed. The Governor was degraded. The money reparation included compensation to the relatives of the murdered priests, damages for injury to the mission buildings, and a contribution to the building of mission chapels near the scene of the murder. The reparation-money was paid to the Roman Catholic authorities. Germany obtained for itself and all foreign states an Imperial tablet condemnatory of the anti-Christian and anti-foreign proceedings. The next year the Vatican granted to Germany the ecclesiastical protectorate over Roman Catholics in Shantung; this religious sphere of influence being subtracted from that of France, which had theretofore extended over all China.

The treaty stated that the Chinese Government regarded the occasion of the amicable closing of the reparation settlement as an appropriate one for giving a concrete evidence of its grateful recognition of friendship shown to it by Germany.

As to the compacts themselves, which were diplomatically negotiated between the Chinese and German governments, they deserve careful analysis, if only that we may judge with a righteous judgment concerning the bewildering action taken at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

According to past usage, and even in the identical language of the Versailles treaty, what Germany had in Shantung was certain "rights." If she had any rights, they were granted her by China and by China alone. These rights, moreover, were determined by treaty of the two governments of China and Germany, and by the action of no other government. For others to strike a blow at this contract is an offence to China as much as to Germany. China has been wronged amid the upheaval of war just because Germany has been wronged. Righteousness has suffered even more. A contract has been ignored, a treaty has been cast aside, and that by outsiders. Rights, both of Chinese and Germans, have been trampled in the dust.

What, then, were German rights in China, particularly in Shantung? What was the compact, solemnly sealed and signed by the two governments, in March, 1898?

The contract is in two parts, the one a treaty respecting the lease of Kiaochow to Germany by the Chinese Government, and the other a treaty respecting railway and mining concessionary rights in the province of Shantung. Note the chief features.

I. The Territorial Lease

There are several features in this lease arrangement which deserve special attention.

(1) Friendly relations between China and Germany were asserted. In the preamble it is stated:

> The Imperial Chinese Government considers it advisable to give a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship shown to them by Germany.

And again:

The Imperial German and the Imperial Chinese Governments, inspired by the equal and mutual wish to strengthen the bonds of friendship which unite the two countries, etc., etc.

Article I also says:

His Majesty the Emperor of China, guided by the intention to strengthen the friendly relations between China and Germany, etc., etc.

All the treaties made by foreign nations with China, with the notable exception of the punitive Protocol of 1901, succeeding the Boxer uprising, have given profuse expressions of everlasting peace, amity and friendship. Fine phraseology and professions of kindly sentiments characterize both Occidental and Oriental diplomacy. They are generally tucked away in some preamble, which too often is sugar coating to a bitter pill. Germany, therefore, was conforming to good usage in proceeding to negotiate territorial acquisition in China.

(2) The German acquisition of Kiaochow territory of the Bay and the islands in the Bay was in the form of a lease. Article II says:

His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Germany in lease, provisionally for ninety-nine years, both sides of entrance to the Bay of Kiaochow.

The leased zone was "a zone of 50 kilometres (100 Chinese *li*) surrounding the Bay of Kiaochow at high water." Also "the whole water area of the Bay up to the highest watermark at present known," and "all islands lying seaward from Kiaochow Bay, which may be of importance for its defence."

The land zone, which was less than the zone of the Bay, was about 117 square miles, smaller than that allotted to either Russia, Great Britain, France or Japan. In the hinterland, there was a neutral zone of some 2,500 square miles. In the more limited area of the peninsula between the east shore of the Bay and the sea lay Tsingtao and the German Concession proper.

This was a new mode of getting control of another country's land and harbour. Heretofore, the aim had been to possess land and sea in perpetuity. The new aim was better, but still bad. The nearest example was the leasing of certain ports as treaty ports for the trade of all nations and placed for the most part under foreign administration.

At treaty ports, the British had what is called a Settlement of their own at Canton, Shanghai, Tientsin, and a few other places; and the French had what they called a Concession in Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow. In all these cases the land was leased by the Chinese Government. According to the new arrangement Germany was to have *exclusive* control of a port or leased territory. As to China, the original owner and the other contracting party, it is to be assumed that she was ready to make out the lease to Germany and *to no one else.*

The treaty made special reference to the reasonable desire of Germany to be treated in the same way as other nations. Thus Article II:

> With the intention of meeting the legitimate desire of his Majesty the German Emperor that Germany, like other Powers, should hold a place on the Chinese coast for the repair and equipment of her ships, for the storage of materials and provisions for the same, and for other arrangements connected therewith, etc., etc.

Seeing that France had a great colonial empire on the Pacific coast, and Great Britain had possessions all the way,

from the Atlantic through the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean to Hongkong in the Pacific, with an ever-expanding grasp of power, it does not seem so reprehensible for Germany to possess in a modified sense *one* open port, that of Tsingtao in Shantung.

(3) The evident intention of both parties to the contract was clearly that the arrangement made was between Germany and China alone. For the territory to pass to Japan or to any other country was not to be thought of. Article V says:

> Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiaochow to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiaochow and to cede to Germany a more suitable place. Germany engages at no time to sublet the territory leased from China to another Power.

It is to be supposed that if any country was to secure all the improvements *gratis,* that country was to be China, not Japan, or any group of allied nations, representing themselves to the world as international.

While the phrasing used implies that Germany would always want some place for her own special administration, it may be taken for granted that if other countries should at any time withdraw from their leased territory and give up extra-territorial jurisdiction, Germany would consent to do the same.

The use, however, of the word "provisionally" in describing the limit of the lease to ninety-nine years gives the natural implication that the occupation was thought of as permanent. It is here that Germany did a great wrong to China, but Great Britain, Russia, France and afterwards Japan have been unable to pose as innocent, while denouncing German culpability.

An English authority, writing of this form of lease, says:

We must agree with Despagnet, who, after remarking that the restoration of the territory at the specified time is very unlikely, says that these pretended leases are alienation disguised in order to spare the susceptibility of the state at whose cost they are made.[1]

Still, this possible alienation should not be stretched so far as to allow at any time transfer to a third party in violation of other stipulations to the contrary. According to the terms of the grant, the rights acquired by Germany were unassignable and non-transferable.

(4) Chinese sovereignty was to be retained in the leased territory, though administration was to pass to the Germans. Article III begins thus:

In order to avoid the possibility of conflicts, the Imperial Chinese Government will abstain from exercising rights of sovereignty in the ceded territory during the term of the lease, and leaves the exercise of the same to Germany.

Article I defines the leased zone as granted by the Chinese Emperor, and adds the clause, "while reserving to himself all rights to sovereignty."

Article III also contains a clause that is slightly equivocal. It reads:

In virtue of the rights of sovereignty over the whole of the water area of the Bay transferred to Germany.

In this phraseology it is the water area of the Bay, not the land zone, which admits of transfer of sovereignty. Even so, it is the *exercise* of sovereignty that must be meant. This was particularly necessary in regard to harbour regulations in the Bay of Kiaochow.

Of Chinese residing in the leased area Article V says:

[1] J. Westlake, "International Law," p. 136.

The Chinese population dwelling in the ceded territory shall at all time enjoy the protection of the German Government, provided that they behave in conformity with law and order.

H. B. Morse adds an important footnote:

The Chinese city of Kiaochow, situated inland from the head of the bay, within the fifty-kilometre neutral zone, remained under Chinese jurisdiction; the German port and administration centre were at Tsingtao at the mouth of the bay.[1]

T. J. Lawrence disapproves of this division of sovereign powers. He says:

In private law both lease and usufruct imply that the property continues to belong to the grantor, while the grantee has the use and beneficial enjoyment of it for the time and under the conditions fixed in the grant.[2]

Then after referring to these leased territories in China, he sums up thus:

In fact, the attempt to separate property or sovereignty on the one hand from possession on the other, by the use of phrases taken from the law of lease or usufruct, is in its very nature deceptive![2]

To show how far the Germans, in acquiring this leased area, were willing to co-operate with the Chinese, it was agreed that Tsingtao should become a free port of trade, and by subsequent agreements with Sir Robert Hart, Inspector-General of Customs, it was arranged that the Chinese customs administration should be established at

[1] "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. III, p. 109.
[2] "Principles of International Law," pp. 176, 177.

Tsingtao itself, and not on the boundary of the Chinese-administered territory. "The free depot," says Mr. Morse, "aided by the railway, prospered, but it was prosperity based on an English free-trade policy, and not on the policy adopted elsewhere in German territory."[1] This fact ought to be kept in mind, when one feels called upon to exclude Germany from all rights in Kiaochow territory as from all her colonial possessions.

(5) There was also a military character to the purposes and plans of the German leased territory. The preamble states that the chief purpose or wish of both countries was "to strengthen the bonds of friendship, which united the two countries, and to develop the economic and commercial relations between the subjects of the two States," while Article I outlines two intentions in the mind of the Chinese Emperor, the one "to strengthen the friendly relations between China and Germany," and the other "to increase the military readiness of the Chinese Empire." This particular feature of the contract has been overlooked by most war-critics. Tsingtao was never meant by either party as a menace to China (though possibly it might be construed as a menace to Japan), but as an auxiliary agency in Chinese plans for national self-defence. Hence not only German troops were to be allowed "free passage" in the leased zone, but Chinese troops were to be allowed to be stationed within that zone.

Article II refers to the new fortifications thus:

> Germany engages to construct, at a suitable moment, on the territory thus ceded, fortifications for the protection of the buildings to be constructed there and of the entrance to the harbour.

Here, very clearly, the newly-built German fortifications were for *defensive* purposes alone, not for *offensive* warfare, or as a naval base for attacking an enemy.

[1] "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. III, p. 110.

Chinese ships of war were also to be free from all restrictions, and from all dues, except those necessary in harbour arrangements.

In a word, the new port became under German direction more of a commercial town and a summer resort than a military fortification. By the expenditure of vast sums of money, provided annually by the German Imperial Government, Tsingtao became the model city of the Far East, administered largely on the single-tax theory. By the increase of trade, by the establishment of a high-grade government hospital and of technical schools under joint German and Chinese control, and by the inauguration of German missionary operations, carried on, side by side, with those of American Societies, the Chinese had reason to express a sincere admiration for the service being thus rendered by an alien government to their own country.

Let us take the opinion of S. K. Hornbeck, once a teacher in a Chinese Government College, and now professor in the University of Wisconsin. He says:

> Before long a substantial breakwater, granite docks with complete equipment and a floating dock capable of handling vessels of 16,000 tons displacement had been installed. At Tsingtao there soon appeared a modern German city, carefully planned, artistically and substantially built. Forts, shops, military departments and well-equipped barracks gave the character of a fortified base; but Kiaochow was never given the military equipment or aspects of a Port Arthur or a Vladivostok—as the comparative ease with which it was recently taken (in 1914) shows.[1]

And again:

> At Tsingtao and its environs more than 60,000 metres of excellent roads were built. Systematic afforestation was undertaken both there and in the hinterland. Schools of all sorts were estab-

[1] "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 296.

lished, including a German High School with well-equipped laboratories and library, and several faculties.[1]

Putnam Weale, writing ten years before the Great War, says:

As has already been stated, this town of Tsingtao, on which part of the Berlin millions have been spent, is excellently well laid out. The streets are broad and admirable, and provided with sidewalks of noble dimensions. Electricity lights all the town, and a complete water-supply system has been installed. There are good hotels and passable shops, a splendid parade ground and fine military roads darting everywhere into the country. Tsingtao is an unique creation in the Far East.[2]

II. The Concessionary Rights in Shantung

Perhaps the more important of the arrangements made between China and Germany in 1898 had to do with railway and mining concessions in Shantung province. They were a part of Germany's subsequent demand for a sphere of interest, to match the spheres of other countries, Great Britain, Russia, France and Japan.

(1) Germans, in this new arrangement, received sanction to build a railway from Kiaochow (or Tsingtao) to Tsinan-fu, the provincial capital, and from each of these places to the Shantung boundary.

(2) To carry on this railway construction, "a Chino-German Company shall be formed," "and in this Company both German and Chinese subjects shall be at liberty to invest money if they so choose, and appoint directors for the management of the undertaking."

Here was a project for joint co-operation and management, most commendable at that time, and capable of ultimate good to the Chinese.

[1] "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 297.
[2] "The Re-Shaping of the Far East," p. 348.

Another Article, No. III, adds: "All arrangements in connection with the works specified shall be determined by a future conference of German and Chinese representatives." The arrangement of 1898 was merely an initial move. But the general principle was a good one, that nothing should be determined except by conference with the Chinese authorities.

The same Article adds: "Profits derived from the working of these railways shall be justly divided *pro rata* between the shareholders, without regard to nationality."

(3) This railway enterprise, thus inaugurated by the Germans, was to be separate from all political designs. There might result a sphere of interest, commercial in character, but not a sphere of influence, political in character. So Article III closed with these words:

> The object of constructing these lines is solely the development of commerce. In inaugurating a railway system in Shantung Germany entertains no treacherous intention towards China, and undertakes not to unlawfully seize any land in the province.

(4) Beside the project of railway building there was another for opening mines. Article IV reads thus:

> The Chinese Government will allow German subjects to hold and develop mining property for a distance of 30 li (some 10 miles) from each side of these railways and along the whole extent of the lines.

(5) Co-operation was also to be encouraged in these mining operations, thus: "Chinese capital may be invested in these operations." And again: "All profits derived shall be fairly divided between Chinese and German shareholders."

(6) The improvement of commerce and of friendly re-

lations between the two countries is stated as the sole object in mind.

(7) Then comes in a far-reaching stipulation, establishing once for all a German sphere of interest, such as other countries were allowed to have, thus:

> The Chinese Government binds itself in all cases where foreign assistance, in persons, capital or material, may be needed for any purpose whatever within the province of Shantung, to offer the said work or supplying of materials, in the first instance, to German manufacturers and merchants engaged in undertakings of the kind in question. In case German manufacturers and merchants are not inclined to undertake the performance of such works or the furnishing of materials, China shall be at liberty to act as she pleases.

(8) The concession for the railway was actually made out in June, 1899, and granted to a syndicate, to be called Shantung Railway Company (Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft), with a capital of 54,000,000 marks, by the German Imperial Government, which in turn had secured the concessionary rights the previous year through treaty from the Chinese Imperial Government.

This participation in railway schemes in China by the German Government is similar to the way any American syndicate, seeking for exploitation in China, must receive a charter from some State Legislature.

(9) According to this new arrangement between the German Government and the newly-formed syndicate, it is specially stipulated that "German material shall be used, as far as possible, in the construction of the railways."

In 1900, the noted Boxer year, while Yuan Shih-kai was Governor of the province of Shantung, a new agreement was made between him, as representing the Chinese Government, and the German Company. The authority for policing and protecting was taken out of the hands of the

Germans and placed exclusively in the hands of the Chinese provincial authorities. China bound the Germans not to utilize their railway rights in Shantung as Russians were using theirs in Manchuria, and as Japan afterwards used hers in the same region. Article 16 reads thus:

Should it ever happen that it becomes necessary for soldiers to protect the railway outside of the 100-li zone, the Governor of Shantung shall detail such soldiers, and foreign soldiers cannot be used. The Governor of Shantung having consented to use his utmost endeavours to protect the railway both in time of construction and operation, he must see to it that the railway receives no injury from bandits.

If in any way it had seemed that China's sovereignty had been infringed upon by the original concessionary rights granted to Germans, it was made clear in the new agreement that China had complete sovereignty and political control along the line of the railway, which were not claimed by Germany.

Article 17 is equally specific:

The object of constructing this line is solely the development of commerce, and it will not be permissible to transport foreign soldiers or munitions used by foreign soldiers to any place outside of the 100-li zone. If by any chance the peaceful relations existing between China and any foreign Power become broken, the railway will still remain under the management of the Company, but the Company must still observe the above rule. But if the offices are seized by an enemy, and the Company loses its control, then this province will no longer assume the responsibility of protecting the line.

The anomalous feature of the Great War was that Japan, a friend, not an enemy of China, proceeded to seize the offices of the Company and to exclude all Chinese provincial protection.

This railway from Tsingtao to Tsinan-fu, of about 250 miles in length, was completed in 1904 at a cost of 52,900,000 marks. The railway proved a paying investment, but the mines were operated at a loss to the German Company. Whatever the reason, by 1911, the Mining Area Delimitation Agreement renounced most of the mining rights granted in the Convention of 1898. In fact the German Company retained for itself only two collieries and one mine. The Japanese, however, in occupying Shantung, made no distinction between mines worked by Germans and those worked by Chinese.

After the completion of the Shantung railway there came the building, as a Chinese Government enterprise, of the grand-trunk line from Tientsin south to Pukou, opposite to Nanking, wherein the northern section to the southern border of Shantung was to be built and financed by a German Company and the southern section by a British.

Towards the end of 1913, the Chinese Government granted to Germans the further right to build two other railway lines running west and southwest to connect with railway systems already built, but on terms more favourable to the Chinese than in the original agreements of 1898-9, and like the terms governing the Tsin-Pu line.

Concerning the character of German commercial enterprise, let us quote from S. K. Hornbeck:

> At first the Germans appeared bent upon asserting themselves politically in Shantung. Practically everything in connection with the railway was kept in German hands. German guards were installed for the "protection" of the railway. A German post-office was established. Germany seemed to be following a policy similar to that which Russia had pursued in Manchuria. But at the end of 1905 they began to withdraw their troops; they handed over their post-offices to the Chinese; they made an agreement whereby the Chinese Customs administration was to function at Tsingtao much as elsewhere in China—with the special

provision that twenty per cent. of the duties collected be contributed toward the expenses of the local Tsingtao administration; and they began to employ Chinese in various capacities.[1]

In referring to the latest German concession of 1913, this writer adds:

The Germans gave evidence of having relinquished the last vestiges of an actively aggressive political policy, in favour of commercial co-operation.[2]

He sums up the situation in the following language:

Since the original seizure of Kiaochow the Germans had made no additional attempt to extend their territorial holdings or special privileges in China. They had not undertaken to extend their *administration* over Shantung—or even over the Railway Zone. The Shantung Railway Company had never attempted to assume a political status and perform political functions. The German Government had not sought to stretch the terms of the Convention of 1898. There had been no creating of issues and demanding of immediate settlement such as had characterized the progress of the Japanese in Manchuria. German subjects had not exceeded their plainly stipulated rights; they had not invaded the interior; they had not become engaged in personal and police conflicts with the Chinese. There was in the later years of German presence in Shantung little of which from the point of view of the open-door policy, complaint could be made. For ten years past the Germans had done practically nothing calculated to complicate the politics of the Far East, and, except commercially, they disturbed no peace in the Far East but the peace of mind of Japanese expansionists. Judged upon the basis of substantial accomplishment, successful and just administration and real contribution to the economic and social welfare of the people who fell within the range of their influence, none of the Powers holding

[1] "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 296.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

bases on the China coast can offer better justification for its presence than could the Germans.[1]

This was written in 1916, before the United States Government entered on war and began to put restraint on the free, full and fair expression of opinions or the statement of facts. My own observation leads me to corroborate what is here said by Professor Hornbeck. With a clearer knowledge of German use of concessionary rights acquired from China, one may the better judge of both the military and commercial ambition of rival nations to uproot German influence in China. He will be the just man who takes the facts as they are in China, however favourable to the Germans, and bases the attempt at righteous judgment on real truth, untainted by the passions of war and bloodshed.

One of the latest books on the Far East, "The New Map of Asia" by Herbert Adams Gibbons, makes this reference to Germany's inroad into China in 1898.[2]

To assert that the Germans were alone to blame or even the first to blame, as has been so frequently done during the recent war, is to deny the facts.

And again:

The Japanese have no more contempt and the Chinese no more dislike for Germans than for other Europeans. All are tarred with the same brush. All have set the same example to Japan. All have acted in the same way toward China.

In concluding this analysis it may be well to note two exaggerations—slight deviations from truth—perpetrated both on Germans and Japanese in their relation with the Chinese. The one is spoken of as "the rape of Shantung," or the robber's seizure. Today Japan is thus condemned;

[1] "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," pp. 298, 299.
[2] "The New Map of Asia," p. 390.

yesterday it was Germany. Of the two Germany is looked upon as the greater criminal. "Japan," it is said, "only took stolen goods from the robber." If German rights and the leased territory were stolen goods, then Japan should hand them back to the rightful owner. If not stolen from China in the first place, Japan had no legal right thereto, for the contract was a personal one, between China and Germany alone. In strict justice there was no robbery, or plunder, or rape, on Germany's part, but a legal transaction, a treaty agreement. Whatever measure of wrong may be detected, the same measure must be meted out to Great Britain, France and Russia, and, later on, to Japan, who acquired similar leases of harbours and territory. Moreover, if a forced lease is a theft, how much more a permanent possession, as Great Britain in Hongkong, France in Tongking, and Japan in Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores.

The second exaggeration is that the transaction of Germany leasing a Chinese port was illegal, because the treaty was made under duress. The same charge has been since made of the Sino-Japanese Conventions of 1915, one of which bears on Shantung. If all treaties are to be abrogated because of the charge of *force majeure,* where are we to stop? What treaties made with China would be left? As a matter of fact, in most cases, the duress did not come when a treaty was made, but before. Thus France secured an indemnity in 1856, after some French missionaries had been killed, and Great Britain acquired Hongkong by treaty, after the Opium War. So the German Government forced things when in 1897 two German missionaries were killed, but the treaty of 1898 was of the same character as all others made with China, or, if you please, forced on China. The treaty part of Germany's action was similar to the treaties made the same year by Great Britain, Russia and France, and was *subsequent* to the reparation act already completed.

From a moral point of view the violence done to China again and again by foreign Powers is to be reprobated, the guilt or innocence of each is to be determined relatively, and the righteous or commendable thing for all to do is for *all* to hand back to China all that they have taken from her, however acquired.

CHAPTER III

INTRUSION INTO CHINA OF THE EUROPEAN WAR: BRITAIN AND JAPAN IN THE LEAD

THE war that was raging in 1914 was not yet a World War, it was only a European war. In it, Germany and Austria-Hungary were arrayed on the one side, and Serbia, Russia, France, Great Britain and Belgium were on the other side. Hence this war had no business in Asia. Whatever the diplomacy which carried the lighted torch from the conflagration of western Europe far away into eastern Asia, it was a diplomacy deserving our severest condemnation. Who, then, was the guilty party? Shall China, in lamenting her present unfortunate situation, forget the primal source of all these woes in the political manœuverings of the year 1914, August to December, and the daring, drastic, unfeeling intrusion on China's political integrity by the two island empires, Britain and Japan?

If it is hard for an American of English and Scotch stock to speak favourably of German conduct, even as seen in distant China, it is just as hard, yea, uncongenial and almost irreverent, to acknowledge any wrong, or error of judgment, or diplomatic waywardness, in those of one's own kith or kin, our cousins across the sea, in their dealings, past or present, with the yellow and brown races of the Asiatic continent. But facts should overrule personal proclivities in matters so serious as the destiny of an ancient people. Personally I still hold in highest esteem the religious qualities, the mental alertness, the sense of fair-play and the courageous resolve to defend among men civil and religious liberty, which characterize the Anglo-Saxon race,

but I cannot close my eyes to the diplomatic blunder and illegal transaction concerning the neutral rights of China, in the closing months of 1914, which characterized the policy of the British Imperial Government and then the joint action of the Japanese Government. It was so-called "military necessity" and arbitrary behaviour, with no concern for China's rights, that went marching on through the Shantung peninsula, under the two flags of Japan and England, the mightiest of the East and the West.

What I here relate as to the actual facts that bear so heavily on China's destiny comes from intimate knowledge and close observation of the varied factors. To criticize Japan is expedient and sane; to say aught of England is both perilous and imprudent. What, however, are the facts?

Two questions must be answered: first, Should the European War have been brought into China at all? and, second, Who was responsible for bringing the war into China, Japan alone, or Japan and Great Britain together? Following this, a little study will be worth while as to how Japan waged the war in violation of international law, and how afterwards she seized all German concessionary rights in Shantung, in further violation of international law.

I. *Why bring the war into Eastern Asia and on to Chinese soil?* If the war had been limited at the outset to the four great belligerents of continental Europe, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and France, not only would there have been a straight, fair fight, but also no occasion for projecting war into the continents of the Americas, of Africa and of Asia. But when England took part on the one side, the whole British Empire was involved, and that meant commotion in all the continents and on all the seas.

Before the first declaration of war, Sir Edward Grey had exerted himself, not only to avoid war, but to keep it circumscribed to the narrowest limits, if war should actually

arise. He wrote of "the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localized"; he dreaded "the possibility of a European conflagration." How much more a conflagration spreading, as on the wings of the wind, to the populous regions of eastern Asia. Surely the act of wisdom was to put forth effort to keep Asia quiet, not to stir up turmoil.

As to whether China should be embroiled, she was the nation most concerned, and her wishes should have been first considered. In accordance with usage, the Chinese Government promptly issued a proclamation of neutrality. Efforts were also made to secure the co-operation of all foreign residents in China for making easy the Chinese task of preserving neutrality. I did my part at the request of President Yuan Shih-kai. China also sought the governmental action of Japan and of the United States, two neutral nations to be deeply affected. Formal request was made of Japan to join in measures for defending the neutrality of the Far East and for mutual well-being along lines of peace. Japan was a neighbour, and might have given China's request a first place in her diplomatic action. Japan as showing her trend abstained from declaring neutrality, as China had done. Moreover, she had begun to mobilize her forces. Japanese papers stated it thus: "The war in Europe gives wings to the Tiger" (Japan).

The Chinese Government, realizing possible danger of conflict on the territories leased to Great Britain, France and Germany, as also to Japan, proposed a plan for neutralization, thus making these territories as neutral as all territory under Chinese control, or as the larger treaty-ports under foreign control.

No obstruction came to the proposition from Germany. She was as anxious to keep the war away from Tsingtao as China was to keep it away from the whole of the China coast. The German Minister, finding that Japan was delaying to give consent to the plan of neutralization, went

so far as to negotiate with the Chinese Government for transfer to China of complete authority over the German-leased area of Kiaochow. This re-cession to China was even brought to the attention of the American Government by the Chinese Government. Events were sweeping on with electric speed, and this plan, like the other, failed of consummation. Japan's speed was too great for the rest of the world.

Should these negotiations come to naught, it was the wish of China, that if war by any means should approach the China coast, it should continue to avoid the treaty-ports, such as Shanghai, Tientsin, or Canton, and also Chinese-administered territory; it must rigidly be restricted to the limited areas held under lease by the nations at war. Even this yielding on China's part ought never to have been necessary. Certainly no more was to be expected.

The places likely to be affected under these contingencies were the British leasehold of Kowloon (opposite to Hongkong), her leasehold of Weihaiwei on the north coast of the Shantung peninsula, and the German leasehold of Kiaochow, with fortifications at Tsingtao, on the south coast of the Shantung peninsula.

Much, therefore, depended on the respective purposes of mind of the two antagonists, England and Germany, or, more properly, of the British and German governments. Much also depended on the tendency of the Japanese Government towards war or towards peace, towards helping China and Yuan Shih-kai to remain neutral, or towards embroiling China in the many complications incident to war at one's own door. As for Japan, jealous of Yuan Shih-kai since the early antagonisms over Korean affairs, and averse to China's experiment in a democratic government, she was more likely to make it hard for China than easy. When China formally requested that Japan use her influence to render China immune from warlike activities, the reply

was that the time was not ripe to consider the proposal and that Japanese action awaited the war measures of Great Britain.

As for Great Britain and Germany, everything depended on the war schemes of the home governments and on the larger issues of military strategy. In a word, China's fate rested not with the thoughts of peoples but with imperialistic governments, engaged in the great but perilous game of war. The entrance of Japan into the war was not popular with the Japanese people; and as for the majority of British residents in China, there was sympathy felt for China and dread of coming trouble, if Japan should enter the fray. It was not until the British Government took action, that the British resident in the Far East began to discipline himself into enjoying the prospect of Japan as an Ally waging war on Chinese soil.

As for the German Government, it sent on August 12 (1914) the following telegram to its ambassador in Tokio:

> East Asiatic squadron instructed to avoid hostile acts against England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese Government.[1]

The Japanese Government gave no reply, as it had given no favourable response to the proposals of China.

The German Government, while anxious that Tsingtao should not be attacked, did the fair thing by making no attack or threat of attack, on either British or French leased territories or on their colonial possessions. Russian Vladivostok also remained immune.

But what was the cry from Japan and accepted as truth the world round? Namely this: "Tsingtao is a naval base." But what were the facts? This: the German Pacific squadron, having left the China and Japan seas in

[1] German White Book, Appendix 40.

the summer months, sailed towards the southern Pacific waters, not back to the China coast; all that remained behind in Tsingtao was what an Englishman has described as "only obsolete craft." Only one ship, the *Embden,* came into Tsingtao harbour with dispatches from Admiral von Spee, of the German Pacific Squadron, but by August 4, along with four colliers, "apparently proceeded to cruise in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok, where she captured a Russian auxiliary cruiser and one or two merchant ships, before going south to make history in the Bay of Bengal."[1] This author outlines five possible objects which the German Admiral may have had in mind in this peculiar naval strategy. Among these there is no mention of any purpose to wage war in either the China or Japan Sea. He concludes that the object "likely to yield a richer harvest" than any other scheme was "to harass our trade with South America." For Britain or even Japan to make the attack in that part of the broad Pacific was legitimate. In equal proportion it was both wrong and needless to make attack on the China coast.

Another Englishman, W. L. Wyllie, writes:[2] "The German squadron was in the Carolines at the opening of war," and "curiously enough, made no attempt to return to their base at Tsingtao." "During August and the first half of September, Count Von Spee's ships steamed about in the South Pacific." October 30, the squadron was about fifty miles west of Valparaiso. November 1st there came the battle with Admiral Craddock's ships, the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth,* in which the latter were sunk, the British defenders dying an heroic death. December 8th, there occurred the second naval battle, off the Falkland Islands, in which Admiral Sturdee's squadron was victorious, and

[1] Commander Spencer-Cooper, "Battle of the Falkland Islands," p. 11.

[2] "Sea Fights of the Great War," pp. 83, 84.

the German ships were sunk, the German defenders dying an heroic death. Thus before 1914 had come to an end, the assumed threat of Tsingtao as a naval base had vanished.

The German purpose, different from the English, was to restrict the war to Europe. If any fighting should take place, far away from the centre of military action, let it be on the high seas and not in a neutral country like China. A battle between British and German fleets on any ocean would have been legitimate, bringing no harm to others. For either fleet to take possession of the island colonies of the other country was also a fair game in war. But there was dynamite in the proposal that an attack be made on Tsingtao, still remaining under Chinese sovereignty, and situated on the China coast.

To infringe on the neutral rights of Belgium may have been construed by the German Staff as a "military necessity," but for Germany or Great Britain or any one else there was no "military necessity" to thrust the European War into the Far East, on to Chinese soil, for attack on either British Weihaiwei or German Tsingtao. For a few thousand isolated Germans, 4,500 in all, to be subjugated by any kind of enemy force, whatever the flag, could have no bearing on the ultimate issue of the war, either for or against Germany. "Foreign leased territories in China," says Thomas F. Millard, "were only pawns in the war, and could have been eliminated without affecting in the slightest degree the essential strategical zones of operations."[1]

If the combined naval forces of Russia, France and Great Britain, Germany's immediate antagonists, were insufficient to vanquish Tsingtao, it would have been better if they had preserved the peace of the Far East by keeping war nearer home and by using peaceful means in relation to the Far East. Being unnecessary, uncalled-for, a mere incident in a mighty struggle, such belligerent activities

[1] "Our Eastern Question," p. 89.

should have been discountenanced, all the more that China's national entity and well-being might be impaired or imperilled. This was the view I took at the time, thinking of China's interests. What has happened since has confirmed me in this view. To bring the war from Europe to Asia has been a calamity to China, though so worked as to be a gain to Japan. Marquis Okuma was no doubt right in thinking that the new circumstances afforded Japan "the one opportunity of 10,000 years." As for China, they brought the one catastrophe of 10,000 years. As between Great Britain and Germany, the blow which Germany received in the loss of Tsingtao and the glory which Great Britain received have been too insignificant to deserve a passing thought. Britons there are who now see that the elimination of Germany and the expansion of Japan is no more good to them than to China.

II. We now come to another question, one more of fact than of opinion: *Which country brought the war into China,* Japan alone or Japan in conjunction with Great Britain?

Most writers and speakers have been accustomed to refer to Japan as the guilty interloper. Few Americans or Britishers, especially those living in the Far East, have so much regard and admiration for Japan as to exonerate her through a division of culpability. An easier way of rendering judgment is to assume one's own innocence and cast all blame on one individual or on one nation. So far as this is done, Japan is unfairly treated, and the cause of justice dishonored.

Putnam Weale[1] states the matter thus, in one of his books:

> Japan, after some rapid negotiations with her British Ally, had filed an ultimatum on Germany.

[1] "Fight for the Republic of China," pp. 71, 84.

Again, more explicitly:

There was also the feeling abroad [in Japan] that England by calling upon her Ally to carry out the essential provisions of her Alliance had shown that she had the better part of a bargain, and that she was exploiting an old advantage in a way which could not fail to react adversely on Japan's future world's relationships.

Dr. Arthur J. Brown,[1] relying for information on many sources, sums up thus:

Great Britain early gave Japan a fine opportunity in connection with the German fortified post at Tsingtao in the province of Shantung, China, which had been made one of the most formidable fortifications in the world. Of course the British could not afford to leave the Germans in possession of a naval base from which the immense commerce of the Allies in the Far East could be successfully raided and, as the British had their hands full in Europe, it was natural that they should expect their more conveniently situated ally, Japan, to attend to this matter for them.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, one of many unholy alliances, was at the bottom of the unfriendly intrusion. But in Dr. Brown's statement two slight errors are found. One, the formidability of the fortification is stated with exaggeration; and the other, Tsingtao was not used as naval base for raiding purposes, as is made clear above. The main idea that Britain was the agent to present Japan with a new opportunity of achievement is correct. How great was the opportunity was probably not realized by the overburdened British Government. Britons might have hesitated to call in such an ally, had they known where such opportunity might lead.

Thomas F. Millard, who is known to be anti-Japan more than anti-England, in two books, "Our Eastern Question,"

[1] "The Mastery of the Far East," p. 416.

published in 1916, and "Democracy and the Eastern Question," published in 1919, holds to the view that "Japan herself took the initiative contrary to the real desire of her ally, and by force of circumstances compelled Great Britain to acquiesce with, and officially to sanction, this diplomatic fiction." He also says the belief held in America, that "Japan entered the war because she was required to do so by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," is not a "correct" one. There seems to be circumstantial evidence to uphold this view. But official utterances speak otherwise. Too much sympathy for Germany existed among educated men in Japan, and particularly in the Army, to lead the Japanese Government to make the first move towards expanding the area of war or towards antagonizing Germany.

Major T. E. Compton, an English officer, writing in November, 1918, says:

> Whatever preoccupations the appearance of the Teuton in China may have caused her, Japan, after her recovery of Port Arthur in 1905, had no quarrel with Germany, from which country her schools of medicine and science and, above all, her army had obtained great benefits.

The fact which induced Japan to enter the war was the opportunity for territorial expansion.

On the other hand, when Great Britain once entered the war, it became her policy to call in the resources of all her possessions for both offensive and defensive war. As Great Britain was in the Far East, war, *ipso facto,* came there also. She seemed ready to go to the ends of the earth and there capture German possessions, both great and small. From London the lines went out to all the world.

At the very time Japan entered the war, a correspondent in the London *Times* (Aug. 24) urged British merchants "to take advantage of every opportunity which may present itself for diverting German commerce to our advan-

tage." If Japan had an ulterior end in projecting the war into China, the British had the same, except that perhaps the Japanese end was political and the British commercial. Subsequent events make clear the motive of both.

Now as to the origin of the war in the Far East, Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time in Marquis Okuma's cabinet, said, in a speech in the Diet on September 4:

> Early in August the British Government asked the Imperial Government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Then, after recounting the terms of this Alliance, he continued:

> Therefore, inasmuch as we were asked by our Ally for assistance . . . we could not but comply to the request to do our part.

And again:

> The Japanese Government therefore resolved to comply with the British request, and if necessary to open hostilities against Germany.

A statement previously issued by the Japanese authorities for publication in the press used these words: "The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in communication with each other, etc., etc."

The British Government has never denied the statement of fact, or charge, if you so desire to call it, that the British Government asked for the assistance of Japan. The actual documents of the negotiations have not been made public, but the results are so obvious that they reveal the "inner consciousness" of the two governments. In a true technical sense, Japan was the only *Ally* which Great Britain had.

The relations of Great Britain to France and Russia were only of an *entente cordiale.*

The London *Times* on August 18, some two weeks before Baron Kato made his speech in Tokio, used these words:

> It should be said at once that the Japanese intervention has not taken place without full consultation with Great Britain.

Later on, under date of September 25th, the London *Times* used stronger language:

> We appealed to our Ally in the terms of the Treaty, and she has answered that appeal with the loyalty we have learned to expect of her. . . . Japan had no desire to intervene in the war. She has done so, the Emperor and his Ministers tell us, because she could not break her promises.

According to Jefferson Jones[1] (a *nom de plume*), who was familiar with the facts as they took place in Tokio, the Japanese Government on August 2d expressed to the British a willingness to put in force the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and by August 7 the British Ambassador in Tokio "handed to the Foreign Office at Tokio a request that Japan join in the European war."

The American diplomat, W. W. Rockhill, in an address which he delivered in New York, November 12, the last speech before his death, gave utterance to this careful statement:

> The action of Japan was taken after consultation with the ally, Great Britain, and, inferentially, with the approval of France and Russia.

Mr. K. K. Kawakami,[2] who is in a position to know, describes how the war plan of Japan was set in motion by the

[1] "The Fall of Tsingtau," pp. 18, 20.

[2] "Japan and the European War," in *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1914.

British Government, even prior to Britain's declaration of war against Germany. These are his words:

The assertion that Japan thrust herself upon the war without England's invitation is as sinister as it is unwarranted. Japan did not join hands with England without England's request. When it became evident that England must come to the rescue of France and Belgium, the press of Japan, without exception, hoped that Japan would not be called upon to aid her western ally. But the western ally did call upon Japan.

On August 3, that is, the day before England declared war on Germany, the British Ambassador to Japan hurried back to Tokio from his summer villa and immediately requested an interview with Baron Kato, Foreign Minister. At this conference the British Ambassador informed Baron Kato that his government was compelled to open hostilities against Germany and that it desired to ascertain whether Japan would aid England in the event of British interests in the Far East being jeopardized by German activities.

Baron Kato answered that the question put to him was such a serious one that he could not answer it on his own account.

On the evening of the same day Count Okuma convened a meeting of all the Cabinet members. Bearing the resolution of this meeting, Baron Kato, on August 4, called upon the British Ambassador and told the latter that Japan would not shirk the responsibilities which the alliance with England put upon her shoulders.

At this time Japan did not expect to be called upon to aid England for at least a few months. But on August 7 the British Ambassador suddenly asked for an interview with Baron Kato and told the Foreign Minister that the situation had developed in such a manner as to oblige England to ask for Japan's assistance without delay. On the evening of that day Premier Okuma requested the "Elder Statesmen" and his colleagues to assemble at his mansion. The conference lasted until two o'clock the next morning. Before it adjourned the policy of Japan was definitely formulated.

What caused Downing Street to invite Japan's co-operation so

soon is not clearly known to the outside world. But the Japanese press is in all probability right when it says that Japan and England were obliged to act promptly in order to frustrate the German scheme to transfer Kiaochow to the Chinese Government before Germany was compelled to surrender it at the point of the sword. Had Germany succeeded in carrying out this scheme she would still have enjoyed, in virtue of Article Five of the Kiaochow Convention of 1898, the privilege of securing in some future time "a more suitable territory" in China. This was exactly the condition which the Allies did not want to see established in China. If, on the other hand, Germany were forced to abandon Kiaochow by the arbitrament of the sword, China would no longer be under obligation to "cede to Germany a more suitable place."

These words show plainly that the war measures to be carried out in China originated with the British Government. It is also disclosed that Japan and the European Allies at the early days of the war had formed the great plan to forestall Germany in her desire to ever have in China a port of her own, as others had. Already the great purpose was made clear that Germany must not only be destroyed militarily, but eliminated, even from China.

It may be taken for granted that the British Government —not the British people, or the British resident in China— while approving and even desiring the military assistance of Japan in the initial stages, was not bound to approve of all that Japan did, to the very end of the war. But an alliance is oftentimes a burden to either ally as well as a prolific source of evil to others. Hence, if we desire to overlook the personal factor, we may lay the blame for these unfortunate transactions in China to so impersonal a factor as the *Anglo-Japanese Alliance,* just as we may blame the horrors and evils of the whole war, not on Germany or Russia or Britain, but on *war* or "special alliances."

The ultimatum which was sent to the German Imperial

Government August 15 was not sent by Great Britain, a belligerent, but by Japan, officially still a neutral, but of course an ally of a belligerent. The document was diplomatically perfect. Japan bound herself by no unnecessary limitations and proclaimed the most laudable of motives. Notice the phraseology:

1. "To take measures to remove the causes of all disturbances of the peace of the Far East."

2. "To secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia."

3. "To safeguard the general interests as contemplated by the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain."

One not trained in the school of militarism or even in the school of diplomacy might suppose that the best measure for effecting peace would be a peaceful, rather than a warlike measure, and for removing any cause of disturbance all that might be needed would be to avoid creating a disturbance through one's own actions. For such peaceful designs, Japan could have solicited the aid of so great a neutral as the United States, and especially of China, the country most affected. By mentioning "the Far East," and "Eastern Asia" Japan was given a wide sweep of activity, but the main concern was the little spot on the Shantung peninsula known as Tsingtao. As stated above, this spot could have been neutralized or re-ceded to China. As it was, there was no disturbing element, for the German squadron had left not only Tsingtao but "Eastern Asia," and the military operations of the Germans were for defensive purposes alone in the eventuality of attack by some outside enemy. It was the entrance of Japan into war, on Chinese soil and in Chinese waters, not the presence of a few Germans in Tsingtao, that brought about "disturbances of the peace of the Far East," which have not yet ended with the signing of the Versailles treaty of peace. Peace in all China was

upset by Japan's "measures" of war. The only "general interests" safeguarded were those of Japan. Not only did Germany lose the "equal opportunities of all," but Great Britain, viewed relatively, lost much at the hands of this her Ally. As for the "interests" of China they have been totally neglected.

The ultimatum made to Germany had two demands:

First—To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

Second—To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Japanese, surely, are humourists, without the appearance of humour. This might be called comedy, were it not for the tragic events which followed.

An ultimatum, presented at so early a date to a Teuton, was the surest way to bring about armed resistance. If the real desire of the Japanese, and with them of the British, was preservation of peace, they could have tried *negotiation,* not an ultimatum; and negotiation would have fared better if left in Chinese hands, with Japanese rendering hearty approbation. If the object was to bring about hostilities, rather than to "remove the causes of all disturbances," Japan, seconded by Great Britain, adopted the wisest course.

Left in Chinese hands, the first element presented in the ultimatum could have been quickly satisfied. The German men-of-war had already left the confines of "Chinese and Japanese waters," and the only way for Japanese men-of-war to find them was to hurry after them in mid-Pacific and take up a few German islands on the way. The other

"armed vessels" left at Tsingtao might have been interned at the request of China to Germany.

Left also in Chinese hands, the second element of the ultimatum could easily have been complied with, except that the restoration of Kiaochow to China would have been immediate and not "eventual."

Again we say, how much better it would have been for China, for the peace of Eastern Asia, for the prevalence of right, free from all sorts of complications and hindrances, if Great Britain and Japan had jointly planned to put out, rather than to kindle, the fires of both war and revolution.

It may be here noted that the promise of "eventual restoration" of Kiaochow to China was made to Germany alone, and also on condition of immediate surrender of the same to Japan. The words used freed Japan from obligation to make transfer to China, if the territory should be acquired in some other way than by compliance with an ultimatum.

It has been reported that prior to the ultimatum, in consultation with the Foreign Office in London, consent was given to this proposal of Japan, if she "confine her war operations to the China Sea," and "eventually turn over Kiaochow to China."[1] It is also stated that the day before the ultimatum expired, the Japanese Minister in Peking "tried to reassure China by stating verbally" that if "Japan was compelled to occupy Kiaochow, that territory would be returned to China after the war."[2]

This matter of "eventual restoration" to China has conflicting interpretation from Japanese statesmen. While Premier Okuma, August 20, declared that Japan "harbours no design for territorial aggrandizement and entertains no desire to promote any other selfish end," and, August 24, telegraphed the New York *Independent* that Japan had "no

[1] Jefferson Jones, "The Fate of Tsingtau," pp. 23, 24.
[2] Thomas F. Millard, "Our Eastern Question," p. 90.

desire to secure more territory" (making no mention of Tsingtao), Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in the Diet, early in December, that "Japan had never committed herself to any foreign Power" "in the matter of final disposition of Kiaochow."[1] It is clear now, that it would have been easier for China to get back Kiaochow with no conditions fixed thereto, if this roundabout and warlike method of Japan had been discarded. Intervention has seldom proved a blessing to China, in her long experiences with outside nations.

About the time the ultimatum was made known, the Press Bureau in England gave out this announcement:

> It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific Ocean, beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory, except territory in German occupation on the continent of Eastern Asia.[2]

How far the Japanese conformed to this understanding as to operations on the high seas, need not here be considered. There was really more reason for the two Allies to unite in capturing enemy-ships or enemy-colonies, than for them to attack the territory of China temporarily leased to Germany. The latter operations brought more harm to neutral rights and to the law of nations than the former could possibly have done.

The fall of Tsingtao, as compared with battles in other areas of the war, needs only brief notice. What happened by way of supplement—the victory of Japanese diplomatic finesse—will require years of investigation by students of history, political science, and ethics, the world over.

When the time-limit of Japan's ultimatum to Germany

[1] Thomas F. Millard, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," p. 82.
[2] London *Times*, August 18, 1914.

expired, August 23, the Japanese were fully prepared to win a victory, even if the 4,500 Germans should be exterminated in an awful holocaust, as seemed likely under reported orders from the German Kaiser "to defend the place to the last man."

The great Japanese navy had its ships, both large and small, arranged in a semi-circle outside the Bay of Kiaochow. The Japanese army, under command of Lieut.-General Kamio, had three divisions aboard transports, ready to land with great guns, smaller arms, and ammunition, with a fully equipped commissariat and hospital service. Later on the Japanese were aided by some 1,200 men under command of Major-General Barnardiston, who came from the British garrison at Tientsin. The fortifications on the hills, Iltis, Bismarck, and Moltke, to the rear of Tsingtao city, were got ready for the siege. The supply of guns and ammunition was only enough for a short siege. The main thing the Germans had to rely upon was their courage. They were practically isolated from the leaders of the campaign in Europe. Tsingtao might have held out against an Anglo-Franco-Russo combination, but not against the army and navy of Japan, conducting the assault as they did.

III. We here approach the third question of our present discussion, as to how Japan, with at least no objection by the British, *violated the neutral rights of China,* as guaranteed by the law of nations, in making attack on Tsingtao.

Japanese transports by September 2 entered the port of Lungkow, on the northern coast of the peninsula, west of the treaty-port of Chefoo and the British-leased territory of Weihaiwei. Lungkow was not a treaty-port, open to trade, neither was it leased to any foreign government. It was purely a "native" port, for the exclusive use of the Chinese. It was a thoroughly *neutral* port, into which

belligerents had less right of entrance than even into the treaty-ports.

The Japanese transports proceeded to land their soldiers, guns and military outfit for transport across the neutral Shantung peninsula, 150 miles, to attack Tsingtao from the land side—and to do other things which they could do only as contrary to the law of nations.

Bodies of Japanese troops, says Thomas F. Millard,[1] made detours, occupying important cities and towns in the province wide of a direct line of march. Wherever they went, the Japanese assumed control of the country, means of communication, posts and telegraphs; and subjected the Chinese population to many hardships, deprivations and indignities, which were observed and reported by American and British missionaries in that region.

Supposing that the Japanese navy, attacking from the sea, was unable to overthrow a small body of Germans, the Japanese army, helped by the navy, ought to have been able to accomplish it, making the attack within the area leased to Germany, or within the much larger "neutral zone," so-called, stretching 37 miles from the shores of the wide Bay of Kiaochow. There was no necessity to wage war outside these limits, on the neutral soil of China.

The British overlooked Japanese wrongdoing in that no protest was made, suitable to an old Ally, but at the same time they appeared well to the world and magnified their friendship for China, by landing their own little military force within the narrow limits of the German protectorate. They came in late, towards the end of September, but, as the London *Times* said, "the distance which separated Laoshan Bay from Tsingtao was so much shorter, and presented so much less of difficulty than the Japanese had to encounter in their preliminary advances, that the British

[1] "Our Eastern Question," p. 107.

really arrived on the scene just as the Japanese were finishing their first engagement in force."

The London *Times,* while exalting the sagacity of Great Britain in landing her force inside the German-leased territory, comments: "thus avoiding the breach of neutrality alleged by the Chinese against the Japanese." This word, "alleged," is more a slap at Chinese stupidity than a rebuke to Japanese illegality. But we must remember that Eastern Asia is not Central Europe. Good and evil, for four years and more, have been divided according to lines of longitude and latitude.

The Chinese Government, being unable to resist the encroachments of Japan, took a different position to that of Belgium when she refused to allow German troops to be transported across Belgian territory. China accepted the advice of Dr. Ariga, Japanese advisor to President Yuan Shih-kai, and proposed a war zone, favourable to Japan's plans, but unfavourable to the German defence of Tsingtao. Japan evaded and then rejected the proposal. The following, however, is the Note presented by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Foreign Legations on September 4:

The Government of China declared its neutrality toward the present European war and is faithfully maintaining it. According to reports from the Chinese local authorities in the province of Shantung, the Germans have commenced war operations at Kiaochow Bay and their sphere of influence there, and the allied forces of Japan and Britain have also started war operations at Lungkow, Kiaochow, Laichow, and in their neighbouring districts. Germany, Japan and England are all in friendly relations with China, and it is to be regretted that unfortunately these Powers have taken such unexpected courses in China's territory; therefore the Chinese Government has decided to propose special limitations as regards the extent of the present war operations as China limited the scope of war operations at Liaotung peninsula at the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Chinese

Government will not accept responsibility for the passing of troops or any war operations at Lungkow, Laichow, Kiaochow, and their adjacent districts, but in the other districts in China the Government will strictly enforce neutrality as declared.[1]

After many obstructions from the "elements," but not from the Chinese or Germans, the Japanese at last, on September 11th, came in contact with a German detachment—of 10 men. From that time on, to the end of October, there were many skirmishes, forcing back the German defenders to the limits of their forts. From the middle of September, Tsingtao was in a state of siege, the only communication with the outside world being by wireless. The white peoples of the United Kingdom, of the French Republic, and of the Holy Russian Empire, mostly Christians, were beginning to exult that at last their brothers of the same race and religion, friends in the social and business life of the Far East, were to be caught like "rats in a trap." The Japanese maintained self-restraint. They were embarked on a bigger expedition than the pigmy game of personal hate. The whole spectacle left a peculiar impress on the Chinese mind. Here for the first time white men fought white men, and called for the help of their little yellow brothers, on the soil of China's millions.

Real fighting began October 31, anniversary of the accession to the throne of the Mikado. Guns of all sizes, from the Japanese and British land forces, and from their cruisers outside the harbour, as well as from the German forts, began to fire back and forth, making the sound as it echoed and re-echoed among the Shantung hills fiercer and more overwhelming to the imagination than was the deadly reality. The Japanese had maps of the whole country, around and inside the besieged town. By use of telephone from land to sea, the gunners learned the exact spot where

[1] Jefferson Jones, "The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 46.

the shells fell. By day or by night the investing forces closed in upon the Germans. One redoubt after another was taken. One battery after another was silenced. By November 6, "twenty-five yards from the front wall that skirted the Tsingtau fortresses for three miles from the Bay of Kiaochow on the right, to the Yellow Sea on the left, was entrenched the front line of the Japanese and British expeditionary forces. Behind this line of underground fighters was another line, a third, and then the large, massive twenty-eight-centimetre siege guns of the Japanese."[1] They had 142 guns on the firing line.

In the final rush up the sides of Iltis Fort there were "17,000 men against 3,800." The Germans, who had held on bravely and untiringly, had fired their last shells; their ammunition was exhausted. The Kaiser had sent word that they might surrender, and so at 7.05 on the morning of November 7, the white flag was hoisted at the residence of Governor-General Meyer-Waldeck, and 3,800 Germans became prisoners of war in Japan. The bushido spirit had won; Great Britain stood by and watched the growing power of Japan.

Of the siege, Mr. Jefferson Jones writes:

> From an Oriental standpoint the siege of Tsingtau will always stand out as remarkably free from hatred. During the operations, Japanese officers sent many messages into the Tsingtau garrison, wishing their German friends and former tutors luck and safety during the siege. The Japanese officers seemed always courteous. They placed courtesy foremost, instead of indulging in recrimination such as usually goes on between the German and British officers and troops. General Kamio and his officers did not desire to humiliate the defeated German officers. The messages that were interchanged during the siege and afterwards were couched in the most courteous language, nor did Governor-

[1] Jefferson Jones, "The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 87.

General Waldeck and his staff officers lose their swords after the final surrender.[1]

What concerns the moralist is the astounding fact that in attacking German Tsingtao, the British condoned the Japanese infringement of the Hague Convention in insisting on transport of troops and arms across the neutral soil of the Shantung peninsula.

Though the Chinese had been advised by the Japanese advisor to give a form of legality to Japan's war operations by establishing a war zone, it was only a matter of a few days when Japanese soldiers were marched outside the prescribed area, and infringed again on the Hague Convention by marching 250 miles along the Shantung Railway to Tsinan-fu, the provincial capital. Japan not once but twice reduced the Hague Convention to a "scrap of paper," and Britain, though an Ally, entered no protest and passed no criticism.[2]

No sooner had the Japanese force succeeded in marching through quagmires from Lungkow to the rear of the German defences, near the middle of September, than a detachment was sent westward to Weihsien, an important centre on the Shantung Railway. "All of northern China rose in revolt against the Japanese action. The Japanese troops took command of the Shantung Railroad, shooting down native employees who seemingly rebelled at the invasion. The troops pushed on to Tsinan-fu, leaving small garrisons in every Chinese town to keep 'Japan's peace,' and in a few days western Shantung was practically in the control of Japan."[3]

The Japanese did it all in quick time, the only ones to obstruct their march being Chinese. And one might ask the

[1] "The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 118.
[2] See Appendix I.
[3] Jefferson Jones, "The Fall of Tsingtau," p. 48.

question: Ought the Chinese to be treated as an 'enemy,' while trying to remain neutral? From the standpoint of law and equity, which nation in the Far East went more astray, Germany or Britain and Japan? And did China suffer, and continue to suffer, for her own misdeeds, or for the misdeeds of outsiders?

By October 3, and before the forts of Tsingtao were silenced, a Japanese military force took over the whole of the Shantung Railway, outside of German-leased territory, or the war zone granted by China. Besides planning the conquest of the German-leased territory of Kiaochow, Japan had a deep-laid plan, to make conquest of all German rights in Shantung, in the form of railway and mining concessions granted in treaty by the Chinese Government. All this was within the bounds of China. The Japanese seemingly did not surmise that it would ever occur to diplomatic minds to discountenance and repudiate the right of conquest; so they went boldly forward, fully confident that Might in the end would win the day.

When the Japanese entered Tsinan-fu, capital of Shantung province, they proceeded to occupy it with a military guard. They also planned the bigger scheme to occupy the German-built railway from Tsinan-fu to Tientsin, but now the British, having schemes of their own, strongly objected. Japan was thus left to Shantung as a sphere of conquest, illegal but none the less actual, and afterwards to be condoned by statesmen believing in self-determination.[1]

Where before, in the laws governing the waging of war, as to the obligations of belligerents and the rights of neutrals, has it been taught that one nation in war with another nation can go into a third and neutral nation and forcibly

[1] Prof. John Dewey in "The New Republic," March 3, 1920, writes: "Japanese troops overran the province before they made any serious attempt to capture Tsingtao. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that they took the 'Chinese' Tsinan before they took the German Tsingtao."

take possession of all enemy property? If this be new international law, suggested by Japan and adopted by Europe and America, then investments in a foreign land become a risky venture. Should Japan some time be at war with the United States, then Japanese soldiers may seize in China some Standard Oil concession or some of the railway concessions granted to American bankers. With equal right in the late war, British marines might have landed in New York, when America was neutral, and have taken over all German Companies from New York to Philadelphia.

Thomas F. Millard touches on the same proposition:

> Japan's seizure of the entire Tsinan-Tsingtau Railway was not a necessary military measure, as was pretended, but was a *political* move. The seeming acquiescence of Great Britain with that move gives it additional importance. Does Great Britain regard the Canton-Kowloon Railway (extending from British-leased territory opposite Hongkong) as also constituting, in Japan's phraseology, "an indivisible part" of Great Britain's Kowloon leasehold? These considerations make this question very significant to China; and also significant to all foreign investments existing in China now, and those which may hope to get a legitimate foothold in China hereafter.[1]

What concerned China was her responsibility in permitting or in forbidding any attempt of a belligerent to infringe on her sovereignty or neutrality. Strong states not only forbid, but actually take steps to resist, all violation of their rights. "If a state has neutrality laws, it is under obligation to enforce these laws." So, on the other hand, if a neutral not only permits, but condones any violation of her neutrality, she ceases to be neutral, and becomes a belligerent. "A neutral state," says Hall in his "International Law," "which overlooks such violations of its neutrality as it can rightly be expected to prevent, or which neglects to

[1] "Our Eastern Question," p. 113.

demand reparation in the appropriate cases, becomes itself an active offender." Considering all the circumstances, however, China's failure to resist must be judged with a degree of palliation and not with condemnation. If any nation might have complained of China's remissness, it was Germany, and not Great Britain or Japan.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN'S INROADS IN CHINA

THE starting-point in the weakening of China by outside attack was in 1914, when Britain and Japan spurned the wishes of China and brought the firebrand of war all the way from Europe to the shores of Shantung, where Confucius and Mencius had instilled wise teachings as to human relationship. In fact, the diplomatic move and the military hard-heartedness was contrary both to Confucianism and to Christianity. The year 1914 was thus a bad year for China, as for European civilization.

But the year 1915 was even worse for China. This was the year when Japan made gigantic strides in the military domination of her nearest neighbour, and threatened as never before attempted by any Power, East or West, the very existence of the Chinese state. This was the period of the "Twenty-one Demands." The manœuverings thereon were so intricate, that without a special effort an unjust judgment will be rendered and misrepresentation will gain currency. Out of a natural indignation at Japan's high-handedness there is danger of going too far in condemning Japan. At least it is incumbent, as in other judgments, to distinguish the policy of the Japanese Government and that of the mass of the Japanese people.

We must tread warily, if we are to avoid a stumble, either in holding to principles or in passing judgment on both Chinese and Japanese.

In 1914 a little band of Germans had been overpowered by the Japanese army and navy, aided by a small British force. It remained for Japan alone in 1915 to overpower

China by skill of diplomacy, by force of arms, or by a threat and an ultimatum. China, being weak militarily as compared with Japan, had been forced to yield, as had the few Germans stranded on the shores of Shantung. The German surrender was no disgrace. The Chinese surrender was humiliating. Japan won by Might, not by Right. She did as all belligerents were doing—sought victory, and then the spoils of war, by superior military strength. The only difference was that Japan's chance came early. The chances for her Allies came late, after over four years of slaughter, anguish and struggle. Japan, arriving early on the field of glory, had no need to wait for a Peace Conference; she pre-empted the ground, forestalled events, outran all runners, by reaching a settlement with China—a victorious belligerent dictating to a neutral about a vanquished belligerent. Japan trusted to *fait accompli*. "Possession is nine-tenths of the law." Militarism was plainly in evidence on the hills around Tsingtao. It was not in evidence in negotiations of the Japanese and Chinese Governments, but, none the less, it backed up the negotiations, it commandeered success, it was the power behind the throne.

The face of a Japanese diplomat is impassive, but his diplomacy is very active. As was once said of the Russians, so it may be said of the Japanese: "They can wait a hundred years." At the end of 1914, the Japanese saw no need to wait longer; their day had come; they had the chance to carry out great plans, far-reaching plans, not merely to take the place of Germans in a part of China, but to become the great predominating power in all China. Japan's ambition was the hegemony of the Far East, and then in due time to have it recognized—signed and sealed—by all the great Powers.

November 16, 1914, 3,800 Germans surrendered to Japan. January 18, 1915, only two months later, the

Japanese Minister in Peking, Mr. Hioki, made a presentation to President Yuan Shih-kai of an official document commonly spoken of as the Twenty-one Demands. The character of each point in the document and the way it was presented seemed almost a duplicate of demands once made on the Emperor of Korea prior to the absorption of that country by Japan. It was a startling venture in the realm of territorial expansion. As Putnam Weale says, it was "a list designed to satisfy every present and future need of Japanese policy and to reduce China to a state of vassalage."[1]

Properly any such official document should have been presented, if presented at all, to the diplomatic department of the Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was an impropriety, and almost an insult, for the Japanese Minister to ask for an audience with the President of the Chinese Republic, and then to go beyond ceremonial usages and hand to him such a menacing and dictatorial document.

The Japanese, never having any great liking for Yuan Shih-kai, were no doubt delighted to have the chance to present him as President—"the strong man of China"—an offensive document whose demands he was powerless to resist.

Moreover, the Japanese Minister insisted on complete secrecy. Any disclosure would prove disastrous to China as a nation and to Yuan Shih-kai personally.

From the beginning of the war to the present nothing stands out in Japanese politics more deserving of severest condemnation than the presentation and attempt at execution of these Twenty-one Demands. As they gradually became known, the British and French, as well as Americans and Chinese, joined in one great uproar of denunciation. The British were beginning to doubt their wisdom in inviting Japan to eliminate "the German menace";

[1] "Fight for the Republic in China," p. 87.

they already saw a Japanese menace, and did not hesitate to warn against it.

The Twenty-one Demands as actually made known to the President of China were in five groups. The first, quite logically, bore on the confirmation of Japan's possession of German rights in Shantung. The second enlarged and prolonged the Japanese hold on rights acquired in Southern Manchuria in the war with Russia ten years before, and linked on with this certain demands concerning Inner Eastern Mongolia. The third related to increased control in the Hanyehping Company, China's greatest industrial enterprise, and in the development of mines, in the geographical centre of China Proper, thus projecting into the British sphere of interest. The fourth, a very brief one, but apparently magnanimous on Japan's part, was the obligation resting on China to lease no more harbours or islands on the China coast to a third Power. The fifth group, most vital of all, related to railway concessions in the Yangtsze Valley, to Japan's priority in Fukien province, recognized for some time as Japanese sphere of interest, and, more than all, to an astounding influence and authority on the part of Japan in the internal and political affairs of all China, deeply affecting China's sovereignty for all future time.

Looking backward, it is clear that Group I, which bore upon cession to Japan of all German rights in Shantung, to be agreed to by China, automatically arose from Japan's method of attacking Tsingtao, and this in turn arose from the appeal to Japan by the British Government to enter the war against Germany in the Far East. Nothing more needed negotiation.

Looking forward, the Demands made as to the province of Shantung afforded Japan the rare opportunity, not to be neglected, of fixing once for all Japan's predominance not only in Shantung, but in Southern Manchuria, in Inner

Mongolia, in the province of Fukien, in the British sphere of interest, and, in a political way, in the whole of China.

The Japanese Government, trusting that secrecy could be kept—"clothed in impenetrable mystery," as Putnam Weale writes—assured foreign governments, who pressed for information, that there "had never been twenty-one demands, as the Chinese alleged, but only fourteen, the seven items of Group V being desiderata which it was in the interests of China to endorse but which Japan had no intention of forcing upon her."[1]

Dr. Sidney L. Gulick says: "I have it on pretty high authority that Group V was put up for purposes of trading. Japan arranged that Yuan Shih-kai could say to China that he had forced Japan to back down on the most important demands and thus 'save his face' for having yielded the rest."[2]

This mode of reasoning rests on a foundation of moving sand. If the mention of Group V was a bargaining process, why insist at the end that the points were to be deferred for future consultation? And why in 1918 was the attempt again made to carry them out through a number of secret agreements with the militaristic faction controlling the Peking Government?

The full text of the Demands was not revealed by Japan to the Governments of Japan's Allies or the United States till rumours had become so loud, as well as manifold, that all denial was threatening to the moral standing of Japan. It was a month before even the limited, and less objectionable, list was made known officially, while the complete list was delayed still longer, until in fact the Twenty-one Demands were modified in a revised list, presented to China, April 26 (1915). In all probability the revision of the original list was due as much to foreign

[1] Putnam Weale, "The Fight for the Republic in China," p. 100.
[2] Arthur J. Brown, "The Mastery of the Far East," p. 425.

criticism and world-wide outcry as to the argumentative powers of the Chinese Foreign Office and President Yuan Shih-kai.

The reader should bear in mind that after many conferences concerning the original Twenty-one Demands Japan presented, April 26, a revised list, less drastic than the previous one, of twenty-four Articles, but arranged in three Groups instead of five; that, on May 1, the Chinese Foreign Office presented to the Japanese Minister a memorandum discussing the general matters at issue, and enclosing China's proposed list of thirteen Articles in three Groups; that, on May 7, Japan presented an ultimatum, demanding acceptance of Japan's revised list and calling for a favourable reply within 48 hours, or "the Imperial Government will take steps they may deem necessary"; that, on May 9, China complied, presenting, however, an able "Official Statement" in defence of China's position, and that, on May 25, treaties were made, or exchange of notes passed, between Mr. Hioki, the Japanese representative, and Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, the Chinese representative, settling once for all, as it was supposed, the right of Japan to dictate in Chinese affairs, and the duty of China to comply on pain of war and complete subjugation.

Thus Japan handed out an ultimatum first to Germany, a belligerent, and then to China, a neutral and neighbour. All along China has been treated less as a neutral or even as an ally or associate than as an enemy. "Japan," says Thomas F. Millard, "employed bludgeoning tactics all through the negotiations. She reinforced her military forces in Shantung and Manchuria and made strategical dispositions unmistakably directed against China." All this gave force and significance to the ultimatum. Had it not been that the "strong man," Yuan Shih-kai, was President, the forces of internal revolt or the forces of external war could never have been held in check. There was *force*

majeure, plenty of it, in negotiation and in the settlement, as in many a treaty before, but through kind words from Britons and Americans the hope sprang in the Chinese breast that in some way and at some time High Heaven would rescue China from the grip of an outside nation. "Yuan chose the wiser cause," says Mr. Millard, with whom all familiar with the circumstances must agree. "He conceded what he must, and saved such exceptions as he could, hoping that China's case would get a hearing before civilization later."[1]

Thus in 1915 Japan acquired certain rights in China by means of a treaty with China; legality enshrouded militarism; China had consented. To understand just how much Japan gained, and how much China was forced to lose, these investigations may be made along two lines, one the *direct* result of the war as seen in acquisition of previous German rights in Shantung, and the other the *indirect* result as seen in acquisition of rights in other sections of China, along with the promise of more blessings still in store.

I. Japan's *direct* gain through rights in Shantung.

(1) The new Chino-Japanese Treaty, Article 1, reads:

> The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany by virtue of treaties or otherwise possesses in relation to the province of Shantung.

The significance of this agreement as bearing on the wisdom of China's own entrance into the war has been generally overlooked. All the rights which China originally ceded by treaty to Germany in 1898 are to be disposed of by mutual consultation of Germany and Japan. And

[1] "Our Eastern Question," p. 154.

China is to agree to it. Was it wise for China later on to antagonize either Germany or Japan by going to war with the one and by conflicting with the other at the Peace Conference in Paris? Would it not have been wiser to keep on friendly terms with both than to rely on the assuring phraseology of America, Britain and France, that China would be befriended, if she entered the war, and would be allowed a seat, however lowly, at the Peace Table?

In conversations which I personally had with the German Minister, Admiral von Hintze, before either China or the United States declared war, I know that Germany was ready to urge on Japan the presence of a Chinese representative at the proposed conference of Germany and Japan. In the Official Statement presented by China, May 7, 1915, it is said:

> The suggestion relating to participation in conference between Japan and Germany was made in view of the fact that Shantung, the object of future negotiations between Japan and Germany, is a Chinese province, and therefore China is the Power most concerned in the future of that territory.

It certainly seemed very probable that more advantage would have accrued to China by following such a line of action than by the policy she was led to pursue from 1917 until the signing of the Versailles Treaty, June 28, 1919—an occasion on which China, alas, was forbidden even to "sign with reservations."

(2) The disposition of the German-leased territory of Kiaochow was settled by exchange of notes. This territory is to be "left to the free disposal of Japan," thus recognizing, as the Versailles Treaty has also recognized, Japan's supremacy over both Germany and China in reference to this territory. However, Japan by her sovereign grace "will restore the said leased territory to China."

Free salvation again, but—but—"under the following conditions." And what are they? Four in all, but two are noteworthy:

"A Concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government";

"If the Foreign Powers desire it, an International Concession may be established."

What is left as a residuum is to go to China, but under the stipulation that Tsingtao "be opened as a Commercial Port," as it had been in fact by agreement with Germany.

This arrangement would make the once free-port of Tsingtao under German jurisdiction a second Shanghai, in which there exists a French Concession, an International Settlement, and the Chinese native city and suburbs.

Showing the pressure that Japan constantly brought on China by dangling the promise of the restoration of Kiaochow, it is stated that when Japan presented the revised Demands, April 26, "the Japanese Minister stated that the Japanese Government would restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China at an opportune time in the future and under proper conditions"; and then it is added—"if the Chinese Government would agree to the new list of Twenty-four Demands without modification." A pretty big *if*, a preliminary ultimatum.

Was it at all likely that China by being embroiled in the war would be able to alter the Chino-Japanese agreement of 1915? The restoration of Kiaochow, if it ever takes place, is to be on the conditions defined in 1915 and by Japan's "free disposal." Japan, to strengthen her position from 1915 to 1919, purchased much land in the desirable portion of Tsingtao and around, to be set apart as a Japanese Concession. Whether an International Settlement is formed or not, Japan has acquired through a grow-

ing population at Tsingtao and through delay a predominant influence in all administration.

(3) Another Article reads:

> The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinan-fu Railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

The Versailles Treaty of Peace has not improved on this arrangement. "China herself" is to build the railway, according to the terms agreed upon by China and Japan. If she has money of her own, as she ought to have under proper management, there will be no necessity for Japanese or German financing. What others object to is that they do not have an equal chance.

(4) One more stipulation is the following:

> Within the province of Shantung or along its coast no territory or island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any pretext.

It is generally supposed that this stipulation was meant to check the designs of Germany, to whom according to the Treaty of 1898 was to be given by China "a more suitable place," "should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiaochow Bay to China."

It is to be acknowledged that the principle here laid down is a good one, and that Japan deserves credit for bringing it forward—namely, that the habit of seizing Chinese ports and territory comes to an end, May, 1915. Japan, too, according to this, is never to occupy territory, at least in the province of Shantung.

Thus, in the above four stipulations, what Japan had gained by right of conquest in 1914, in Shantung, she has

confirmed by treaty in 1915, except that a few points were to be amicably settled through negotiation after the termination of war. The Treaty of Versailles was no better, for it, too, gave its sanction to the principle of conquest, without the definite agreement of future negotiation.

The Chinese in the negotiations preceding the ultimatum of May 7 did not specially complain of what Japan insisted on concerning Shantung. In fact in China's Memorandum of May 1st, it is stated:

> As regards matters relating to Shantung, the Chinese Government has agreed to a majority of the demands.

Thus so far as Shantung is concerned, it is hard to understand why more stress was laid at the Peace Conference on Shantung affairs than on other matters to which China strongly objected in the 1915 negotiations. If China expected to have altered or abrogated the agreements of 1915, she should have placed on record her protest and not declared that she "agreed." Still less could China complain at the Paris Peace Conference that the Treaty of 1915, so far as Shantung was concerned, was made under duress. Duress was applied to other matters.

There were, however, two particulars in the Shantung settlement of 1915 which China brought forward and which Japan as a good neighbour might have agreed to. One, as given out in China's "Official Statement," reads:

> Another supplementary proposal suggesting the assumption by Japan of responsibility for indemnification of the losses arising out of the military operations by Japan in and about the leased territory of Kiaochow was necessitated by the fact that China was neutral *vis-à-vis* the war between Japan and Germany.

This was simple justice. As Germany is called on to indemnify the losses in Belgium, much more should Japan

indemnify the losses of China. Why so clear a duty slipped from notice at the Peace Conference at Paris can only be explained by the skilful manœuvering of the Japanese delegates.

Another reasonable request reads:

> That the military railway, the telegraph lines, etc., which were installed by Japan to facilitate her military operations should be removed forthwith; that the Japanese troops now stationed outside of the leased territory should be first withdrawn, and those within the territory should be recalled at the time when Kiaochow is returned to China.

Knowing of the inroads made by Japan in Manchuria after the war with Russia through a military railway and refusal to withdraw troops and police, it was China's duty to avert such evils in Shantung. Japan's persistent refusal to comply with such a reasonable request can only increase Chinese suspicion of Japanese designs.

The Agreements of 1915 were thus bad, not so much in what they affirmed as in what they omitted to affirm.

The peril to China was also not so much in the actual specifications of the Treaty bearing on Shantung as in the substitution of Japan for Germany, thus excluding a strong balancing power and transferring it all to the increased predominance of Japan. S. K. Hornbeck has written:

> With the Manchurian railways penetrating the heart of Manchuria and the Shantung Railway extending to the heart of Shantung—and with the right to extend the latter line to join the Peking-Hankow line—Japan is in a position, should she so choose, at any moment to grind Peking between the millstones of her military machine. So far as strategy is concerned, Japan has North China commercially, militarily and politically at her mercy.[1]

[1] "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 346.

II. Japan's *indirect* gains in other parts of China.

(1) Japan's demands in Manchuria are agreed to in the following particulars:

(*a*) The lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (or Dairen) is extended to 99 years.

(*b*) "The terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway" also extend to 99 years. The Chinese Memorandum acknowledges that it must "abandon its own cherished hopes to regain control of these places and properties at the expiration of their respective original terms of lease."

(*c*) "Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises." They also "shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever." Thus, merchants, manufacturers and farmers, if they are Japanese, may live anywhere in South Manchuria, as in China's treaty-ports.

(*d*) "In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its permission." Such co-operation is unobjectionable.

(*e*) Japanese subjects "shall also submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation of China." The treaty on this point is a slight improvement on the revised list of the Japanese, in that the latter stipulated that the laws and ordinances must be "approved by the Japanese Consul," while the former adds merely that "the Chinese authorities will notify the Japanese Consul."

(*f*) A rule is laid down, to which no exception can be made, as to Mixed Court procedure in litigation between Chinese and Japanese, similar to that at treaty-ports. Then the clause is added:

When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law courts.

This feature while not appearing in the original copy of the Demands, appears both in the revised list and in the final agreement.

(*g*) A revision is made in the terms of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement, giving Japan the concession, and to this China had already assented.

(*h*) It is agreed that in building railways "if foreign capital is required, China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first." This merely establishes South Manchuria as a Japanese sphere of interest, just as British, French and Germans had secured in other parts of China.

(*i*) New commercial ports are opened in Manchuria, wherein all foreigners may carry on trade.

(*j*) Japan is allowed certain mining areas, heretofore not worked. In this way South Manchuria more than ever becomes Japan's special and exclusive sphere of interest, similar to the position of other countries in other parts of China.

(*k*) "Hereafter, if foreign advisors or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first." This is like the original form of the Demands, except that "*may* be employed" is the improved form of the phrase, "the Japanese Government *shall* be consulted." To this the Chinese commissioner presented no objection.

(2) Japan's demands in Inner Eastern Mongolia are agreed to in only a few particulars, namely, (a) opening of commercial ports, (b) applying for loans to Japanese capitalists first, and (c) employing Japanese advisors and instructors first. These are similar to the revised list,

while the original list aimed at much more, giving to the Japanese nearly the same position in Mongolia as in Manchuria.

In reference to Japan's position in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, the Treaty says that it is concluded "with a view to developing their economic relations," while the original Demands state that "the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan." In either case China was set to lose in her sovereign position in Manchuria and Mongolia far more than in Shantung.

(3) Japan secures greater control of the Hanyehping Company, consisting of iron and coal mines and a great steel foundry. Greater co-operation of capitalists from both countries is to be allowed. "The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, to convert it into a State enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese."

The mines and works of this great industrial Company are in the very centre of China, within the British sphere of interest.

The original Demands extended Japan's influence in the Yangtsze Valley by insisting that "all mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company."

Naturally the opposition by Britons to the Twenty-one Demands was directed more to Group III, which related to this Company, than to the settlement of either the Shantung or the Manchurian and Mongolian questions. The Chinese Minister also could not agree to the insertion of the original form, as it "seriously affected the principle of equal commercial opportunity." Few foreigners or Chinese

at that time of discussion had much to say about the Japanese acquisition of German rights and concessions in Shantung, which, therefore, was not particularly a work of *force majeure.*

As Great Britain was and is a formal Ally of Japan, Japan yielded to British criticism about the Hanyehping Company, and simply omitted, but did not abandon, the objectionable part of the original Demands.

(4) Japan secures an agreement from China through exchange of notes to the effect "that the Chinese Government hereby declares that it has given no permission to foreign nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien province, dockyards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments, nor does it entertain an intention of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establishments."

This recognized Japanese priority in Fukien province, where for many years Japan had claimed a sphere of interest. The new wording gave recognition to Japan's political influence, by warning off all other foreigners.

In the original form of the Twenty-one Demands, the reference to Fukien is contained in the objectionable Group V as Article 6.

It was understood at the time that Japan desired such an agreement, out of fear that the United States was designing some scheme of intrusion into the Fukien province.

Thus Japan, in as early an hour as possible, by means of the Treaties of 1915, protected and expanded her interests not only against Germany but against Great Britain and the United States and even against China herself.

(5) China also agrees in the final arrangement to the modified form of Group IV, that she will "give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with the following

principle: 'No bay, harbour or island along the coast of China may be ceded or leased to any Power.' "

This is an expansion of a very desirable article in the Shantung arrangement. If all the countries, Japan included, would now agree to give up all harbours or territory already held on lease, China's national integrity and the peace of the Far East would be greatly solidified.

(6) In the reply of the Chinese Government, May 8, to the ultimatum of Japan, it is agreed that "five articles of Group V" are "postponed for later negotiation." These five "refer to (a) the employment of advisors, (b) the establishment of schools and hospitals, (c) the railway concessions in South China, (d) the supply of arms and ammunition and the establishment of arsenals, and (e) right of missionary propaganda." "It is this fact [of postponement] which remains the sword of Damocles hanging over China's head, and until this sword has been flung back into the waters of the Yellow Sea the Far Eastern situation will remain perilous" (Putnam Weale).

Several of the items to be postponed came up for "negotiation" and also for settlement in 1918 before the announcement of armistice. What Japan thus acquired, in Shantung, in Manchuria, in Mongolia, in the Yangtsze Valley, in Fukien, in all China (potentially), was startling.

This much can be said, however, of Japanese attitude to China that there was more readiness to negotiate than in most treaties concluded under coercion.

Moreover, while the original form of the Twenty-one Demands deserves the severest censure, the ultimate agreement is less objectionable. What China agrees to after receipt of the ultimatum is in the main what she had agreed to in conference prior to the ultimatum. The subsequent complaint, made known at the Peace Conference in Paris, that the Agreements of 1915 should be abrogated by the League of Nations because they were signed under duress,

is worthy of no consideration, in face of the far greater act of duress, with exclusion of all negotiation, as revealed in the Versailles Treaty with Germany as well as in most treaties with China. In the "Official Statement" which China made May 8, it may be seen that according to China's own acknowledgment she had consented to practically all that the ultimatum required, and that therefore coercion, if it existed at all, was insignificant:

> Of the twenty-one original demands there were six, as previously mentioned, to which China could not agree.

And these six were not included in the "Revised List," concerning which—and not the "Twenty-one Demands"—Japan had issued her ultimatum.

Still less could the Shantung settlement be made a matter of objections, except so far as it omitted certain points which China desired to have inserted.

The restoration of Kiaochow to China seems to have been the chief factor in the Chinese claim as made to the Supreme Council in Paris, but, May 7, 1915, the Japanese Government declared: "If the Chinese Government accept all the articles as demanded in the ultimatum the offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to China, made on the 26th of April, will still hold good." In fact, the Versailles Treaty accorded more to Japan, and took more away from China, than the settlement of 1915 as made between China and Japan direct.

If China has complaint to make, it should be against the *entrance of war into China* in 1914, from which has issued a variety of evils, annoyances and misfortunes.

A minor complaint might be this: why did not Japan content herself with reaching a settlement on the one question of disposal of former German rights in Shantung? Why did she compel China to drag in other matters, con-

nected perhaps with the former war with Russia, but not with the war with Germany? And why, too, did the Chinese delegates at Paris lay stress on only the matters relating to Shantung, and not to the major part of the 1915 Agreement?

S. K. Hornbeck[1] presents the reader with a philosophical conundrum:

> The ultimatum demanded little of importance to which China had not already agreed. Was it then really nothing but a stuffed club, a mere bluff, its presentation a "grand-stand play"? Was the threat of war made simply to save the face of the Chinese Government before the Chinese people, to enhance the prestige of the Japanese Government with the Japanese people, to place before the world a picture of Japan provoked by Chinese obstructionist tactics to the point of raising the sword and then, rather than break the peace, magnanimously foregoing the easy glory of an easier conquest and the full fruits of an assured and early military success? Or was Japan really asking for a little more in addition to the very much which China had already conceded, actually ready to go to war rather than be denied?

My own opinion is that Japan presented the original Twenty-one Demands with the probability of having them accepted, but when by official conference and public agitation complete acceptance seemed improbable, Japan issued an ultimatum as to what China had already agreed, knowing that refusal on China's part was unlikely, and that compliance under circumstances of an ultimatum would imply a yielding to Japan's superior Might, with a world-wide recognition of Japan's predominance.

Still, Japan has suffered through the prevalent misconception that Japan forced on China the Twenty-one Demands.

Looking at the whole transaction, illustrative of Force

[1] "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 327.

and characteristic of War, the Chinese, and the whole world, may well complain that as a result of excluding Germany from China and substituting Japan, a way is found in the garb of legality, and by the sacredness of treaties, to establish irrevocably the supremacy of Japan in all Eastern Asia.

No sooner had China and Japan come to an agreement, which was all to Japan's gain and China's loss, than the United States Government, through the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, sent an identic note to Japan and China as follows:

> In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic [of Imperial Japan] that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy.

It is evident that an official utterance of this kind would inspire in the Chinese confidence of American help, and in the Japanese resentment at American intrusion. On the one hand, the confidence of the Chinese was futile, for if the American Government, in the face of past treaties, did nothing to prevent the Japanese annexation of Korea, how could she be expected to help China in a matter so indefinite as these agreements of Japan and China, during the administration of that strong man, President Yuar Shih-kai? On the other hand, the resentment of the Japanese foreboded no good; to stir it up was an act of folly.

Unless America had something definite to complain about, rather than utter general insinuations, it would have been better to remain silent and observe the customary proprieties. Reading the words of the Note one might suppose something substantial was about to take place, when in reality there was a combination of illusion and offensiveness. The Chinese, or even the "Open Door," received no help, while the Japanese were offended. Unless the United States Government intended to rescue China from a harmful situation there was no reason for such a formal utterance.

CHAPTER V

THE INJURY TO CHINA THROUGH AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTRIGUE

VIEWING events in China in historical order, we now come to the next scene in the great drama, to the events of 1917. The narration, for an American, is most humiliating. For the first time in history, the American Government tied itself up with intrigue, chicanery, secret diplomacy and selfish agreements. Rather, it was that part of the American Government called the Executive branch, that is, the Wilson Administration. The intricacies of intrigue make it hard to separate the responsibility of one government from that of others. In bringing China into the meshes, perils and enthrallment of the World War, how far was the United States accountable, how far the Entente Allies, and how far Japan? And as to the United States, how far was President Wilson the accountable party, how far Secretary of State Lansing, and how far the American Minister at Peking, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch?

In any case, it was most disastrous to China that outside advice, appeal, threat, pressure, by means of diplomatic intrigue under the semblance of friendly solicitude, induced China to forsake the safe path of peace and neutrality and enter the whirlpool of a World War and of world chaos.

It was unfortunate for America's fair name that her agents should counsel China to forsake peace for war, democracy for autocracy, liberty for enslavement and quietness for confusion, discord and upheaval.

There were two centres of intrigue, the one in Peking under American instigation, and more and more encour-

aged by the European Allies and by Japan; the other in Tokio, where the European Allies connived with Japan in secret compact not only against Germany, but against China and the United States.

I. *First, then, the intrigue in Peking to embroil China in the Great War.*

There were three steps for China in diplomatic procedure: first, to send Germany a letter of reproof and of threat, February 9, 1917; second, to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, March 14; and, third, to declare war against Germany and Austria-Hungary (without Parliamentary action), August 14.

The war issue did not specially engross the attention of China until February 4 (1917), and then through action of the American Government and by definite request of President Wilson.

Heretofore advocates of war and of peace, except out-and-out pacifists, have generally theorized thus: Never go to war except as a last alternative. But President, Wilson announced a new dictum to all neutral nations for assuring a real world war: Whether with or without just cause, every neutral nation is advised to do what the United States does—first, be neutral; second, break off diplomatic relations with Germany; and, third, declare war on Germany. On this new theory, there will be no neutral nations, no neutral rights, and no laws on neutrality or freedom of the seas. This new doctrine, more chaotic than idealistic, was subsequently introduced into the Covenant of the League of Nations, as invented at Paris for maintaining peace and also for assuring a world war, if war is ever to come again. So far, then, President Wilson was solely responsible for getting China on the war-path.

Prior to President Wilson's innocent suggestion of February, 1917, China had managed to remain at peace, on

equally friendly terms with all nations. During the incumbency of President Yuan Shih-kai, there had been two or three slight, tentative overtures—properly mere queries—on the part of President Yuan to his old friend, Sir John Jordan, the British Minister, as to the advisability of the Chinese entering the war. There is no question as to the friendship of this Britisher for the Chinese President, or as to his sincere concern for China's development and progress. Thomas F. Millard,[1] from his varied sources of information, states that the British Minister did not look upon these suggestions with favour, probably on account of Japan's opposition, but that the French and Russian Legations gave some encouragement. However, there was no unity of purpose in Peking and Tokio among these diplomatic representatives. As to the American Minister, representing a neutral country, Mr. Millard asserts: "I am informed that the American Minister expressed his private opinion to Yuan Shih-kai that such a move probably would save China." This was some time towards the end of 1915, when the United States was not yet a belligerent. It was strange advice to come from a neutral and an advocate of universal peace.

A somewhat different account of President Yuan's attitude to the war is given by Mr. Kawakami. I quote his words:[2]

> What Yuan really had in mind in declaring himself in favour of the Entente Powers was the attainment of his ambition to become an emperor. . . . The resourceful Yuan, unwilling to give up his imperial designs, secretly conferred with England proposing that he would declare war upon Germany and drive German interests from China, if the Entente Powers would, in return, support his scheme to enthrone himself. England, eager

[1] "Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 95-100.
[2] "Japan and World Peace," p. 129.

to exterminate German influence in China, was favourably disposed towards this proposal.

This was the impression which I also received as to political manœuvres going on in Peking. I was told that when President Yuan actually launched his imperial scheme towards the end of 1915, he had a secret understanding with the British Minister that British recognition would be accorded, if the scheme was successful, and if the new Imperial Government declared war on Germany. When the scheme failed, President Yuan, as I was informed, asked Sir John Jordan to come and consult with him, but the request was not granted, and President Yuan, mortified over his failure, was taken ill and died. Needless to say, this nice little intrigue for bringing China into the war also came to naught.

Mr. Kawakami is probably correct in saying that Japan did not join England in perfecting this scheme; but I regard it that the opposition was not so much due to Japan's being "unalterably opposed to the crowning of Yuan Shih-kai," as being opposed to the man, and also to China's war purposes, unless Japan's ambitions were satisfied.

In a general way, if China's entry into the war should have effect on the spread of righteousness, truth, love and liberty throughout the world, or even on the military operations of the war in Europe as distinct from commercial rivalries and jealousies, then it was a duty of the United States to put forth every effort to persuade China to become one of the belligerents on the side of the majority, and probably also on the side of the victors. Moreover, if China could only get her wrongs righted, that is, wrongs done by Japan, through being present at the future Peace Table, and if she could be present there only by going to war with Germany, then it was wise, though not impera-

tive, to yield to outside persuasion under the leadership of the United States. Should the presence of Chinese delegates at the Peace Conference be without effect, then it would have been better for her to have remained neutral, at peace within her own borders and with all peoples.

Furthermore, if China wanted a *casus belli,* she had a better one against Japan than against Germany. The China Sea and the Japan Sea were more vital to China than the North Sea or the English Channel. To get ahead of Japan by warring on Germany: to force compensation from Japan by joining the Allies, of whom Japan was one, partook too much of the old diplomacy of intrigue and chicanery rather than the new diplomacy, widely proclaimed, of "open covenants" and straightforward dealing.

At that particular time, also, China had greater grievance against France than against Germany, owing to French high-handed occupation of Lao-shi-kai, adjoining the French Concession in Tientsin.

The President of China, successor to Yuan Shih-kai, was Li Yuan-hung. He assumed office June 6, 1916. He had been military leader of the first revolution which overthrew the Manchu Monarchy, of which Yuan Shih-kai had been the last Premier. Yuan was monarchical in his sympathies; Li was devoted to the democratic idea. Yuan left the country broken by discord and strife; Li set out to unite the country, to stop fighting and to establish a *bona fide* Republic. All factions, all sections of the country, were brought together under the centralizing, or rather harmonizing influence of President Li. Every one trusted him. He only needed a fair chance and sufficient time to show to the world that Democracy was suited to the Chinese. If the country could be kept at peace, if war could be put at arm's length, he was sure of success. His

Premier was General Tuan Chi-jui, last Secretary of State under Emperor-President Yuan, who, like President Li, was opposed to all monarchical schemes.

The Parliament, which had been dissolved by President Yuan, was re-called by the new President. This Parliament early began the discussion of a permanent Constitution, and by the spring of 1917 had almost completed its task. Clashes had arisen between the different branches of authority, but none so serious as to forebode defeat to liberal institutions or renewed strife in the land. The outlook for democracy, peace and national prosperity was bright.

Thus it was until February 4, 1917, when the American Minister in Peking, Paul S. Reinsch, made known to President Li the request of President Wilson, that China, as well as all other neutral nations, should imitate the example of the United States by severing diplomatic relations with Germany. Thus it was that the leader of neutral nations became a leader in belligerency. I had previously conveyed to President Wilson the desire of President Li to follow the lead of the United States in bringing together all neutral nations in a common effort to effect peace. Now the Chinese President was forced by another and diametrically opposite proposition, looking to active participation in war.

If this proposal or request had been communicated to China merely in the usual official way without pressure, no harm would have been done to China and no confusion would have arisen. China, in all probability, would have remained neutral and at peace. Moreover, no further advantage would have accrued to Japan at China's expense. Samuel G. Blythe, who was in Peking those critical days, has described the character of the campaign and propaganda, which was carried on with prudent secretiveness, to embroil China in war against Germany in the probable eventuality that war would arise between Germany and

the United States. He speaks of this political crusade as a "Flying Wedge."[1]

(1) First, then, the initial step of sending a threatening letter—a kind of ultimatum—to Germany. The great mass of Chinese officials, merchants, students, farmers, labourers, had no desire to take sides in the calamitous struggle going on in Europe. They resented what Japan and Great Britain had already done on Chinese soil in the years 1914 and 1915; they knew no reason why they should join such company as against Germans and Austrians. They did not wish to become entangled in affairs in Europe.

When a really friendly nation like the United States, one that had professed to follow the same path of neutrality and impartiality, came forward to counsel association in the task of upholding law and righteousness, Chinese officials who were thus approached felt bound to consider the new suggestion from a sister Republic. America had not yet declared war or joined the Allies. But never mind; diplomacy is far-reaching.

As already stated, President Wilson was solely responsible for instructing on February 4, 1917, all his agents in neutral countries to advise them to sever relations with Germany. How it was carried out in Peking was left to the responsibility of the American Minister, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, sometimes acting with, and sometimes without, the instructions of Secretary of State Lansing. To show America's abundant power and to hasten compliance on China's part, Dr. Reinsch secured an entourage of capable experts, skilled in manipulating Chinese political thought. He himself was "at the apex of the wedge," to use Mr. Blythe's phrase. Next in point of capacity was Dr. John C. Ferguson, counsellor of the Chinese Red Cross Society, and so in semi-official relations with the Chinese Govern-

[1] *Saturday Evening Post*, April 28, 1917, "The First Time in Five Thousand Years."

ment. Next came Roy S. Anderson, son of a Methodist missionary and familiar with the intricacies of Chinese officialdom. Along with these two Americans there were brought into the secret two Australians. One was Dr. George E. Morrison, a paid political advisor of President Li Yuan-hung to look after the special interests of China. The other was W. H. Donald, editor of the American magazine, the *Far Eastern Review,* and for some time Peking correspondent of the New York *Herald.* Then came another duet, "writing men," Charles Stevenson Smith, representing the Associated Press, and Samuel G. Blythe, representing the *Saturday Evening Post.* With all these were associated four young Chinese, Dr. Chen Chin-tao, a Yale graduate and then Minister of Finance; Admiral Tsai Ting-kan, also educated in America, and naval A. D. C. to the President; C. C. Wu, son of Dr. Wu Ting-fang, educated both in America and in England, and associated with his father in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Eugene Chen, an English University man, a master of style, and at the time editor of the Peking *Gazette.*

The President was first approached by Admiral Tsai and Dr. Morrison, both drawing salaries from Chinese revenues. "That genial dignitary told them he was opposed to the matter in its entirety and in all its parts." (I quote from Mr. Blythe's disclosure.)

Who next? Naturally the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, but he "was opposed." "Most of the older generals" were also opposed. "The Young China party must be appealed to." Arguments were ready to hand, forceful arguments, when only one side is heard. Here they are:

(1) "China will secure in her own right a place in the Peace Conference." This was probably the great outstanding reason for China's acceptance of the American proposal. The Chinese looked upon the coming Peace Conference as the open sesame.

(2) "It is the one great chance for Young China to sweep away this archaic, inefficient governing class and come into Young China's own." This thought, full of suggestion, captivated Young China—more than it did the old mandarins.

(3) China would be "in a position to repudiate the German and Austrian share of the Boxer indemnity." This was just what the Chinese liked: getting rid of a debt through legal processes. Of course, the possibility implied that China must declare war; nothing less could win the stakes. The mere thought of shuffling off a treaty obligation and financial indebtedness was most alluring.

These were reasons for breaking off relations or even for going to war, but at the time, considering all the complex factors, the play was to persuade China to do something less, that is, to *threaten* Germany. If possible, China was to be blindfolded, so that the future might be involved unescapably in the present.

Let me again quote from Mr. Blythe, who was on the inside of this renowned American exploit and this unfortunate Chinese venture:

> For hours and hours, day and night, Peking resounded with speeches to timid Chinese made by these urgent Americans and the two invaluable Australians, urging, forcing, begging, cajoling and showing the Chinese who were needful to toe the mark. There was no rest. There was no soft-pedal business. It was a big, hard, two-fisted campaign, and he who dallied was a dastard; and he who doubted was roundly damned!

Two other arguments began to be used: (1) that China associate herself with the United States—an informal alliance of two Republics, and (2) that China with the help of her sister Republic would then be able to checkmate the ambitious designs of Japan.

As to the former point, "a long course of argument was

necessary to make it plain that the Americans were not asking China to join the Allies, but were asking China to join America and the other neutrals, which was an entirely different matter." Mr. Millard says that "among foreigners in China, except Japanese, there was almost unanimity of opinion that China's opportunity to escape foreign domination and a further restriction of her autonomy and territory lay in getting under the wing of America." So far as the Chinese listened to any words of mine, I warned them that all this fine talk was illusive and that once started on the slippery down-hill path, it would not be long before China would, willy nilly, take orders from all the Allies, and that Japan would not be found in that dread day the smallest and most gentle.

As to the second point, the Chinese were ready enough to put a check on Japan, but they were apprehensive. And there "was more than apprehension." There was "actual fear"—"fear of what the Japanese might do." From my side (and I edited the only paper in English which supported the Chinese President in his policy of neutrality), I warned the Chinese against anything like sharp practice in resisting the Japanese. "What you do," I said again and again, "let it be done aboveboard. Don't aspire to be tricky."

Mr. Blythe again:

> There was no let-up to the campaign. Dr. Reinsch was indefatigible. He had repeated audiences with the President and with the Premier. He worked night and day, and he captained the squad that was working with him. . . .
>
> At this juncture Dr. Reinsch rose and declared himself in a vigorous and American manner. He told the Chinese exactly what was proposed to them; what the benefits to China would be. And he also told them that their attempt at a compromise would not suffice. They must go the distance or not start. Also, the Flying Wedge enunciated the same sentiments—not in the diplo-

matic language employed by Dr. Reinsch, mayhap, but in words that were to the point. No compromise! That was the watchword. All or nothing! To be sure, we didn't expect a definite break in diplomatic relations; but we demanded just that, none the less. What we wanted was an adequate declaration that would align China with the United States, and were content to leave the question of breaking off diplomatic relations to a later date. The Chinese did not know this, and they were much perturbed Chinese. They argued shrewdly that they had no grievance with Germany; that there had been no situation anterior; and that to do this thing would be like walking up and assaulting an old and unoffending friend.

Thus the American Minister in Peking and his coterie of friends were aspiring to high diplomacy of a typical kind, so familiar in past ages; they were playing politics, and the Chinese were the tools. There can be no doubt of Dr. Reinsch's friendly intentions in China's interests, but one may well doubt the wisdom or utility of his diplomatic venture.

The result was the first step, namely, a mere formal dispatch from the Chinese Foreign Office to the German Minister, protesting against Germany's method of waging war and advising in solemn terms a speedy reversal of policy. In phraseology and moral ideas China was, indeed, aligned with the United States. As to the authorship of the document, supposedly prepared by Mr. C. C. Wu, acting for his father who was laid aside by illness and was being medically treated by a German physician, Samuel G. Blythe says:

The form of the Notes was to be decided. It is not necessary to say when or where or by whom the Note to Germany and the Note to the United States, presented by China, were written. All that is necessary is to say that before these Notes were agreed upon by the Cabinet and given to the German Minister and to

the American Minister, they were entirely satisfactory both in manner and in matter to all intimately concerned.

The dispatch to the German Minister, dated February 9, five days after the receipt by the Chinese Government of the American Minister's dispatch, contains this magnificently conceived sentence:

The new measures of submarine warfare inaugurated by Germany, imperilling the lives and property of Chinese citizens to even a greater extent than the measures previously taken which have already cost China so many lives, constitute a violation of the principles of international law at present in force, and an interference with legitimate commercial intercourse between neutral states and between neutral states and belligerent powers; if we submit to this method of warfare it will be equivalent to an admission on our part that this arbitrary and unjustifiable course of action is in accordance with international law.

Beside the rebuke and protest, the Note contained this warning—it might almost be called an ultimatum—conceived by a brilliant brain:

In case, contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffectual, the Government of the Chinese Republic will be constrained, to its profound regret, to sever diplomatic relations at present existing between the two countries. It is necessary to add that the attitude of the Chinese Government has been dictated purely by the desire to further the cause of the world's peace and the maintenance of the sanctity of international law.

The Chinese were delighted with their literary effort and diplomatic ingenuity. In fact the version in English far surpassed the version in Chinese. Eugene Chen, editor of the Peking *Gazette*, exulted that the two Republics were taking together such a lofty moral position. He wrote:

The decision arrived at is in every sense a victory of the younger intellectual forces over the older mandarinate, whose traditions of *laisses faire* and spineless diplomacy have hitherto cost China so much.

Miss La Motte [1] gives expression to a somewhat prevalent view:

Again I marvelled at the lofty tone of this note, and wondered how this moral strength had been so suddenly acquired. Thought I to myself, can this be poor old browbeaten China—humbled and prostrate before the Powers of Europe, unable to protest when her territory is snatched away from her,—now suddenly giving voice to these exalted ideas? Does it not seem rather ludicrous that she should suddenly proclaim herself the upholder of international law? Like Moses of old, she is now stretching forth her arms; but who are they who uphold those arms? These solemn notes are given forth to the world, and the world is asked to believe sincerely, as China herself states, that they were "dictated purely by the desire to further the cause of the world's peace and by the maintenance of the sanctity of international law." Let us believe it, if we can.

For the moment the Chinese were captivated by an hallucination.

There are those who now blame the American Minister for giving assurance of help to the Chinese Government and which the President failed at the Peace Conference to have realized. He would, indeed, be to blame, if he was not authorized by the President. Others blamed the President for not guaranteeing to China all that she had been led to believe was to be hers. But here it is to be supposed that he authorized assurances to China. Discrimination here is most important. To be sure, the President was the one responsible for requesting China along with other neutral nations to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, as an-

[1] "Peking Dust," p. 142.

nounced in his Message to Congress, but he was not to blame for all of China's subsequent entanglements for the very reason that what he definitely authorized was the official presentation of his personal request. What occurred in Peking in the way of assurance of American help must be traced to the difficulties of executing the President's request and to the policy pursued in reference to what is called both the first and second steps of the Peking Government.

What the President has understood as to his own intentions in early 1917 has been made clear in the conversation, August 19, 1919, between the President and the Senatorial Committee of Foreign Affairs. I quote:

Senator Johnson—Did China enter the war upon our advice, the advice of the United States?

The President—I cannot tell, sir. We advised her to enter and she soon after did. Whether she had sought our advice, and whether that was the persuasive advice or not, I do not know.

As will be seen in the subsequent discussion of China's taking the third step, that of declaring war, the chief factor or "persuasive voice" was Japan, while Great Britain and France came next in point of persuasiveness, and the United States was a passive third. It was in the initial stages of persuading China to threaten and warn Germany and then to sever diplomatic relations that the American Government was the active factor and "persuasive voice." What the President recognizes to be his responsibility in those initial stages is further disclosed in this peculiar "official inquiry":

Senator Johnson—Do you recall, Mr. President, that preceding that advice we had asked China, as one of the neutral nations, to sever diplomatic relations with Germany?

Mr. President—I do not recall, Senator. I am sure Mr. Lansing can tell, though, from the records of the department.

Senator Johnson—Do you know, Mr. President, whether or not our Government stated to China that if China would enter the war we would protect her interests at the Peace Conference?

The President—We made no promises.

It is quite likely that no promise in this identical form was given. It is equally probable that the President himself was not kept posted as to the real form of assurances which lured the Chinese Government on to coming danger.

As to the arguments advanced by Americans in Peking for embroiling China in the war the Allied Ministers in Peking passed no criticism so long as the end was attained. They were conscious that the best way to get China started on the war-path was to leave the counselling to America alone, and that the two arguments of aligning China with the sister republic and of putting a check to Japan's designs were more impelling than any argument of their own.

Japan, on the other hand, was both jealous and indignant at American intrusion and at the kind of argument used. Her ingenuity was equal to the occasion. Hitherto she had opposed all plans for bringing China into the war, now she suddenly wheeled around, rushed in ahead of the American propagandists, and ever since has held the position of predominance, superior not only to American influence in China, but to that of the British and French. She was more insistent than any American or European that China must delay no longer to sever relations with Germany, not because she hated Germany, but because she could give good proof that what Americans and Europeans could not do, she was able to do.

(2) We thus come to the second step, that of severing diplomatic relations with Germany. The campaign against China for effecting this object was triangular. The Chinese who argued for action grew in numbers and were of three

groups according to the leadership to which they attached themselves. One group advanced the argument that China should align herself with the United States; this was mostly the Young China party. The second group argued that China should align herself with the Allies, meaning European Allies, as against the Central Powers and Turkey; this was under the leadership of returned students from those countries and of those who had held offices at the European capitals. The third group did not so much argue, as they secretly plotted, to bring China and Japan into closer relations under Japan's military direction; this was composed of the pro-Japan party, which grew stronger as the war continued and as China's entanglements increased.

The Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, fell under the influence of the third group and of Japan. In a conversation which I had with him at the time, he said, "We are bound to take the second step. We are helpless. We are pressed to act," meaning the pressure of Japan, which worked with no ostentation or open propaganda.

Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his young son, C. C. Wu, joined the American group; they, very reasonably, thought it best that China should have a place at the Peace Table.

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs when Japan presented the Twenty-one Demands, and once Minister to France, Mr. Liang Chi-chiao, the noted reformer and active participant in the revolution against Yuan Shih-kai's monarchical movement, and Mr. Tsai Yun-pei, noted educationist, who had just returned from a visit to Europe, were three of the strongest agents of the pro-Ally party. Really it was a pro-French party.

Tsao Yu-lin, who had been educated in Japan, and was Minister in the Chinese Government, Lu Tsung-yu, formerly Minister to Japan, and Chang Tsung-hsiang, Min-

ister to Japan during these critical times, were of the pro-Japan party.

Agitation flourished as never before. Money in abundance was forthcóming to make sure all doubtful ones. The Allied Legations of Europe, Japan and the United States, all from different angles, pressed the Chinese to make what was called a "masculine decision." President Li Yuan-hung was chief of the party of strict neutrality. He wished to see China on friendly terms with all nations. More than all, he abhorred intrigues, secrecy, trickery and bribery. His one desire was to see China a real Republic, and that he and all officials abide by the law and Constitution. At the same time he refused to force his own will on the Government. As the situation became more intense, and his own views clashed with those of the Premier and the Cabinet and the whole group of agitators, he consented to refer the matter of severance of relations with Germany to the two Houses of Parliament, and to submit his own judgment to the decision of the people's representatives.

The Lower House, March 10, voted 330 to 87 in favour of the Cabinet's recommendation. The Upper House voted the next day, 158 to 37.

By a strange coincidence the reply of the German Government to the Chinese dispatch of February 9 was made on the same day. It had no effect in altering the general result of the campaign of enlightenment. The German Minister and his staff received their passports, March 14. Many Chinese officials really regretted the departure of Admiral von Hintze, who had commended himself and his government by his geniality as well as by his thoughtfulness for China's best interests. It was not till March 25 that he and his suite left Peking, some of the Chinese having taken the unusual position that he might live on quietly at some seaside resort till the war came to an end; this, they thought, would not be far away.

(3) The third step, most serious of all, but one in which the United States was less implicated, was to get China to declare war. Here confusion, already great, became worse confounded. For five months China's turmoil increased from day to day and from one plot into another. China became a land of upheaval and strife, of the passions of war and of autocratic domination.

The Premier and his coterie argued that the third step was logical and even necessary. The President favoured a declaration of war even less than he had favoured the break in diplomatic relations. Members of Parliament, who saw that all the nice things which the Allies had suggested as quite possible, and which the Premier had represented as "assurances," were mere fancies of an excited brain, became antagonistic to the Premier and his proposals of war. The Young China party, while ready for war, all the more that the United States had declared war in April, was not so ready to allow leadership and added power to the Premier and his military associates. The war issue had brought schism between the President and the Premier, and now was bringing schism between Parliament and the Premier, between democracy and militarism. There was a growing feeling that China had done enough in connection with the European War, and that more should not be expected unless some decided advantages were to appear.

As to the change going on in the arguments used, I quote from the Washington correspondent of the New York *Tribune* for April 12, 1917:

> It is understood that the principal question confronting the Peking Government at this moment is not whether China should enter the war, as this virtually has been decided, but whether China should continue to align herself with the United States and follow this country's lead, or should join the Entente Alliance under the leadership and direction of Japan. If a decision following the latter course is made it is believed here that Japan

will obtain control of China's army and military resources, and establish a semi-protectorate over China that would make it difficult for either China or the other Powers to induce Japan to surrender after the war.

The Premier towards the end of April called a conference of all the Military Governors, who decided to follow the lead of their military chief. The military element was now in the saddle. On May 1, the Cabinet unanimously decided in favour of a declaration of war. The President, still opposed to these war schemes, consented in the constitutional way to refer the matter to Parliament. A dispatch was sent to Parliament by the President, on May 7. By May 10, Parliament met to discuss and decide. A howling mob, hired by the militarists, gathered outside Parliament building, to force compliance to the patriotic demand for war. Naturally Parliament refused to act under such methods of coercion. Moreover, all of the Cabinet Ministers except one resigned. The Military Governors supporting the Premier memorialized the President to dissolve Parliament. Being rebuffed, they retired to Tientsin. The Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, was dismissed from office by mandate of the President, and Dr. Wu Ting-fang became acting Premier. The militarists formed a "Provisional Government" of their own in Tientsin. Different provinces or their Military Governors declared independence. The cry was, "On to Peking!" The President was firm, and issued a proclamation to warn these officers of the government who were plotting revolt. General Chang Hsun, the most reactionary of all, but holding ideas of his own, was invited to mediate. He arrived in Tientsin June 7. An ultimatum from the mediator came to the President to dissolve Parliament. The mediator, moreover, had troops, as had the Premier and Military Governors. The President yielded and prepared a mandate for Dr. Wu

Ting-fang to countersign. This veteran statesman showed a lofty courage: "You may take off my head, but I will sign no such mandate." He was allowed to retire. Another man was chosen, who signed, and the mandate went forth. Parliament disappeared, and the militarists were in the saddle. In fact, *the Republic was no more;* this was the result of a crusade for war. Men who wanted war with Germany were having war with themselves. Civil strife had begun. Meanwhile, in all this confusion and lawlessness, General Chang Hsun came with his soldiers to Peking, compelled more mandates to be issued, declared the restoration of the Monarchy, and then by a quick reversal was in a few days defeated by the troops of the ex-premier, General Tuan Chi-jui.

Most of the Parliamentarians retired to Shanghai and then to Canton, where they established a "Constitutional Government." President Li Yuan-hung, chagrined at his failure, resigned, and the Vice-President, General Feng Kuo-chang, came to Peking as acting President. General Tuan Chi-jui, who had once more shown his loyalty to the Republic, again became Premier, but without sanction of a Parliament. The militarists were in complete possession. The war issue could again come to the front with chance of favourable consideration.

So long as the act of inducing China to enter the war was looked upon as a great achievement for a worthy cause, credit was given to Dr. Reinsch; but no sooner did the act begin to appear unwise than America's responsibility began to be denied. Thus W. Reginald Wheeler[1] writes, in a foot-note however:

> The personal influence of the American Minister and his associates at Peking, throughout all the negotiations leading up finally to a declaration of war, was one of the strongest factors in inducing China to join the Allies.

[1] "China and the World War," p. 79.

Whatever the purpose of the American Minister, the policy of the American Government, and of Americans familiar with Chinese conditions, was, if not hostile to the inoculation of China with the war-fever, at least of a negative and somewhat inoperative character. It is not quite the truth to say that China entered the war at America's invitation.

During the months of turmoil and civil strife, the American Minister, as if to make amends for past zeal, was instructed to send, on June 5, the following dispatch to the Chinese Government:

> The Government of the United States learns with the most profound regret of the dissension in China and desires to express the most sincere desire that tranquillity and political co-ordination may be forthwith re-established.
>
> The entry of China into war with Germany—or the continuance of the *status quo* of her relations with that Government—are matters of secondary consideration.
>
> The principal necessity for China is to resume and continue her political entity, to proceed along the road of national development on which she has made such marked progress.
>
> With the form of Government in China or the personnel which administers the Government, the United States has an interest only in so far as its friendship impels it to be of service to China. But in the maintenance by China of one central, united and alone responsible Government, the United States is deeply interested and now expresses the very sincere hope that China, in her own interest, and in that of the world, will immediately set aside her factional political disputes, and that all parties and persons will work for the re-establishment of a co-ordinate Government and the assumption of that place among the Powers of the world to which China is so justly entitled, but the full attainment of which is impossible in the midst of internal discord.

This was another of America's admirably phrased messages to China. To one not trained in the manœuvrings

of diplomacy it would seem that real interest in China might have been better effected by keeping the war issue entirely away from China's political life. If it had never been broached by the American Government or pushed by the persuasive reasonings of Americans the European Allies would have had no lever to move China to enter the war and no *raison d'être* to intrigue with Japan to consent to the general scheme. Without the war issue, Parliament would hardly have been dissolved, and civil strife have had no chance to begin.

Shortly before the United States sent this Note, an English correspondent of the North China *Herald,* David Fraser, on May 17, expressed his doubts as to the wisdom of seeking Japan's co-operation. He wrote thus:

> It was one thing to admit Germany to a special position in Shantung because her military power could never have been exerted in the Far East. It is quite another thing to see Japan become so privileged, ambitious as she is of predominance in China.

The action of the United States Government in issuing a warning to China probably resulted in more harm than good. (1) The Note was futile in restoring peace to China. (2) The action of the American Government soon changed to its original form, of advising China to follow the United States and enter the war, thereby nullifying the force of the warning. (3) Japan was offended at American intrusion into Chinese affairs, without consulting the Powers most concerned. Thus, then, as all through the subsequent events of war and peace, China, the United States, the Entente Allies and Japan, all of whom were associated in the overthrow of Germany, were jealous and suspicious of each other, now giving more power to Japan and then trying to withdraw it.

When General Tuan Chi-jui again became Premier, July 15, and General Feng Kuo-chang formally became President, August 1, little argument was needed to bring to a successful end the long campaign of inducing China to take part in the Great War. The Cabinet and the President declared war against both Germany and Austria-Hungary, August 14. No parliamentary sanction was possible. China's entrance into the war was an autocratic move, not a democratic one, and yet China, too, professed to believe that she was fighting to make the world "safe for democracy."

China declared war more at the behest of Japan than from the irresistible pressure of public sentiment. There were stronger reasons against the fatal action than for it. Arguments on both sides turned Peking into a Debating Society, but they were never the propelling force. Japan held the reins.

Some of China's leaders who were opposed to a declaration of war were ex-President Li Yuan-hung, military leader of the first revolution; Dr. Sun Yat-sen, great revolutionist and first Provisional President; Tang Shao-yi, first Premier; and Kang Yiu-wei, the noted reformer of 1898, and one who still held fast his original views for twenty years. Most of the Chambers of Commerce, fearful of the growing power of the military autocrats, and of the spread of internal strife, counselled neutrality so far as was then possible.

The chief argument in support of a declaration of war was the financial one. On the one hand China would be free from paying the enemy countries monies due them, altogether amounting to $170,000,000, and on the other could receive from abroad a big loan, estimated at $200,000,000 to be floated if not in London, Paris or New York, at least in Japan. Japan's proffered aid in reality was already assured.

Another reason was that having put their hand to the plough, the Chinese should not look back. There could be no assurance of having Allied promises fulfilled, if China stopped halfway. With an actual declaration of war, one blessing after another would follow.

Dr. George E. Morrison, the President's diplomatic advisor, thought out two other reasons, which carried weight with the intellectuals, though not with the mass of the people. They were:

> By terminating her treaties with Germany China would be able to make new and more advantageous treaties after the war, and possibly have a general revision of treaties.
>
> In the Customs there are 118 Germans employed, 41 in the indoor and 77 in the outdoor. By their removal vacancies would be made which could be filled by Chinese students, of whom 24 per year are turned out by the Customs College and are waiting employment.

Another reason, which had had more weight at the opening of the crusade by the American Minister than after the political upheaval, was that through representation at the coming Peace Conference all China's international problems could be solved and past wrongs could be righted. This was the dream-land in which not a few continued to live until the day the Versailles Treaty was signed.

The arguments opposed to the declaration of war may be summarized as follows:

1. As the war issue had led China into confusion, it was wiser to put it to one side.

2. China's internal difficulties were too many and too serious to allow scope for action on outside and far distant questions. Better for China to reorganize than to enter the European War.

3. As complications had already arisen, more must be expected, if China joined one side or the other.

4. So long as the people saw no reason for the war, and there was no Parliament to sanction, the declaration of war had better be postponed.

5. Promises of outside help must be taken as illusory. China had better start out to help herself.

6. If China declared war, she would be compelled to take orders from others, and to that degree lose her power of independent action. A strong nation like the United States might avoid subjection to the will of others, but not a weak nation like China.

7. Many who had favoured war as an abstract proposition, were opposed to the way the war was declared and to the type of government consummating the act. In a word, it was not the Chinese nation, but the Peking Government that was to make the decision.

8. To use a figure of speech, China was asked to spring into the fire with no weapons to put the fire out. Or to use another figure, China was asked to float out to the whirlpool, from which she would then be admonished to escape and come to the shore.

The views of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were made known in an open letter to Premier Lloyd George as early as March 7. They were ridiculed by the Allied press (not by the Japanese), but at this later date may be regarded as good foresight. I quote in part:

. . . I have been approached by prominent English to consider the question of China joining the Allies. After careful study I come to the conclusion that it would be disastrous to both countries should China break her neutrality. For China is yet an infant Republic and as a nation she may be likened to a sick man just entering the hospital of constitutionalism. Unable to look after herself at this stage, she needs careful nursing and support. Therefore China cannot be regarded as an organized country. She is held intact only by custom and sentiment of a peace-loving

people. But at once, should there arise discord, general anarchy would result. . . .

. . . Should China enter the war, it would prove dangerous to her national life and injurious to the prestige of England in the Far East. The mere desire to get China to join the Allies is to Chinese minds a confession of the Allies' inability to cope with Germany. Just now comes Premier Tuan's report to the President that the Entente Powers are coercing China to join the Allies. Already the question has raised bitter dissensions among our statesmen. Discord now may evoke anarchism which will arouse the two strong but perilous elements in China, anti-foreign fanatics and Mohammedans.

The dissensions which arose after Dr. Sun penned these words, and which have continued to the present, show the foreign thinker and schemer that it may be prudent as to things Chinese to give heed to the warnings of the Chinese, who place first the interests of their own country.

I may here recount part of a conversation with President Feng Kuo-chang, August 13, the day before he issued the declaration of war.

I said to him: "There is no objection to China's declaring war on Germany, if that is all. It will be a declaration, but nothing will be done. Germany has no troops or ships to send here, and you are not likely to send any to fight Germany. What I fear is that you will have to join the Allies, of whom Japan is chief, and henceforth you will have to obey them. This will be your disaster."

"I am opposed to joining either side," the President said, and then added: "China will fight Germany independently. China is opposed to violations of international law, and therefore joins with the United States in opposing such violations. We will take orders from no one."

"Very good," I replied, "I hope so. Wait and see."

This idea of making war without joining the Allied nations, including Japan, was where President Feng differed

from the more zealous agitators. Possibly he had derived the idea from President Wilson. Before leaving Nanking for Peking, late in July, to enter the Presidential Palace, he made a speech containing these words:

> Originally I was absolutely opposed to the declaration of war. But after my attempts to oppose it proved futile, I have had to follow the general trend of public opinion. Although I now have no objection to the declaration of war upon Germany, yet I am still opposed to the idea of my country entering into alliance with the Entente Powers. If our entry into the war on the side of the Entente Powers becomes a matter of imperative necessity, we may do so on certain conditions, without which I deem it were better for us to keep out of it. For it must be understood that in the case of declaring war upon Germany independently, we can do so at our own perfect will, but if we go to war on the side of the Entente, we should not be as free as we should like to be.

Here, then, we are able first to detect the varying course Chinese thought had taken from those early days in February. The scheme of China aligning herself with the United States had vanished, the subsequent scheme of joining the Entente Allies was not accepted by all the Chinese, and was advocated by Japan only on the understanding that she was to act for the Entente in Far Eastern affairs, and might ultimately become the sole Ally of China.

As illustrating the attempt to get China to do what the new President was anxious not to do, I cite an instance on August 6, when the seven Ministers for France, Portugal, Russia, Japan, Belgium, Great Britain, and the United States had audience with the new President. The capable French Minister, M. Conty, was spokesman for the group. He not only extended congratulations as befitted a ceremonial call, but seized the opportunity to express appreciation that China was going to declare war on Germany. He added the hope that the bonds between China and these

Allied nations would be cemented by a closer association in the great struggle. These words did not harmonize with the American Note of warning, issued shortly before. Neither did they harmonize with President Feng's explicit desire that China go to war in an independent capacity.[1]

Thomas F. Millard [2] writes thus of the purposes of Japan:

> When it was evident that the united urging of the American, British and French Governments, and the influence of individual foreigners, would bring China into the war, Japanese diplomacy made a characteristic manœuvre. The Chinese Government was advised by Japan to declare war as one of the Allies, and not as a separate nation. This was a scheme to detach China from the United States, which power never had formally joined the Allies, and attach her to the Allies, thereby making her a part of and subject to the private agreements made among the nations composing the original alliance.

The climax of the tragic and momentous moulding of China's destiny received a touch of pleasant humour from the hand of the Minister for Austria-Hungary, Baron von Rosthorn, who had remained in Peking till the middle of August, 1917. This diplomat had originally been in the Chinese Customs Service, was a Chinese sinologue, and was a protagonist of Chinese rights. His term of service in the Legation was longer than that of all the seven Ministers combined who formed the opposing group.

On the day war was declared by the Peking Government, he sent to the Chinese Minister this most unusual Note:

PEKING, August 14, 1917.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today of the following tenour:

(Text of Chinese Note)

[1] See Appendix II.

[2] "Democracy and the Eastern Question," p. 131.

In reply I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have taken cognizance of your note and am awaiting instructions from my Government.

I cannot here enter into the arguments contained in the declaration of war, but feel bound to state that I must consider this declaration as unconstitutional and illegal, seeing that according to so high an authority as the former President Li Yuan-Hung such a declaration requires the approbation of both houses of Parliament.

Etc., etc.

II. *The Intrigue going on in Tokio to embroil China in the war.*

To make clear the peculiar windings of diplomacy in inducing China to take the three steps that bound China to one group of warring nations, a study must be made of the greater and wider intrigue going on in Tokio, in which the Governments of Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, and at first Russia, all had a part.

As soon as the Entente Allies detected that the United States was seeking in early February to take the lead in Oriental politics by inducing China to align herself with the sister Republic in all war measures, the Ambassadors in Tokio for Russia, Great Britain, France and Italy secretly negotiated with Japan as to Japan's connections with China's war measures. The one intrigue conflicted with the other. The American Legation in Peking was pointing out how China could get ahead of Japan in reference to German and other rights which Japan had planned to appropriate. At the same time the four European Embassies were pointing out to Japan how she could appropriate all German rights not only in Shantung but in the German colonies north of the equator. Europe agreed with the United States, a future associate in the war, in the one matter of arraying China against Germany. But Japan had previously resisted the European advice that China

should enter the war. To resist American advice in the same direction was less feasible, for China would probably accept the advice. Japan, therefore, would do well to accede to the combined advice of Europe and America, if so be that her gains would be greater. To induce Japan to allow China, first to break with Germany and then to declare war, all that was necessary was to give Japan a reasonable *quid pro quo*. This was to guarantee to Japan, whatever China or the United States might wish, all the German rights in Shantung and the South Seas north of the equator. In making this guarantee, which proved of highest value at the Paris Peace Conference, Japan, too, was requested to give a *quid pro quo*, namely, to assist in bringing about the repatriation of all Germans, and the requisition of German commercial houses in China. In fact it seems clear that the British and French were more anxious to consummate these last designs than to lead China into the war. China's entrance into war was the means for facilitating and legalizing the total elimination of Germans from China and the destruction of German trade.

Thus while China supposed, at American suggestion, that her entrance into war would afford her the chance of terminating treaties with Germany and possibly of nullifying the agreements with Japan of 1915, and so of restoring all German rights to China, the European Allies were conniving with Japan, unknown to China or to the United States, that what China hoped to get would all pass to Japan. If these facts had been known to the Peking Government, the arguments of all groups of outside agitators would have lost most of their persuasiveness. As to the United States, even as late as August 11 and 19, 1919, both President Wilson and the Secretary of State asserted that they had been kept in ignorance of these wonderful compacts of our associates in war.

One informing document is a dispatch of Viscount

Motono, February 19 (1917), to the French and Russian Ambassadors. It is as follows:

. . . In view of recent developments in the general situation and in view of the particular arrangements concerning peace conditions such as arrangements relative to the disposition of the Bosporus, Constantinople and the Dardanelles, being already under discussion by the Powers interested, the Imperial Japanese Government believes that the moment has come for It also to express Its desire relative to certain conditions of peace essential to Japan and to submit them for the consideration of the Government of the French Republic.

The French Government is thoroughly informed of all the efforts the Japanese Government has made in a general manner to accomplish its task with the present war, and particularly to guarantee for the future the peace of Oriental Asia and the security of the Japanese Empire, for which it is absolutely necessary to take from Germany its bases of political, military and economic activity in the Far East.

Under these conditions the Imperial Japanese Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace negotiations the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean.

The Imperial Japanese Government confidently hopes the Government of the French Republic, realizing the legitimacy of these demands, will give assurance that, her case being proved, Japan may count upon their full support on this question. . . .[1]

The reply of the French Ambassador at Tokio, under date of March 2, 1917, reads thus:

The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung and the German Islands on the Pacific north of the equator.

[1] Charles A. Selden, New York *Times*, April 12, 1919.

It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in this Chinese province and these islands.

M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. The consequences in China should be the following:

First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and consuls;

Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave Chinese territory;

Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and Portugal;

Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in China; forfeiting the rights of the Germans in the Concessions she possesses in certain parts of China.[1]

The fact that these secret Agreements were not disclosed to the Peking Government bespeaks no real friendliness to China. The fact that they were not disclosed to the Washington Government, at the very time America's help was being sought by the Entente Allies, and at the time American arguments were deluding the Chinese, bespeaks no real friendliness to the United States. This was hardly playing the game. According to the statement of Secretary Lansing, August 11, 1919, before the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations,[2] neither Mr. Arthur Balfour, nor M. Viviani, nor Viscount Ishii, on coming to the United States in 1917 on special missions, confidential and far-reaching, disclosed to any one in the American Government the arrangements arrived at in Tokio the early part of the same year. Senator Borah, at the same Committee meeting,

[1] Charles A. Selden, New York *Times* Paris correspondent, April 21, 1919.

[2] New York *Sun*, August 12, 1919.

read the following from the records of the House of Commons March 4, 1918:

Mr. King asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether there have been communicated to President Wilson copies of all treaties, whether secret or public, and memoranda of all other agreements or undertakings to which this country has become a party since August 4, 1914; and if not, whether copies of all such documents will be handed to the American Ambassador in London?

Balfour—The honourable Member may rest assured that President Wilson is kept fully informed by the Allies.

At least the Secretary of State was kept ignorant of these arrangements made by the Allies in Tokio, for when Senator Borah asked Mr. Lansing, "Notwithstanding the statement of Ishii and the statement of Balfour, it is a matter of fact that the Secretary of State of the United States had no knowledge of these treaties until after the signing of the armistice, is it not?" Mr. Lansing replied: "That is true." It is even more likely that President Wilson was left in ignorance.

More serious was the omission of informing China. She was the one country vitally affected. Germany had no rights in Shantung except as granted by China, the sovereign State. For American agents to urge on China the severance of relations with Germany in order that China might strengthen her position in Shantung as against both Germany and Japan, at the very time that the Allies were trying to eliminate China from having possession of German rights that Japan might be the gainer, was hardly playing fair with China, a past friend and a potential ally. The rights which Germany had had in Shantung prior to the war were all embraced within the bounds of China, not of Japan. China, not Japan, had sole responsibility for the disposal of German rights, German property, German title-

deeds and German investments within the confines of China. Japan had the same responsibility within her own confines.

It was a sorry spectacle this trickery and chicanery being perpetrated on China. And, how blind was American statecraft and how inconsistent American idealism to proclaim on one side of the globe righteousness, democracy, open covenants and the emancipation of the oppressed, and to share in intrigue, secrecy, selfishness and deception on the other side of the globe.

In a general way, the United States was trying to help China as against Japan, while Great Britain, France and Italy were seemingly helping Japan as against China. The American attitude to Japan, as represented by the doings of the American Legation in Peking, was not hid from the statesmen of Japan: but the attitude of the three European Allies towards China, as revealed by their scheming in Tokio, was the very opposite of what the Ministers in Peking for Britain, France and Italy loudly proclaimed to the Chinese. As we now read the facts, these six countries not only were forming plots to overwhelm Germany, but were at loggerheads with each other on the very eve of combining against Germany. Above all, this medley of war scheming was taking place during the months of February and March before either the United States Congress or the Chinese Parliament was asked to declare a state of war with Germany. The intrigue was a motley mixture of semi-neutrality and defiant belligerency. Secrecy enveloped all. Strange associations for President Wilson and the American people, who from the founders' day have stood for straightforward dealing with all peoples of men, Oriental as well as Occidental.

Dr. Arthur J. Brown,[1] referring to Japan's change of mind in reference to China under influences so adroit and

[1] "The Mastery of the Far East," p. 436.

unholy, comments thus: "Verily, dubious are the ways of secret diplomacy." And he quotes from Dr. Frank J. Goodnow of March 14, 1917:

China would never have broken off relations but for urgings of Japan, which has sinister designs against the integrity of China. And unfortunately she will be able to carry out her scheme. One obvious motive is the opportunity it will afford Japan to gain control of China's army and navy, a step that will put her absolutely at the Mikado's mercy.

The Englishman of the Far East has as a rule a high sense of honour, a reputation for probity, straightforward dealing and playing fair, but the diplomatic tactics pursued in Tokio by the four European Allies were of the Old World type, made feverish by contact with a sly kind of Oriental diplomacy. There was in those days, on entrance into war of both the United States and China, a lot of humbug, and some buncombe, a fair amount of self-complacency and an immense amount of secrecy, inconsistencies galore, and selfish national ambition beyond measure.

A few days after the Chinese President issued the declaration of war, all the eight Ministers of the new group (arrayed against Germany) sent to the Foreign Office in Peking, in almost similar phraseology, notes of congratulation and profound assurances of renewed friendship. I append the one from the United States as being the one nation whose word was more likely to be fulfilled.

. . . My Government is happily desirous of taking this opportunity to make it definitely known that in friendship, co-operation and support my Government will do what it can to enable China to enjoy the position and special regard that are due to a great country.

The reception of such Notes had only one effect, to inspire in the Chinese breast hope and joy and to remove all fears of future trouble.

My views on the situation have been clarified by subsequent events, but what I thought at the time is shown in an editorial which I wrote, somewhat sceptically, I confess, August 21:

It is a pity that the Chinese Government and the various Allied Legations have not given more publicity to the replies sent to the Chinese Government by the Allied Ministers (including the American) in congratulation of having another ally against Germany.

China in entering the war at the behests of friendly advisors from near and far was just a little tremulous as she neared the fateful hour, but now she is assured, yea, seven times reassured, that she will now have more gains than her fondest fancies had painted for her.

We have had the impression, and we told President Feng so, that the outlook for China had never been so hopeless. We must reverse this extravagant statement, until facts prove that our revised view is wrong.

Ministers Plenipotentiary of eight countries ASSURE China (yes, assure her) that she is now to receive their united "friendship, solidarity and assistance." Japan goes still further. She says, "That at this moment the friendship of these two countries has been much enhanced and their relations have grown still closer." This is comforting. Moreover, all the eight Ministers point China forward and upward, for she is now to enjoy the position "*due to a great Power.*"

At one bound, by a simple Declaration of War, China attains to all this glory, distinction and assured friendship of other Powers. She has become with less trouble than Japan one of the family of nations.

On our part we have no doubt but that the ex-Ministers for Germany and Austria-Hungary would be pleased to write the same Notes with the same assurances, if so be the Notes were not returned.

Several years ago Japan took the lead in making an arrangement with Great Britain, France and Russia, for guaranteeing

equal opportunity in China to all nations, and the sovereign independence of China.

Today she takes the lead—for leader she is—in bringing not only Great Britain, France and Russia, but the United States, Belgium, Italy and Portugal, to the policy of *solidarity and assistance.*

Premier Tuan Chi-jui deserves all the honour he can get for effecting this tangible result.

For half a year we have written upwards of 120 squibs against the abandonment of neutrality and peace. We now see how foolish we have been; China gets into no trouble at all, but has abundant assurances of blessing that are never to end.

CHAPTER VI

A SERIES OF AGGRAVATIONS AND PERILS TO CHINA

WHEN the Peking Government, with no sanction of Parliament, declared war on the two Central Powers, August 14, 1917, the mass of the Chinese took the result with their customary spirit of fatalism. What matter if the outcome be good or bad? What would happen was inevitable; why complain? Already China had been carried along for six months by complex and hidden forces, as in a current, and the future no man could see. That complications, entanglements, annoyances, and all sorts of troubles, with possible catastrophes, would arise, seemed to be a certainty. War seldom brings blessing to the weak; and China surely was weak. Dr. Arthur J. Brown, writing at the close of 1918, says:[1]

> Time alone will show whether China embroiled herself in the world war to her benefit or to her hurt. We suspect that, in spite of the virtuous and well-meant declarations of the various Powers regarding "the rights of weaker nations," poor, helpless China will get only what the representatives of stronger governments deem expedient and that Japan will have a good deal to say as to what that shall be.

Coincidentally the United States and China should fare well, for the former declared war on Good Friday and the latter on the day the Holy Pontiff made his appeal for peace.

Most of the Japanese papers, more familiar than others

[1] "The Mastery of the Far East," p. 436.

with the part played by the Japanese Government, wrote in commendatory language of China's decision. One paper, however, the Osaki *Asahi*, wrote in a different strain, a few days prior to the decision, thus:

China's participation in the war has now become a matter of time. No one has doubted that it will come. Now after Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang's arrival in Peking, the decision has been arrived at. Whether it is necessary for her to take that step or not is not the question now. An independent nation to be forced by others to do anything, to talk about humanity which is not in her mind and to declare war which is not necessary, is indeed a regrettable thing from the point of view of national existence of that nation. To be sure, even Japan is not free from doing things which are not altogether necessary but because forced by others. Some persons are inclined to regard Japan's declaration of war against Germany merely from the point of view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. We supported the war from the point of view of the Oriental problem, independently of all else. As for the question of China's participation in the war, judged from the history and effect of it, it is doubtful whether it is advantageous to China or not.

As I viewed the probabilities at the time, I was more than doubtful, I was pessimistic as to the outcome for China. In a conversation with President Feng on the eve of declaring war, I said:

"I have seen China in many difficulties; I passed through the Boxer uprising; but I have never been so hopeless as to China's future as I am now."

"And I, too," he replied, "have no hope."

China, even more than vigorous and prosperous America, would have done well to heed these words of Washington's Farewell Address: "Harmony and liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an

equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favours or preferences."

The question was never presented to China to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers; therein these two Powers showed themselves true friends of China. The question urged on China by eight Legations—I will not say Governments—was to join the United States, or the Entente Allies, or Japan, or all of them, against the Central Powers, until the latter should be vanquished not only on the field of battle, but in the marts of trade and even within the sacred domain of missions, science and education. For one to argue otherwise was to lay himself open to being called pro-German, and few cared to take the risk. I was among the number to follow my own conscience, and I had the joy of suffering for it. If China had persisted in remaining neutral, she would have had good company, Spain, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, and two of the A. B. C. Republics of South America—Argentine and Chile. If China had merely severed diplomatic relations with Germany, as President Wilson requested, China's sole associates of any importance would have been Peru and Ecuador. To go further, and declare war, China was in the company of Brazil, Guatemala, Siam and Greece, and still more of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, the Czarist Russia (still retaining a Minister in Peking) and Japan. It certainly seemed as if China in going with the crowd was on the winning side, both by superiority of military power, by combination of financial resources, and by a widespread profession of lofty aims, righteous ideals and untarnished justice. When all these eight foreign Ministers solemnly assured China that she could rely on their help and solidarity for placing her high among the great nations of the world, it was simple folly for a private individual like myself to sing in a minor key.

Hardly, however, had China made her choice as to the side of righteousness and the policy of prudence and security than one by one a series of complications, annoyances or troubles befell her, held sway through the Paris Peace Conference, and has not yet come to an end. These troubles which have come to China have come from China's associates in war, not from enemies in war. Some of the more glaring misfortunes and annoyances I will now briefly mention.

I. *British demands as to Tibet.*

While China was all stirred by the hot discussion on the war question, the British Government, having kept silent for several years, with no fixed agreement in her possession, suddenly presented to China, in the month of March, 1917, Twelve Demands concerning Tibet. Previous negotiations in 1913 had failed to secure unanimity of action. In the whirl of events in 1917, China was again urged to be reasonable. Japan, in 1915, presented to China, under President Yuan Shih-kai, Twenty-one Demands; Great Britain, in 1917, presented to China, under President Li Yuan-hung, Twelve Demands. Two Allies, mistrustful of each other alike, were playing havoc with China. The Demands, as made public by the Japanese press, and translated into Chinese newspapers, are as follows:

1. Great Britain shall have the right to construct railways between India and Tibet.

2. The Chinese Government shall contract loans from the British Government for the improvement of the administration of Tibet.

3. The treaty obligations between Tibet and Great Britain shall be considered valid as heretofore.

4. British experts shall be engaged for the industrial enterprises of Tibet.

5. China shall secure the redemption of loans contracted from the British people by Tibetans.

6. Neither China nor Great Britain shall send troops to Tibet without reason.

7. The Chinese Government shall not appoint or dismiss officials in Tibet *on its own responsibility.* (Italics ours.)

8. The British Government shall be allowed to establish telegraph lines in Lhassa, Chianghu, Chamutao, etc.

9. British postal service shall be introduced in Lhassa and other places.

10. *China shall not interfere with the actions of the British Government in Tibet.* (Italics ours.)

11. No privileges or interests in Tibet shall be granted to other nations.

12. All mines in Tibet shall be jointly worked by the British and Chinese Governments.

Surely Great Britain is not the one to cast the first stone at Japan. And between these two Allies—upper and nether millstones—China is being ground.

Miss La Motte,[1] writing of these same Demands, says:

> Remember, over here it is not customary to think of or speak of anything but "Japanese aggression." Japan, you see, offers the only stumbling-block to the complete domination of the Orient by Europe. But for Japan—China might possibly become another India.

These Demands, as well as final Agreement, were kept in abeyance till after the Great War. But the Chinese in official circles knew well enough that sooner or later they must come to an agreement by agreeing with Great Britain. The matter was again broached in 1919, and the Chinese are being pressed to sign an official document. Since the armistice, Great Britain has been busy safeguarding her position in Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, Burma and India, and in widening her influence and beneficent sway in Afghanistan, Mesopotamia, Persia, the Caucasus, and

[1] "Peking Dust," p. 223.

far-away Tibet, all strategic points in the Asiatic portion of world-wide empire.

And China, like Persia, like Egypt, will have to submit, unless—unless—she yields to the other dominating force, Japan.

Mr. C. C. Wu, in a memorandum, issued in the same year, 1917,[1] wrote:

> China wants nothing more than the re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, with recognition of the autonomy of the territory immediately under the control of the Lhassa Government, she is agreeable to the British idea of forming an effective buffer territory in so far as it is consistent with equity and justice; she is anxious that her trade interest should be looked after by her trade agents as do the British, a point which is agreeable even to the Tibetans, though apparently not to the British; in other words, she expects that Great Britain would at least make with her an arrangement regarding Tibet which should not be more disadvantageous to her than that made with Russia respecting Outer Mongolia.

II. *The Lansing-Ishii Agreement.*

No sooner had the United States declared war than the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium designated some of their ablest men for special commissions to visit the United States and to secure American help, financial, military and political. The Japanese Government did the same, designating a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to Paris, Viscount Ishii. He was equal to the task. The Chinese Government, on the other hand, did nothing. After frequent conferences of this Japanese Envoy with Secretary Lansing, at opportune times and in a friendly spirit, there appeared on November 2, 1917, the exchange of Notes between the two. The Agreement being in this form did not need to be referred to the Senate for ratification.

[1] Putnam Weale, "Fight for the Republic in China," p. 479.

On the one hand the Notes reaffirmed the "open door" principle in China and the preservation of China's independence and territorial integrity; and on the other hand there were introduced phrases capable of more than one interpretation, as follows:

> The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous.

It was known that only in a narrow sense was there an "open door" in China, so long as spheres of interest existed and preferential concessions were granted to particular countries in particular parts of China. Japanese and also Chinese would naturally give more attention to the other words quoted above, "special relations" and "special interests." However much Americans might claim that these words meant nothing or only reaffirmed the principle of the "open door," Orientals were positive that a new day had come in which Japan, through recognition of the United States, had a prior position in China, ahead of all others.

The Japanese Legation in Peking was the first to make announcement of the new agreement. A translation into Chinese was made, in which the Japanese used a strong term for "interests," implying both power and benefit. The American Legation, later on, made another translation, implying simply relationship. The American Minister also issued a formal statement that these words which attracted so much attention were meant to harmonize with the traditional policy of the "open door" and equal opportunity.

Dr. Reinsch wrote:

> The visit of the Imperial Japanese Mission to the United States afforded an opportunity for free and friendly discussion of the

United States and Japan in the Orient by openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan as regards China is not one of aggression and by declaring there is no intention to take advantage commercially or indirectly of the special relations to China created by geographical position.

The Japanese preferred to explain for themselves what was, and will be, "the policy of Japan," and their explanation carried greater weight.

Secretary Lansing also issued a statement in Washington, practically overlooking the words which made the stir:

The statements in the Notes require no explanation. They not only contain a reaffirmation of the "open door" policy, but introduce a principle of non-interference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, which, generally applied, is essential to perpetual international peace, as clearly declared by President Wilson, and which is the very foundation, also, of Pan-Americanism, as interpreted by this Government.

The Chinese Government, seeing a meaning in the words, and the particular meaning attached thereto by the Japanese, issued a kind of protest to both Japan and the United States, and so to all the world:

The principle adopted by the Chinese Government toward the friendly nations has always been one of justice and equality, and consequently the rights enjoyed by the friendly nations derived from the treaties have been consistently respected, and so even with the special relations between countries created by the fact of territorial contiguity it is only in so far as they have already been provided for in existing treaties. Hereafter the Chinese Government will still adhere to the principles hitherto adopted, and hereby it is again declared that the Chinese Government will not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations.

Thus, as the United States sent an identic Note in 1915 to China and to Japan about agreements those two countries had made, China in 1917 sends an identic Note to Japan and the United States about an agreement which they had just made.

China had good reason to complain. Was it a friendly act for two Governments to consult among themselves about rights in China, without ever consulting China? All along, in previous arrangements with Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States, Japan had pursued the same policy of negotiating about China, with China left out. As Japan has prior position in Japan, so China, and no outside country, has prior position in China. To infringe to the least degree on this simple rule is to put an entering wedge into China's national integrity.

III. *The reign of military autocracy with the overthrow of the democratic system of government.*

Probably no aspect of the Great War, as affecting China, has proved a greater misfortune to China and the Chinese people than this which concerns China's internal and political condition.

Autocracy was supposed to be an essential characteristic of monarchies, just as true of Chinese, Manchu or Mongol monarchies as of the monarchies of the Romanoffs, Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns. But here we find something anomalous: autocracy flourishing in the seventh and eighth years of the Chinese Republic and among a people who for centuries had enjoyed local self-government and believed in the fundamental ideas of liberal institutions.

As for militarism it had never been the political creed of the old dynasties where the literati ruled as it was in days of the Republic, where Military Governors assumed to dictate national and international policies as well as those of their own provinces.

This ascendancy of autocracy and militarism began, strange to say, when the scholarly representative of the American Republic first broached a topic for discussion and then strenuously agitated for a definite and prompt line of action—that of breaking relations between China and Germany. From February, 1917, to the time of armistice, in November, 1918, and even since, the military faction of autocratic mould under the leadership of General Tuan Chi-jui, Premier and Minister of War, dominated China's political affairs, both in the preliminaries of the declaration of war and in the character and degree of subsequent participation.

Nations which stood for free democracy in the Western world—France, Great Britain and the United States—gave in the Orient their sympathetic countenance to the plans and deeds of men who stood for despotic rule and the military system. That which united these divergent elements was the common readiness to wage war on a common enemy, when for safety's sake a dividing line should have separated that which was democratic from that which was autocratic. The union which existed might bring victory on the field of battle, but never a victory for democracy; it could effect the conquest of a nation but not the defeat of a wrong principle.

It is here that the Great War made China suffer. The Republic under President Li Yuan-hung had had a chance to prove its worth, but the injection of the poison of war and the passion of hate brought on dissension and turmoil, turbulence and bloodshed, resulting in a complete collapse of a diseased body politic.

Dr. Arthur J. Brown[1] says:

> China has a weary road to travel before the discordant elements of her vast population settle themselves into a compact

[1] "The Mastery of the Far East," p. 294.

and well-governed republic; but the monarchy has gone beyond possibility of recovery.

True, the monarchy has gone, but not autocracy. Give men power anywhere, and they will love to keep it for themselves, and this is autocracy.

Dr. Wu Ting-fang[1] in an address, July, 1917, after he had retired from Peking, used these words:

> We are engaged in a struggle between democracy and militarism. Between fifty-five and sixty per cent. of the taxes of China are now going to support militarism in China. This must be changed, but the change must be gradual. I ask Americans to be patient and give China a chance. Democracy will triumph.

IV. *The renewal of revolution and internecine strife.*

When the first revolution arose in 1911, I was conservative enough to favour the peaceful but advancing movement of the liberal, constitutional government of the Manchu House, and was wont to say: "The fever of revolution is hard to check. When about to cease, there comes a relapse. One revolution will lead to a second, and this to a third, and no telling when it will stop among a populous nation like China."

The revolution which began in July, 1917, was the fourth revolution. By introducing the war question—war the other side of the globe—there came a clash between the liberal and military elements with the ascendancy of the military, the dissolution of Parliament, and the revolt and protest of the constitutional element, with headquarters in Canton. These constitutionalists are commonly spoken of as revolutionists, but the real revolutionists were the Military Governors who declared independence from the authorized government in May and June, 1917, and shattered the fabric of the Republic.

[1] *China Press*, July 14, 1917.

The overthrow of the Tuan Chi-jui military faction in the autumn of 1920 seemed to many to be a sign of hope, but it meant the establishment in power of another military faction, not the strengthening of democratic ideas. Up to 1921 the Republic has not yet been restored as a real entity and a living factor.

It may be said that the cause of all strife in early 1917 was neither the wrangling over war or the dissolution of Parliament, but the germ of revolutionary fever. The germ, however, was dormant, and in a healthy constitution would soon have been destroyed. When the more lively germ of a great war-fever was taken into the system, it at once set into action the old revolutionary germ, and no Western physician has been able to effect a cure.

As an outsider, I would say to the Chinese in the words of Hiawatha,

> "I am weary of your quarrels,
> Weary of your wars and bloodshed,
> Weary of your prayers for vengeance,
> Of your wranglings and dissensions:
> All your strength is in your union,
> All your danger is in discord;
> Therefore be at peace henceforward,
> And as brothers live together."

V. *Increased scope for bringing China in thraldom to Japan.*

Japan through the fortunes of war had from August, 1914, to August, 1917, many chances to strengthen her position in China. When China declared war, August 14, 1917, very largely at Japan's behests, new opportunities appeared to Japan to augment her growing advantages. She was aided by the good luck of having the pro-Japan faction in power in Peking. The President, Feng Kuo-chang, was an opportunist and was easily managed. The

Premier, head of the militarists, had already taken his orders from Japan, though presented in the form of friendly advice.

Even before China declared war, there was pretty good evidence that the two Governments were negotiating a secret Convention on military affairs and the sale of arms to China by means, strange to say, of a loan to China. This Military Convention got wrought into shape early in 1918, when Japan was called upon by the Allies to make an expedition into Siberia. Japan made use of this necessity to urge upon China co-operation in the military advance under the military leadership of Japan. When pressure was brought to bear by true patriots of China to make public the secret arrangements, this innocuous portion bearing on joint action to be taken in Siberia was duly published. Other arrangements were still kept secret.

"Two agreements were concluded," as the Chinese Minister wrote in a dispatch to Viscount Motono, "one relating to the army being signed, May 16, and the other relating to the navy, May 19." He continues in the exchange of Notes:

> These Agreements only embody concrete arrangements as to manner and conditions under which the armies and navies of the two countries are to co-operate in common defence against the enemy, on the basis of the above mentioned Notes exchanged on March 25. The details of the arrangements constituting as they do a military secret, cannot be made public, but they contain no provision other than those pertaining to the object already defined.[1]

The Peking Government, namely, that of Tuan, which was recognized by the Allied Powers for the declaration of war, was also ready to hold confidential conferences with various Japanese that money and arms might be secured

[1] The Agreement, so far as the military part is concerned, was rescinded in the early part of 1921.

for carrying on war with the Southern Chinese. A new department called War Participation Bureau was formed, of which General Tuan Chi-jui was head, even when he was no longer Premier. This Bureau took matters out of the hands of the Foreign Office, of which Lou Tseng-tsiang was Minister, being afterwards the chief delegate at the Paris Conference. A writer in *Asia*[1] says:

> . . . Of between $200,000,000 and $225,000,000 loaned, much has gone into the hands of corrupt officials and the Military Governors and by them wasted instead of being used for the demobilization of the troops and for the constructive purposes declared.

With civil war on hand, the Peking Government was helpless in securing revenue from the provinces sufficient for its own needs and also for the requirements of the loyal Military Governors. European countries and the United States, even if so disposed, were too absorbed in the war in Europe to give attention or help to China. Japan remained sole benefactor. Moreover, the Japanese are intensely patriotic, placing Japanese interests and the honour of their country first. Money to supply China's needs was loaned again and again, on most liberal terms as to control of expenditure, thus placing China in bondage, financially, to Japan. Loans were made not only to the Central Government, but to the provincial authorities, contrary to law, and even to the opposing Government in the south. By further loans to the Bank of Communications and the Bank of China, these two financial institutions of the Government came under the control of Japanese banks.

The other important circumstance in Japan's path of opportunity was the facility granted through loan-bargaining for receiving concessions of various kinds as security

[1] "Asiaticus" in *Asia*, March, 1919, p. 216.

for monies lent and as *quid pro quo* for deeds of generous helpfulness. As the article in *Asia* cites for a sample, "for a paltry $15,000,000 loan China has signed away a lien in all her forests in the two northern provinces of Heilungkiang and Kirin, equal in area to the combined area of all the states of the United States touching the Atlantic seaboard from Maine to, but not including, Florida."

Millard's Review for July 27, 1918, says:

> To pay for these loans China has mortgaged railway lines, gold, coal, antimony and iron mines. She has mortgaged the Government printing office at Peking, the Hankow electric light and water works and native forests in various parts of the country. There is a chance in each of these loan agreements to the effect that the Chinese authorities shall not obtain additional funds upon these securities unless the consent of the Japanese bankers first has been obtained.

The year 1898 has been called the year of the war of concessions, wherein Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States were competitors. Twenty years later, 1918, saw another war of concessions, but exclusively for Japan's benefit.

It has been estimated that Chinese and Japanese agents in 1918 made upwards of 40 contracts, and their Governments a dozen Agreements or exchanges of Notes.

With all this growth of peaceful expansion, even after the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the Japanese Government has maintained a rigid attitude as to the conduct of Chinese officials, especially in Peking, Manchuria, Shantung and Fukien as to whether their conduct be friendly and obliging or antagonizing and annoying. Not only under the Terauchi rule but under that of Hara, who is supposed to stand for democratic ideas, has Japan's influence in China been both commercial and political.

The Associated Press telegraphed from Peking, March 27, 1919, the following:

The Japanese Minister here has warned the Chinese Government that if the premature disclosures of secret documents by China causes loss to Japanese financial and commercial interests, Japan will hold China responsible for such loss.

Baron Goto afterwards explained that as with all confidential negotiations or agreements, the parties concerned must in all honour consult each other as to the time and mode of publications.

In fairness to Japan it must be acknowledged that in 1918 as in 1915 Japan safeguarded her predominant position by definite Agreements with the recognized Peking Government. If fault there be, it must rest with the agents of the Peking Government, men who urged on war with Germany and were then congratulated for their noble deed.

VI. *Dictation by the Governments with which China had associated herself in war.*

I have already referred to the warning I gave President Feng Kuo-chang, on the eve of China's declaration of war, as to the impossibility of China acting alone. China's difficulty in this regard became more apparent as the months passed by. I have just outlined Japan's engrossing grip on China's finances and political policies and war measures. But all the eight Legations forming the one group were equally persistent in asserting their superior position and the negligence, remissness or incapacity of the Peking Government. Sometimes they acted as a body, sometimes singly. The British Minister, Sir John Jordan, versed in Chinese affairs, was doyen of the diplomatic body as well as chief among the eight. Of course, they issued no orders; they generally gave advice, or insinuated some misfortune

if China continued to act foolishly. Frequently China was presented with an *aide mémoire*. Not a week passed, it may be safely said, that the Chinese Foreign Office did not receive some reminder that the Associated Nations expected to have their wishes followed. The nearer the end of war, the greater this outside pressure. Even after the armistice, China was being admonished. Notice the joint Allied Note of October 29, 1918:[1]

1. At the commencement of China's declaration of war against the Central Powers, the Allied Governments agreed to the postponement of the payment of the Boxer indemnity and other privileges in the hope that the Chinese Government would use the proceeds for the betterment of China's industry and economical conditions to the mutual advantage of both China and the Allied Powers; but, to the dissatisfaction of the Allies, it is reported that the proceeds have been squandered by certain high Government authorities for party strifes.

2. Although the War Participation Bureau has been established for some time in Peking, nevertheless it has done nothing to assist the Allies, and it is rumoured that part of the troops who were originally trained for services in Europe have been misused for civil war in certain provinces of China.

3. Without previous consultation or knowledge of the Allied Powers, the Chinese Government suddenly appointed Tai Chen-lin as China's representative to the Vatican.

4. The ineffective manner in which the Chinese Government have acted towards the liquidation of enemy properties in China is unsatisfactory to the Allies, as in the case of the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank, etc.

5. The movements of enemy subjects in China are not effectively scrutinized by the Chinese Government authorities, so that dangerous Germans, such as Hanneken and others, are not interned up to the present time. It is said that the recent dispute between the American Mongolian Trading Company and General Tien Chung-yu of Chabar was also mentioned in this category.

[1] From Asiatic News Agency.

6. The prohibition of Chinese subjects to trade with the enemies as promulgated by the last Cabinet was not carried out by China.

7. It was known to everybody that the Hôtel du Nord was enemy property and it was used as headquarters of enemy subjects in North China for their unlawful conferences and activities against the Allied cause; that the Chinese Government did not do anything to close it until the matter had been many times brought to the notice of China by the Allied Legations in Peking. This is a strong witness that China does not intend to help the Allies to check German activities.

8. In spite of the protest of the Allied Legations, the Chinese Government has done nothing to punish the Taoyin or Neiho, of Heilungkiang, on account of his pro-Bolshevik German actions.

9. The lack of sincerity on the part of the Chinese Government authorities in conducting cases concerning Allied subjects and enemies and the arrested enemy subjects was quoted as an example, because China refuses to permit Allied consuls to act as witnesses in the court.

10. The enemy internment camps are not properly conducted, and in consequence many dangerous Germans are not interned at all. The action of the Chinese authorities in certain cases is quite unsatisfactory to the Allies.

11. Chinese bandits have been permitted to overrun the districts along the Tientsin-Pukow and Lunghai railways, so that Allied interests are suffering greatly on account of these bandit activities.

12 There is still ample time for China to do something to satisfy the Allied Powers; as one of the members, the Chinese Government will pay attention to the twelve points enumerated by the Allied representatives so as to gain for China equal rights of speech in the future peace conference in Europe.

Let me briefly review these twelve points.

The first admonition is sound, except that men who had been praised and congratulated, August, 1917, should not be thus reproved, October, 1918.

The second is a slur on China's aid rendered to Russian Siberia and on the Manchurian border. Moreover, the eight Allies had never represented that China was expected to aid in a military way.

The third rebuke is a case of outside interference in China's affairs. It was a wedge thrust into the independence and national integrity of China, which the Lansing-Ishii agreement and other conventions had guaranteed to respect. For over twenty years the priests of the Roman Catholic Missions other than French had been withdrawn from the French protectorate. In this war the French saw an opportunity to bring back the German missions under French control. This plan disagreed with the desire of the Chinese, who favoured a complete separation of political and ecclesiastical affairs, and direct dealing with the authorities of the Church. The incidents of war seemed to have blinded the eyes of British and American diplomats as to what was best for China.

The fourth specification, that of liquidating enemy property, deserves special consideration. I shall only remark here that the Allied Ministers regarded the destruction of German business as indispensable to winning the war, and thereby came into conflict with the modern spirit of the law of nations.

The fifth point as to internment of enemy subjects devolved upon the Chinese Government to act as it saw fit. It was no affair of the Allies as to the way the Chinese Government acted, any more than the way the Japanese Government acted on the same matter.

The sixth specification is misleading. Almost from the beginning of the war there had been no trade between Germany and China. Since China declared war, the only business dealings of Germans were of those living in China, acting as commission agents for Chinese and American goods.

The seventh makes special reference to the Hôtel du Nord, which was kept by a subject of Austria-Hungary, not of Germany. The Germans rented a room for their round-table, and the Chinese kept close oversight as to whether this club went beyond the bounds of propriety. The German Protestant community also held divine service on Sunday in the dining-room of the hotel. What displeased the Allies was the failure of the Chinese to expel the Germans. In fact, the Chinese treatment of the Germans was generous, like the policy of the Japanese.

The eighth specification was another case of intermeddling. The Chinese officer who was complained of merely gave protection to refugees from Russian Siberia or interned them, whatever their supposed political affiliations.

The ninth is more intermeddling. When German and Austrian consuls were given their passports, German and Austrian subjects remaining in China came under Chinese jurisdiction, not under British or French.

The tenth is a case of useless worry. There was certainly no more remissness than in Japan or even in the United States. Anyway, the kind of internment was China's sole affair. So far as I know, there was more cause of complaint on the part of those interned. Those interned were non-combatants, not prisoners of war as in Japan. The unhealthy condition of these internment-camps was brought to the notice of the American Red Cross Society for possible relief.

The eleventh point deserves no notice. In time of war and revolution is it usual to have law and order as in piping days of peace?

The twelfth point is a summary, but it gives the gist of the Allied motif, namely, that compliance with Allied wishes must be forthcoming, if China is to secure "equal rights of speech in the future peace conferences in Europe."

After the armistice, not before, the Allied Ministers (with whom was associated the American Minister) insisted on the issue of two mandates by the new Chinese President, one concerning repatriation of enemy subjects and the other concerning liquidation of enemy property. Failure here implied refusal to China's participation in the Peace Conference.

Several joint dispatches or oral reminders were given the Chinese Government as to restoration of internal peace. As a result the two Governments at Peking and Canton appointed delegates to their own Peace Conference in Shanghai, and thus were allowed to send delegates to the Peace Conference in Paris.

What the reader must bear in mind is China's loss of independent action, with the increased power of outside nations to interfere in the affairs of China. In all this interference, the European Allies were as active as was Japan, and with them the United States was sympathetically and officially associated. This was the goal of China's entry into the war, under Allied pressure.

VII. Kindred with the previous calamity that has befallen China, is the other possible calamity of *being placed under a foreign protectorate.* This was the possibility during the Boxer craze of 1900; it was held in check by the generous policy of the American Government through action taken by Secretary of State, John Hay. It may be said that the United States saved China twenty years ago both from dismemberment and from a foreign protectorate.

Today China faces the same alternative dangers, or rather three alternatives, dismemberment, a foreign protectorate, or a Japanese protectorate. It remains to be seen whether China's salvation will again come from the United States, by a wise and generous policy.

As opposed to the threatened domination by Japan of

Eastern Asia, there stands a threefold combination. One is euphemistically called the League of Nations, but which actually consists of the victorious nations. Another combination is that of the four financial as well as military Powers, forming the consortium, the United States, Japan, Great Britain and France. A third combination, as opposed to Japan as well as to Germany, is that of Great Britain, France and the United States. Either form of governing China would be not only a wrong to China, but a reproach to the nations participating in the war. Ex-Senator Burton,[1] writing of a "joint protectorate" or a "protectorate by a single nation," says:

> To both these plans there is the objection that jealousies and conflicting interests would render agreement difficult if not impossible. Then there is the more substantial objection that eventually every nation must work out its own salvation.

The only true policy is that of the "open door," one that includes as before the war "equal opportunity" in all parts of China for all nations. To profess the "open door" and to practise exclusion of some one nation stultifies all right, generous and remedial policy in treatment of China.

Towards the end of 1919 the British Chambers of Commerce in China, which assembled in Shanghai in conference with the British Minister, Sir John Jordan, passed the following resolution:

> That this conference is of the opinion that the time has come when the policy of the open door should be reaffirmed as an essential commercial principle and that its reaffirmation be accompanied by an international agreement for the abolition of spheres of influence.

This action is most commendable. It is worthy of the traditional spirit of the British merchant. But the reso-

[1] New York *Times*, April 4, 1920.

lution must mean what it says. That is, (1) the policy of the open door must be internationally observed, (2) Germany, Austria, Hungary and Russia must be again included, and (3) the combination of all nations, with abolition of spheres of influence, must not lead to an international protectorate or a mandate from the "five great Allied and Associated Powers."

Through the war China has grown weaker and the power and dictation of the victorious group of foreign nations have grown stronger. Hence the renewal of the old cry, "A foreign protectorate for China!"

VIII. Another trouble to arise for China comes from *the spread of Bolshevism.* The end is not yet, it lies in the future. It looks now as if an Asiatic conflagration is to take the place of the European conflagration. Unless preventive measures are taken and a just scheme of reconstruction is initiated, the danger of the peace to Asia is imminent.

How Bolshevism may become a disturbing factor is easily explained. Of all the countries of Asia, China borders on Russia to the longest extent. When Japan took the lead in repelling the Bolshevist advance in Russian Siberia, overtures were made to the Peking Government to join forces under Japan's leadership. This plan enabled China like Japan to take part in the war near to the home base. Thus the military government of Japan first joined with the militarists of China, and then they unitedly joined with the dictator rule of Russia.

At the same time the democratic element of China, which was arrayed against the military autocracy of Peking, was receiving no countenance from democratic nations of the Western world. Appeal for help in democratic development was ignored. The power of militarism grew apace. Here and there a few Chinese, revolting against the rule

of Peking officialdom, ventured into Russia and became mercenary troops for the Bolshevik leaders. Is it not apparent that if the democratic element in China finds no succour or encouragement from Western democracy, while the Peking militarists are hand-in-glove with the Japanese militarists, then approach will be made to the proffered aid of Bolshevik Russia? The most discontented in China will join the most discontented in Russia and together work for the overturn of all government. The extreme of conservatism leads to the extreme in liberalism; autocracy breeds anarchy. It is becoming clearer every day that all the peoples of Asia are agreed in casting off European rule.

John Spargo[1] points out the coming danger. He says:

> Bolshevism is peculiarly adapted to the Orient, both as regards its philosophy and its methods. Indeed, the whole political experience and psychology of these Asiatic peoples tend to make them ready recipients of Bolshevism as a political system. It is far easier for them to accept and believe in political dictatorships established by conspiratory uprisings than it is for Occidental peoples who for centuries have been subject to the discipline of stable government and of established political and legal forms. . . . For desperate and unthinking and even fanatical hordes to follow daring political adventurers and give allegiance to them is as common today in Asia as it was in Europe ten centuries ago. In surveying the recent history of China, Persia and India, for example, it is remarkable how many close and striking parallels to the Lenin-Trotzsky régime one finds.

Dr. W. D. P. Bliss, an expert on the problems of Asia Minor, refers in an illuminating article[2] to the possibility of the Turkish Pan-Turanian movement being linked to the Russian Bolshevist movement, and still further of the "combination of German science and militarism with Bolshevist communism, Turkish nationalism and Tartar fierce-

[1] New York *Times*, February 29, 1920.
[2] New York *Times*, March 14, 1920.

ness." He mentions a statement of Radek, Bolshevist representative at Berlin, that if they cannot be consulted on measures for restoring peace, they will set the Near East and the Far East on fire. "We will," so Radek is reported as saying, "stir up such trouble in Turkey, Afghanistan, Turkestan, Kurdistan, Persia and India that England will not have another moment of peace." Then Dr. Bliss gives this advice:

> The best cure ror Bolshevism is industry. Give both Germany and Russia a chance to get busy and ere long Bolshevism will disappear.

The discontent and desperation of different peoples are apt to ignore true logic in forming combinations, but unite in spite of the inherent dissimilarity of other elements in the problem. It is not at all a question of China adopting a Soviet form of government, but of her favouring the general spirit of revolution.

What would have kept her from this new menace of Bolshevism was the continuance of the Republic's evolution under President Li Yuan-hung in 1917, free from all the perils and entanglements of war. This was the course of safety, the policy of moderation. But Fates, that is, the Allied and Associated Nations, decided otherwise. New intricate problems arise for China to solve, if her perpetuity is to be assured.

A fitting summing-up may be given in the following forcible language of President Wilson as addressed to a group of pro-League Republicans, October 27, 1920:

> We should not be deceived into supposing that imperialistic schemes ended with the defeat of Germany, or that Germany is the only nation that entertained such schemes or was moved by sinister ambitions and long-standing jealousies to attack the very

structure of civilization. There are other nations which are likely to be powerfully moved, or are already moved by commercial jealousy, by the desire to dominate and to have their own way in politics and in enterprise, and it is necessary to check them and to appraise them as it was against Germany, if attempt of any similar thing is made.

CHAPTER VII

COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES AS AFFECTING CHINA

ONE of the misfortunes which has befallen China as a result of her participation in the war is the way the political and commercial equilibrium has been upset. China's complications in the sphere of commerce are inferior only to those in the sphere of international politics.

"Economic rivalries and hostilities," as much as "special alliances," as President Wilson has pointed out, have been the source of all wars; they had to do with China's part in the Great War. It was commercial jealousy that fired war passions and emblazoned war policies. President Wilson in one of his late addresses (in St. Louis, September 5, 1919) said: "This was a commercial and industrial war. It was not a political war." How much more true that part of the war which touched China.

When the European War began there were four great trading peoples in China, British, Americans, Germans and Japanese, of whom the Germans were more and more forging to the front, competitors of British and American merchants, though often having a part in British and American trade and helping it on. In the matter of railway and mining concessions the rivals were British, Americans, French, Belgians and Germans, while in Manchuria there were two other rivals, Russians and Japanese.

From the outset of the war, as conducted in the Far East, the clash was between British and Germans more than between any other two peoples. To the eyes of the Britisher living in the Far East "the German menace" to be uprooted by Japan was the menace to British trade. If as a

result of war a stop could be put to German enterprise, the war would not have been fought in vain. War was simply one way to destroy German business. To the Japanese, on the other hand, the object in mind was more political than military or commercial.

In the early months of the war the contest was not so much between belligerents, like British and Germans, as between belligerents on the one side and neutrals on the other. In the former group were British, French, Russians, Belgians and Japanese. In the latter group were Americans, Italians, Hollanders, Swiss, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Spaniards, and above all the Chinese. In large treaty-ports like Shanghai the British element predominated. British officials took it upon themselves to dictate to everybody. The Orders in Council as to Trading with the Enemy were made to apply to neutrals as well as to Britishers. For an American in China in those days to trade with a German in China was to place him on the British black-list. Neutral rights had to give place to questions of expediency and livelihood. Most Americans, for convenience in trade and banking, consented to yield to the superior force and persistent dictation of British authorities. Americans in China as in the home country were neutral, but through force of circumstances became aligned with the British as the pressure increased. After the fall of Tsingtao there were no more battles to be fought; the only object then was to destroy German business, and incidentally to oppress every neutral who declined to be amenable to British behests. The ones most affected were neutral Americans and neutral Chinese.

The method of restrictive procedure was not difficult. If an American firm, for instance, desired to sell American goods to a German firm to be in turn sold to the Chinese, or to sell Chinese goods through a German firm to some company in the United States, there were two ways

to hamper the transaction. One was to refuse transportation by British or Japanese ships. Another was for the banks to refuse a draft. An American bank would make the same kind of refusal, under warning that action taken contrary to British orders would mean closing up the business of the bank's branches under British jurisdiction. In a word, bankruptcy stared a neutral firm in the face, if it proposed to trade with opposing belligerents in the same manner. It was not a question of law and right, but for the neutral trader one of expediency and self-preservation. It was a practical question, not one of theory, precedent or morals.

In attacking German business all that was necessary was to attack some neutral, notably an American or Chinese.

It was one thing for the British to seize and sell out German business houses in British possessions. It was another thing to bring this about within the confines of China.

This destruction of German business was the controlling purpose in trying to get China to enter the war against Germany. It was not disclosed till China, under American persuasion, severed relations with Germany, and was not consummated till China actually declared war, or, strange to say, till armistice was declared.[1]

Definite action was taken early in March, 1917, by the secret agreement of France and Japan. In return for the guarantee to Japan of all German rights in Shantung and of all German colonies north of the equator, it was made

[1] It may seem that this judgment of the British is wrong, owing to the apparent friendly attitude of the British Government towards German industrial restoration. This new symptom of friendliness, a stroke of good policy, is partly due to a liberal sentiment of the average Briton and to insistent demands of English labourites, and partly to the fact of British investments in big business in Germany and by the use of the consequences of war for the supremacy of the Briton over the German in matters of trade the world over. So long as Great Britain is on top why should a Briton be anything but generous to the defeated German foe?

known to Japan, as outlined in a previous chapter,[1] that the French Premier, M. Briand, demanded, among other things, first, the repatriation from China of all German subjects, and second, "requisition of German commercial houses established in China." France thus became the active supporter of British designs, and through her Japan became another supporter.

The Chinese, accustomed to trade with Germans as with the British, the French and Japanese, little realized the commercial complication of taking part in a European war.

No sooner had China severed relations with Germany, March 14, 1917, than the French ordered closed the best scientific school in China, namely, the German Medical and Engineering School, situated in the French Concession of Shanghai. The Chinese immediately took steps to re-start the school outside Shanghai under Chinese jurisdiction.

British and French plans could not be carried out with any show of legality till China should actually become an associate in war. It was also necessary to have the United States an associate, ready to yield to the British and French interpretation of international law.

The Chinese, left to their own sense of justice, and following the precedent of their recent wars with France and with Japan, or of the war between Russia and Japan, were not disposed to follow the ancient and more rigid rule of confiscating property of enemy subjects. In this attitude they opposed British and French demands, and in the early stages of the war found encouragement in the more liberal policy of Japan and the United States. When the United States altered her policy to the harsh one of ancient days, China, too, had to change.

In the Regulations issued by the Chinese Government in August, 1917, reference was made to the transfer or sale of

[1] See Chapter V, last part.

property of enemy subjects, "whenever such transfer or sale is rendered necessary either by special circumstances or for the convenience of safe-keeping." It is then added: *"The sale of said property must be assented to by the owner of such property."*

The Chinese, however, refrained from such action until the spring of 1919 (after the armistice), by which time, as before mentioned, pressure from eight Allied and Associated Nations was too great to be resisted.

It is recalled that on the eve of armistice these eight foreign Ministers, representing a higher civilization, had admonished the Peking Government under twelve specifications. One was remissness in interning enemy subjects, and another, failure to liquidate enemy properties. Internment regulations, in fact, were not issued by the Chinese Government until October 5, 1918. November 9, the Inspector-General of Maritime Customs and of Salt Gabelle, and the Director-General of the Post Office, two British and one a Frenchman, decided that no Germans were to be readmitted to these three services after the war. About the same time French soldiers also gave a pitiable spectacle to the Chinese populace in dynamiting the Von Keteler monument in Peking, and the German bank, situated within the Legation quarter.

Towards the end of January, 1919, the new President of China issued two Mandates, one for repatriation of all enemy subjects, and the other for sequestration of enemy property. For repatriation needs the British Government agreed to provide the ships, but the cost would be charged against the Chinese Government. For meeting this expense, the Allied banks agreed to loan $500,000, at 8 per cent. interest! In this way the British could consummate their designs with no burden to themselves. The disposal of German property at the treaty-ports, while properly a Chinese affair, if done at all, met constant intrusion from

British and American municipal authorities, thus retarding the free action of the Chinese.

When the question of deportation of enemy subjects came up for discussion at an earlier date, the editor of the *Japan Chronicle,* an Englishman, wrote:

> It is stated that negotiations are proceeding between the Chinese Government and those of Japan and France for obtaining a supply of vessels for the transportation of these enemy subjects. It is difficult to believe that in these days of tonnage scarcity such a proceeding can be contemplated. In any case, unless it be for the benefit of the enemy subjects themselves—e.g., against a possible uprising—the whole proceeding appears to be as unnecessary as it is likely to be futile and expensive.

However, while peacemakers were conferring in Paris, Germans and Austrians, both men and women and children, were being sent home at China's expense, and all German business houses were being liquidated and sold. As an English writer, July 20, 1919, in the *North China Herald* says: "The liquidation of all enemy business in the country, and the repatriation of enemy subjects, were matters of the most vital importance to the Allied cause in China, from the point of *post bellum* considerations." The war was thus a tool for commercial advantage in the piping days of peace.

German merchants, German educationists, German missionaries, whether from North Germany or South Germany, were made to suffer as an outcome of China's entry into war and through the pressure of the Allied and Associated Nations. Whether just or unjust was not much considered. So long as one was German, that was enough to condemn him even in far-away China. It must be said that not every Britisher living in the Far East approved these harsh and drastic measures.

If it had not been for American example, the Chinese

would have refrained from anything more than internment of a few enemy subjects. What, then, is American example? One thing one day, and another thing another day, but in the end conforming to the dominating mind of Britain and France, our associates on the field of battle, in the struggle between Right and Wrong.

At the time the United States broke with Germany, there was anxiety as to the probable effect on Germans living in the United States. John B. McMaster[1] says:

> To quiet the anxiety felt by German subjects residing in our country lest their bank deposits and other property should be seized by the Government in the event of war, the President instructed the Secretary of State to say that such fears were unfounded. Under no circumstances would the Government take advantage of a state of war to seize property to which international law and the law of the land gave it no just claim or title. All rights of property both of American citizens and of subjects of foreign states would be respected.

That the American Government would abide by this announcement of the President was all the more to be expected from the remarkable Agreement of Prussia and the United States made in 1785 and reaffirmed in the Treaty of 1828. This Treaty, which has never been abrogated, provided that Germans in the United States, in case of war between the two countries, should be given nine months to wind up their business affairs, to dispose of their property, and to return to Germany "without molestation or hindrance."[2]

In due time, at request of the Executive Department, a legislative act was passed giving power to a Custodian of Alien Property, A. Mitchell Palmer, to take over the prop-

[1] "The United States in the World War," p. 329.

[2] The Treaty of 1785 was negotiated by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, and that of 1828 by Henry Clay—all great and true Americans.

erty of German aliens living in the United States. Thus from an American point of view the seizure of enemy property became a legal act.

In the spring of 1918 the same rule was applied to Germans doing business in the Philippine Islands. A large number of Germans were deported to the United States, and here interned. All German business was liquidated and sold to Americans or Filipinos, the money being held by the Custodian.

When the American Government acted in the Philippines in the same way as the British Government acted in Hongkong, it became well-nigh impossible for the Chinese Government, taking the example of the United States, to deal differently in treatment of Germans living in China. China had to do as others did. She had entered the war and must bear some of the war's burdens.

The question is: Did this harsh method conform to the best spirit of international law, and was it a good rule to teach an Oriental people?

Chief Justice Marshall once said: "When war breaks out, the question what shall be done with enemy property in our country is a situation rather of policy than of law."

The policy, and the law, too, of America's Custodian of Alien Property is seen in the following language delivered in Philadelphia, November 7, 1918:

> Germany must be made to understand that her plan has failed in the industrial field as in the military. Industrial disarmament must come along with military disarmament. Autocracy in industry must fall with the fall of the Hohenzollern dynasty. The same peace which frees the world from the menace of the autocratic militarism of the German Empire should free it from the menace of its autocratic industrialism as well.

American ideas have travelled far since the early days of the war, when the United States stood as champion of

neutral rights, and as the coming pacificator in a world of passion.

Oppenheim, the English authority, says:

> Under a former rule of international law belligerents could appropriate all public and private enemy property they found on enemy territory. This rule is now obsolete.[1]

He adds:

> Private personal property which does not consist of war material and means of transport serviceable to military operations can regularly not be seized.

Hall, of Oxford University, is even more explicit. He says of sequestration of private property of enemy subjects that it "would be looked upon with extreme disfavour." He continues: "It is evident that although it is within the bare rights of a belligerent to appropriate the property of his enemies existing within his jurisdiction, it can very rarely be wise to do so." Once again:

> The absence of any instance of confiscation in the more recent European wars, no less than the common interests of all nations and present feelings, warrant a confident hope that the dying right will never again be put in force, and that it will soon be wholly extinguished by disuse.[2]

The text-book in American schools of Wilson and Tucker says:

> The most recent practice has been to exempt personal property of the subject of one belligerent state from all molestation, even though it was within the territory of the other at the outbreak of war.[3]

[1] "International Law," Vol. II, pp. 127, 144.
[2] "International Law," pp. 368, 373.
[3] "International Law," p. 249.

The modern spirit of liberality was embodied in the Hague Convention of 1907, Article 46: *"Private property cannot be confiscated."*

From an American point of view it is interesting to go back in memory to over a hundred years ago, to the Jay Treaty of the United States made with the British Government. Article X stipulates that in the event of future wars between the United States and the United Kingdom private property shall be inviolable. Alexander Hamilton in a memorandum to President Washington wrote thus on Article X:

> In my opinion this article is nothing more than an affirmation of the modern law and usage of civilized nations, and is valuable as a check upon a measure which, if it could ever take place, would disgrace the government of the country, and injure its true interests.

What is most remarkable is that men whose countries had been fighting for righteousness should embody in the Versailles Treaty the very opposite of this recognized principle of the Hague Convention and the Law of Nations. Thus Article 297 (B) reads:

> Subject to any contrary stipulations which may be provided for in the present treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property rights and interests of German nationals and companies controlled by them, within their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including territories ceded to them by the present treaty.

This means the possible liquidation of German property in the larger part of the globe. It means at least the possibility of liquidating German property in China. The ground for hope that the Chinese Government will continue to protect the property rights of all nationals within the

limits of China, making no discrimination against those of German nationality, is that the Chinese delegate has not signed the treaty, and that the President of China has already declared a state of peace with Germany. Moreover, the act of sequestrating German private property, though approved by the Big Five Military Nations, is not agreeable to the Chinese for three reasons. One is that many Chinese have had satisfactory business relations with Germans in the past. A second is that such procedure does not appeal to the Chinese sense of fairness. A third is that the British and French at treaty-ports insist on taking the liquidating out of Chinese hands and on managing it themselves.

Concerning this last point, it is well for citizens of advanced nations to bear in mind that at most of the treaty-ports, especially at Shanghai, the largest foreign community of all, the British and French, and not the Chinese, exercise control within extensive areas, where Germans in the past have built up business and owned property. The Chinese attempt to sequestrate German property therein is sure to meet with British and French interference—none from Americans.

Moreover, it has been customary in past years for Companies, formed of shareholders other than British, to be incorporated under the Ordinances of the Colony of Hongkong. When war was declared, dividends due to enemy shareholders were held back from payment till the close of the war. By another Ordinance in 1915 a Custodian of Alien Property was appointed by the Governor of Hongkong, but this only affected property within the jurisdiction of Hongkong. In 1919, after the armistice, a new Ordinance was passed recognizing the Custodian appointed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and so by the British Minister in Peking, as to all China Companies with British registration. "In the case of every China Company the term 'Custodian' means 'the Custodian of Enemy

Property in China' ''—a Britisher, not a Chinese. "Such Custodian shall be deemed to have had and shall have full powers of selling, managing and otherwise dealing with and transferring such shares, stocks, annuities and other obligations of such China Company." Every Company must report to this British Custodian—in China—all enemy shares, and these shares will be invested in his name.

Here, then, is introduced a most bewildering complication for the Chinese Government in its new experiment of trying out the laws of war, as inculcated by one side in the Great War. Incidentally it can now be seen that if the British are to acquire German property at the large treaty-ports, they cannot object to Japanese possession of German rights in Shantung.

That the clauses in the Treaty of Peace relating to seizure of enemy property in private hands have not been more generally criticized by liberty-loving Englishmen and Americans is probably due to a fear of being dubbed pro-German. If, however, the settlement reached is to be more righteous than any in past history, then the leader of political thought and world-rejuvenation should have the moral courage to defend recognized principles of international law and the innate sense of right and fair-play, without regard to race or nationality.

Furthermore, according to the Treaty, Germans are to be deprived of the regular processes of law, or of counter-claims, or of appeal or protest; they must bow to the ruling of arbitrary Might. And this is to be the new teaching of moral ideas to enter into the life of the Orient. Thus Article 298, under the head of "Claims," reads:

No claim or action shall be made or brought against any Allied or Associated Power or against any person acting on behalf of or under the direction of any legal authority or department of the government of such a Power by Germany or by any German

national wherever resident in respect of any act or omission with regard to his property, rights or interests during the war or in preparation for war.

Not only is this drastic ruling applied to German property and investment in the Allied and Associated Powers, of whom China is one, but also to all German "rights and titles over her oversea possessions," which by Article 119 "Germany renounces in favour of the principal Allied and Associated Powers." Thus Article 120 reads:

All movable and immovable property in such territories belonging to the German Empire or to any German State shall pass to the Government exercising authority over such territories.

As Article 297 stipulates that private property in "territory ceded" may also be liquidated, the transaction of world-wide appropriation may be regarded as complete.

In the future, Germans are to have a hard time of it in former German possessions. Article 122 reads:

The Government exercising authority over such territory may make such provisions as it thinks fit with reference to the repatriation from them of German nationals and to the conditions upon which German subjects of European origin shall, or shall not, be allowed to reside, hold property, trade or exercise a profession therein.

How different the opportunities of all nationals of victorious Powers, as seen in Article 277:

The nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in German territory a constant protection for their persons and for their property, rights and interests, and shall have free access to the courts of law.

Verily this is the day of the rule of Might. How strange this guarantee of lasting and just peace!

When these economic phases of the Treaty were telegraphed to the New York *Globe* from Paris, June 2, 1919, the correspondent began:

For many years the United States has contended for the inviolability of individual property rights in war.

And then he proceeded to state these remarkable Articles of the economic clauses, depriving Germans of property rights within the sway of other nations.

The leader of the Administration in the United States Senate, Senator Hitchcock, discussed, September 3, 1919, the bearings of these Articles on the United States, and his words make one doubt the moral aims of the peace settlement. He said:

Again, take the matter of German property in the United States—the matter of private property owned by German nationals in the United States when the war broke out. Under Acts of Congress that property was seized and much of it has been sold and liquidated. In the aggregate its value runs into hundreds of millions of dollars—not less than $750,000,000 and possibly more than $1,000,000,000.

Under this Treaty all acts of the United States and of the Alien Property Custodian with regard to that property are validated unless Germany can show actual fraud.

Under this Treaty they are validated. Under this Treaty the money derived from the liquidation of German property can be used to pay for the debts of Germans to Americans and the balance is subject to the absolute disposition of the Congress of the United States. This power can be used to protect American claims and property in Germany.

Suppose Germany refuses to validate our acts with regard to this property. Suppose she points to the Treaties of 1799 and 1828, under which we agreed that we would respect the private property of German nationals in the United States, under which we agreed that we would give them nine months after the out-

break of any war between Germany and the United States, during which time they could sell their property and leave the United States; under which we agreed that Germans engaged in business, agriculture or manufacturing in this country could continue peacefully in carrying on their occupations under the protection of law, even though war existed between the United States and Germany. Can any one doubt that we would have a serious and dangerous controversy with Germany over that question which might last for generations?

Another day, after a long conference with President Wilson, Senator Hitchcock issued a statement containing these words:

Through the Treaty, we will yet get very much of importance. . . . In violation of all international law and treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of German-owned property here. The Treaty validates all that.

Is this the kind of law, politics and morals that American people and English people desire to see taught to Oriental nations, brought up under other systems of ethics?

May I quote President Wilson, when he called upon Congress to agree to a declaration of war:

We shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and fair-play we profess to be fighting for.

Defenders of the moral value of these portions of the treaty have been known to point to a new mode of protecting the property rights of German citizens, who have had residence outside the Fatherland. The world's conscience is directed to this sentence that closes Article 297:

Germany undertakes to compensate its nationals in respect of the sale or retention of their property, rights or interests in Allied or Associated States.

Naturally one may conclude that if Germans still fail of compensation, the blame lies with the German Government, and not with the Allied and Associated Powers. But how is the German Government to possess the capacity, or even the opportunity, of reimbursing the great losses of Germans all over the world, amounting to many hundreds of millions of dollars and billions of marks? Will the Allied nations postpone reparation charges till the rights of German citizens have been met? Is not this hold of a private German on his own Government like a third mortgage rather than a first? No German merchant whose property has been seized in Shanghai, Hongkong, Calcutta, Bombay, East Africa or Cape Colony need expect any restitution in this roundabout fashion, till the rival merchants of England and the United States have successfully pre-empted the ground and closed the door.

Granted that ten years hence the then German Government, out of the taxes of the people, advance the money to the former heads of business firms in China for rebuilding their establishments and resupplying a marketable stock of goods, will not these men be greatly handicapped in the new competition and find themselves at an unjust disadvantage? Help may come from Chinese, and it probably will, but others of Western nations will be seen, as they are, the opposing influence to German enterprise.

The wrong done will never be realized till some one of the present conquering nations enters on another war, is then defeated, and learns anew that no law exists for protecting private property. It is henceforth an absurdity to speak of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as "the inalienable rights of man."

Another absurdity is that in overthrowing German militarism it is equally legitimate to destroy German business and uproot the ambition to be strong commercially. Does

any one imagine that this is the way to guarantee a lasting peace? Or that this is justice?

Worse than all, the Treaty of Peace did not limit itself to political and commercial issues. It ventured forth into the realm of ethics and religion. Commercialism swamped the boat of Christian missions. At the very end of the Treaty—a sort of climax—an Article is drawn concerning the work, the interests and property of German missions. The property of Christian missions under German management "shall continue to be devoted to missionary purposes" (Article 438), but under control of "boards of trustees appointed by or approved by the Governments and composed of persons holding the Christian Faith." Germany must agree to such arrangements as these Governments will make. Germany as to these missions "waves all claims on their behalf."[1]

Is this not the limit of dictatorial determination? Is this not the greatest surprise of all, that President Woodrow Wilson and Premier Lloyd George should, in the name of Righteousness and "impartial justice," countenance restrictions of this nature to the world-wide commands of the great Head of the Church?

My own views are best expressed by a Memorial to the Peace Conference of the Society of Friends in London:

> It is understood that it has been proposed to exclude, at any rate temporarily, all German missionaries and missionary societies from British possessions, that China is being urged to take a similar course, and that it is likely that German colonies handed over to mandatory Powers will be in the same position. If this were carried out, it is not impossible that some five-sixths of this splendid work would be terminated. We desire to point out: (1) That any such policy or exclusion means that Christian enterprise becomes a matter for exclusive national treatment. This

[1] See Appendix III.

work should be essentially both international and supra-national, and to legislate for it on a merely national basis would be to mistake its contribution to the world order. (2) That the churches of Germany will have scarcely any opportunity for outward expression. This will surely lead to disastrous results for Germany and the world. (3) That temporary exclusion for more than a very short time (say, twelve months) would be tantamount to permanent exclusion. There has already been a long interruption, and it will be difficult enough to resume the work in any case. (4) That, on the other hand, a different policy would do a great deal to help in the strengthening of the best elements in German national life, and in enabling her to take a right and helpful place in the society of nations.

In view of these and other weighty considerations, we urge that all these matters be not hastily decided, but rather be referred to a special commission, which, besides Government officials should include representative missionary leaders from the different countries, whose duty it shall be to discover means by which this valuable work may be continued, by which German missions and missionaries may, under suitable guarantees and safeguards, be readmitted to the territories concerned, and to emphasize the supra-national character of the Christian enterprise. . . .

An admirable memorandum on German missions, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, was presented in November, 1919, by Professor Julius Richter of Berlin University to Dr. Arthur J. Brown of the American Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions.[1] I make a few citations:

About half of the fields of the German missions are wholly or almost wholly deprived of the paternal care of their fathers in Christ. . . . A million and a half of native Christians under the care of German missions, Protestant and Roman Catholic, are in serious danger of disintegration for lack of the necessary supervision and leadership. . . . An enormous amount of spiritual capital seems to be hopelessly lost. The knowledge of the lan-

[1] In *Christian Work*, February, 1920.

guage and of the customs of the peoples, the confidence won by the patient work of generations of missionaries, scientific research, Bible translations and other literary work pursued with usual German thoroughness will fade away. . . . On the other hand, the repatriated missionaries, most of them, stand at the market, looking out eagerly for a corner in the vineyard of the Lord where they can pursue their noble work, and nobody calls them. Many of them are really in serious distress. And so about two thousand German missionaries, Protestant and Roman Catholic, are pushed aside at a time when the non-Christian world seems to cry out loud with one voice, "Come over and help us," and when the missionary conferences are sounding forth again and again the call for more labourers in the harvest. . . . Paragraph 438 of the Peace Treaty creates a new international law, and this law seems to be disastrous for the rest of the German missions. If this paragraph should be put into operation to its full extent, nine-tenths of the German missions which have been saved through the stormy years of war-time would be lost by and by—the missions in German Southwest Africa, in German New Guinea, in Usambara, and on the slopes of the Kilimanjaro, in South Africa, China and Japan; only the rest which lie in the Dutch Colonial empire might perhaps be retained in spite of Paragraph 438. . . . Remember in China now for two years and a half the German missionaries know that the Entente is demanding their expulsion; more than once the situation seemed critical. At any time missionaries had already been ordered to the harbours. Happily the majority of them have been able to remain up to the present time. They do not know how long. This awful Paragraph 438 gives them no security. It eats out the life of mission work; it puts the whole property of German missions at the disposal of the colonizing power, only under the condition that the profit of it must be spent for missionary and educational purposes. It is the strongest contradiction of the super-nationality of Christian missions.[1]

As I have stated concerning commercial penalties inflicted on Germany, so in regard to Christian missions and

[1] See Appendix IV.

mission property financed by the gifts of German Christians, there is more hope that justice will be rendered by the Chinese than by the Entente and Associated Powers. Through China's declination to sign the Versailles Treaty, due to injustice in the Shantung settlement, she may yet become an example to the rest of the world in just treatment of peoples, once enemy, now friends, once belligerent, now reconciled. Not only does the cause of justice receive a blow from these treaty demands, but the cause of Christianity will inevitably suffer in the estimation of all classes of the Chinese, when comparison is made both with the teachings and the practice of the old Faiths of China. It is certain that Chinese officials and the Chinese people, even those outside the Christian constituency, if free to act with no pressure from outside nations, will accord in the future as in the past equal opportunities to the commerce and missionary enterprises of all nations, in the spirit of fairness and hospitality. That which is beneficial China will never reject. She opposes that which works her harm, whether from Buddhist Japan or Christian Europe.

Would not the cause of justice and world-wide law have fared better, if the negotiators at Paris, in respect both to private property and to Christian missions, had observed international law as already established? Was it wise to ignore the Hague Conventions in forming a League of Nations? Was it fitting to overlook the fundamentals of the Christian Faith?

Bishop Gore, when speaking in this country in 1918, said:

> The mere determination to beat Germany is apt to absorb all else. Whereas, in fact, we might defeat Germany and at the same time absorb so much of what is false in the spirit of the war as to defeat our professed aims in entering upon it. That is what makes me ready to do anything that lies in my power to keep the right moral principles of the war to the fore.

The late Governor-General of Canada, the Earl of Grey, shortly before his death, said:

> You know the idea of those words, "He being dead, yet speaketh." A voice from the dead often gets a hearing. That's what I'm after. I want you to make my voice sound from the grave. I want to say to the people, there's a real way out of the mess materialism has got us into. I've been trying to tell them for thirty years—"It's Christ's way." Mazzini saw it. We've got to get together. We've got to realize we're all members of one family. There's nothing can help humanity, I'm perfectly sure there isn't, except Love. Love's the way out and the way up. That's my farewell to the world.

So far as the victorious nations conform to these noble sentiments, will they be able to exert an influence that will work out for China moral regeneration and national salvation.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BLOW STRUCK AT CHINA AT THE PEACE TABLE

We now reach the climax of the War's great drama as affecting China. If, indeed, it was a wise move to induce China to enter the war, then the high hopes held out to her for redressing past wrongs should have met at least a fair measure of fulfilment. If the results were bad, then the initiative move of Americans, supported by seven Allies, was a wrong to China additional to all past wrongs.

In brief, the war has brought havoc to China, and gain to Japan. Germany's interests in China have been injured commercially; China's interests have been injured politically and morally. Japan's position in China has been strengthened both commercially and politically, but not morally. The confirmation of these charges is to be found in the Versailles Treaty of Peace and the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is in respect to China that the Treaty and the Covenant show how far short they fall in meeting the high ideals and professions of Americans and the Allied peoples—victors in the greatest war of the ages.

When armistice was declared, and a Peace Conference was to take place, the Japanese tried to persuade the Chinese Government to leave all matters in the hands of Japanese negotiators. This proposition was not altogether unacceptable, for the Chinese Government ever since its entrance into the war was of the military faction under General Tuan Chi-jui, and had more and more entered into close relations with Japan, culminating in numerous Agreements of 1918. However, the new President of China, Hsü Shih-chang, backed by popular sentiment, insisted on a rep-

resentation from the Chinese Government. At once there appeared divergence of opinion between China and Japan, until the antagonists seemed not so much to be Germany on the one side and China and Japan on the other, as China arrayed against Japan. There has grown to be more enmity between Chinese and Japanese, kindred in race and culture, than between Chinese and Germans, or between Japanese and Germans.

As soon as the Chinese delegation appeared in Paris, the demand came for making public all secret agreements between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. This move, which was meant to strengthen China's claims, was displeasing not only to Japan, but to the military pro-Japanese Peking Government. However, the Chinese delegates gained their wishes in part, but cordiality between the two countries was weakened. At different times during discussion of the League or the Treaty the two delegations appeared as opponents. The final settlement of the China-Japan question depended on other than the strength of argument; Japanese military power and all possible complications arising therefrom cast a spell over the thoughts and purposes of the Supreme Council.

Because Japan was a strong military nation, she was welcomed to the inner group, known as the Council of Five, and later on was assured a permanent position in the Council of the League. China, though she represented a great population and an ancient civilization, was not thus honoured.[1]

Moreover, Japan was allowed five delegates, and China only two. The five of Japan were Marquis Saionji, one of the Elder Statesmen, a veteran in years and experience, and in his early days educated in France; Baron Makino,

[1] It is pleasing to record that through the capable statement of Dr. Wellington Koo, the first meeting of the League at Geneva elected China as one of the Council.

Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Matsui and Ambassador Ijuin, all of whom had received an education or held a diplomatic position in some one of the countries of Europe.

Of the Chinese delegation the chief was Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs and for many years Minister to France. He spoke elegant French, had married a Belgian lady and had joined the Catholic Church. He represented the Peking Government, though not the military and pro-Japan faction. He was more in touch with the French aims than with the American. The second delegate was C. T. Wang. He had been educated at Michigan and Yale Universities, was active in the Y. M. C. A. and connected with the Protestant body. He was first the representative of the constitutional or revolutionary government centred at Canton, but afterwards, for his recognized patriotism and ability as well as for the impression to be made of national unity, he was formally designated by the President of China as representative of the Peking Government. He was an exponent of the American idea, and had taken an active part in following America's advice that China sever relations with Germany and be aligned with the United States. He, like his chief, was opposed to the pro-Japan clique and to Japan's ambitious aggressions.

With this delegation there was associated a group of young men, who were more in sympathy with the democracy of the Southern Government than with the militarism of the recognized Peking Government. They were all antagonistic to Japan. Of these the leader was Minister Wellington Koo, an honoured graduate of Columbia University. As Minister at Washington, he was given a place on the special committee in Paris for drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations. He and Dr. Wang had an eloquent command of the English language, which was unmatched by the Japanese delegation. As the months passed by, the impression made was that the Chinese delegation

stood not only against the Japanese demands, but in support of President Wilson's well-known principles. It was thought that China by aligning herself with the United States had a better chance to frustrate the designs of Japan and to win liberty, democracy and political independence.

The Japanese achieved a victory over their neighbour and ally by choosing the right moment for calling for a decision. It was at the close of the deliberations. The Italian delegation had already withdrawn. Japan's argument for equality had been cast aside. The hint was thrown out that if Japan's claims as to German rights in Shantung should also be rejected, Japan, like Italy, might also withdraw. The decision was hastily made in Japan's favour. The ones who made the decision were not all the members of the Assembly and not even the Japanese delegation, but three men—the Big Three—Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. For making a wrong decision these three men, one an American who stood at the pinnacle of fame, and not Japan, must bear the blame. Moreover, Britain, France and Italy, in the secret compacts of early 1917, had guaranteed to Japan all German rights in Shantung, and had not disclosed the fact to President Wilson prior to the Peace Conference.

Bearing closely on the Treaty I advance the thought which has revolved in my own mind, but which I have not seen expressed by others, "Is it really right that Germany, the new Germany, should be compelled by her conquerors to 'renounce' all her rights in Kiaochow and Shantung, and to sign a treaty consenting to such renunciation?" This termination of German rights is a vital feature of these Articles of peace settlement. No one of President Wilson's Fourteen Points bears directly on this requirement. But the fifth point, concerning "a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims," while not regarded as very imperative in the matter specified,

might properly be applied to territory that is only leased, or to concessions that have been legitimately acquired, as was true of Germany in Shantung. To this fifth point the President adds a principle, a most important one, that "the interests of the populations concerned" must have weight. And here the Chinese are concerned. On July 4, 1918, President Wilson enlarged on this principle thus:

> The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of free acceptance of that settlement by the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

The people and the territory concerned are Chinese. The Germans are concerned in only a minor way. Kiaochow had never ceased to be Chinese territory. It was never a German colony; it was only leased to Germany for a limited period of years. If self-determination is to mean anything, it means that Chinese territory is not to be appropriated by Japan without China's free consent, and, particularly, that the Chinese people living in Kiaochow territory shall determine for themselves whether they prefer to remain Chinese, be under German rule, or come under Japanese rule.

Considering only the best interests of China, and not "the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people," it would have been better if Germany had not renounced her rights in Shantung in favour of Japan. With Germany in Shantung, the spheres of influence of rival nations were more nearly equalized, except that Germany's sphere was a little less than that of France, Great Britain, Russia and Japan. By a transfer under compulsion to Japan, Japan acquired thereby a preponderating influence over all the rival nations, while Germany was totally elim-

inated. Moreover, by the elimination of Germany the Chinese lost their most conciliatory friend, even surpassing the United States. This statement will be startling to many, but it is true to the facts. Germany after the Boxer upheaval changed her policy from the forceful kind of German officialdom to the co-operative kind of German commercialism. Since 1900 the Chinese have had little cause to complain of German aggressiveness.

Alpheus H. Snow says:

> There appears to have been no abuse by Germany of the social, political and economic privileges granted to her. That such privileges are capable of gross abuse in the hands of a Power disposed to use them for political purposes goes without saying.[1]

Prof. John Dewey, after a late tour through Shantung and able to revise his preconception as to the superiority of Japan over Germany in their bearings on China, says:[2]

> No foreigner can be found who will state that Germany used her ownership of port and railway to discriminate against other nations. No Chinese can be found who will claim that this ownership was used to force the Chinese out of business, or to extend German economic rights beyond those definitely assigned her by treaty. Common sense should also teach even the highest paid propagandist in America that there is, from the standpoint of China, an immense distinction between a national menace located halfway around the globe, and one within two days' sail over an inland sea absolutely controlled by a foreign navy, especially as the remote nation has no other foothold and the nearby one already dominates additional territory of enormous strategic and economic value, namely, Manchuria.

He then enlarges on this comparison of Germany and Japan. This statement being one of facts, should effectu-

[1] *The Nation*, September 20, 1919.
[2] *The New Republic*, March 3, 1920.

ally offset the somewhat prevalent opinion that Germany's elimination was desirable, and that Japan's substitutionary position is equally to be desired. He says:

The Germans exclusively employed Chinese in the railway shops and for all the minor positions on the railway itself. The railway guards (the difference between police and soldiers is nominal in China) were all Chinese, the Germans merely training them. As soon as Japan invaded Shantung and took over the railway, Chinese workmen and Chinese military guards were at once dismissed and Japanese imported to take their places. . . . Within a few hundred feet of the railway [at Tsinan-fu] that connects Shanghai, via the important centre of Tientsin, with the capital, Peking, you see Japanese soldiers on the nominally Chinese street, guarding their barracks. Then you learn that if you travel upon the ex-German railway towards Tsingtao, you are ordered to show your passport as if you were entering a foreign country. And as you travel along the road (remember that you are over two hundred miles from Tsingtao) you find Japanese soldiers at every station, and several garrisons and barracks at important towns on the line. Then you realize that at the shortest possible notice, Japan could cut all communications between southern China and the capital, and with the aid of the Southern Manchurian Railway at the north of the capital, hold the entire coast and descend at its good pleasure upon Peking.

Theodore E. Burton, who has also made a visit to Japan and China, expresses much the same opinion:[1]

It is the practically universal opinion that the control exercised by Japan since the expulsion of the Germans, in the autumn of 1914, has been more severe and much more extensive than that of its predecessors. The Germans were at first somewhat ruthless. Clashes occurred in which Chinese were killed. But about the year 1908 [really after the Boxer year] a more lenient policy was adopted. The inhabitants were treated with marked considera-

[1] New York *Times*, February, 1920.

tion. . . . Last October all conductors, officials at stations and most of the trainmen, were Japanese. The spacious barracks for soldiers which have been constructed or are under construction at many stations certainly look like permanent occupation.

Herbert Adams Gibbons writes in a similar strain:[1]

In fact, an open-minded examination of the documents submitted by the Chinese delegation to the Peace Conference leads one to believe that the Chinese had much less to complain of in regard to the Germans in Shantung than in regard to the Russians and Japanese in Manchuria and Liao-tung. The Germans were not oppressive masters of the natives within the leased territory. Their control led to improved sanitary conditions and to economic prosperity. Germany did not follow the tactics of Russia and Japan in using the railway concession as a means of permanent military control.

Mr. F. Anderson, Chairman of the China Association, in his annual message of July 17, 1920, said:

The Japanese administration of Shantung is worse than the German. While there were only about five hundred Germans resident in Tsingtao, all of whom were officials or leaders, there are now over 35,000 Japanese residents.

These facts as to Japan indeed refer to her military occupation of German rights and sphere of interest in Shantung the past six years, and of course are no criterion as regards the future. Whether Japan's policy changes for the better or becomes even worse, there is nothing in the settlement of the Versailles Treaty to determine one way or the other.

Even Americans living in Shantung must soon realize that the substitute for Germany is a bane to their enterprise, whether commercial or missionary. They must re-

[1] "The New Map of Asia," p. 489.

call that when this German-constructed port was formed, the German authorities donated the ground for the establishment of the Presbyterian mission, adjoining the site of the German Protestant mission. Since Japanese occupation the American missionaries and Chinese teachers and evangelists have been subjected to many annoying regulations, while below the girls' school has been erected a palace of vice, lit up by electric light, and an alluring tempter to the unfortified Chinese.

In general, Japan in capturing Tsingtao and forcibly taking possession of all German properties in Shantung, without any one's leave, became more high-handed than the Germans had been prior to 1900. Through these five years, Japan has shown herself both a menace and an exasperation to China. The immoral influences of the Japanese, especially in morphine and the social evil, as compared with the missionary and educational influence of the Germans, cause the Chinese to look longingly to the former days of German administration.

I next draw attention to that which the German Government is called upon to renounce, namely, German "*rights.*" That Germany has had any rights, lasting through the war down to the peace settlement, is beyond dispute; it is recognized by all the nations signing the Treaty; the word, "rights," is even introduced by the Japanese delegates, who, it is understood, drafted these three important Articles relating to Shantung. For Germany to renounce recognized rights is an act of unparalleled, though compulsory, self-abnegation. For Japan to acquire them, when Germany held them only through a grant from China, is a transaction that will not stand in any court of equity.

The German "rights, titles and privileges" in Shantung, as the Treaty words it, came by contract, by treaty. The other contracting party was the Chinese Government, not the Japanese or the American, or all Europe combined.

For dignitaries, who set out to make a Treaty and a League of Nations based on justice, to compel Germany to break the treaty made with China twenty years before, is an anomaly so great as to throw into the shade all other inconsistencies of the Versailles Treaty.

The question then becomes: Did these German rights still exist in 1919? The Chinese and Japanese have both advanced arguments against the validity of the claim. But the inference is not the same. The Chinese are wont to say: "China's declaration of war on the Teutonic Powers in August, 1917, abrogated all treaties and agreements existing between China and the former German Government, and automatically terminated at the same time the Chino-Japanese Treaty of May 25, 1915, respecting the province of Shantung. Upon this abrogation and termination of treaties and agreements, including the lease of Kiaochow, China is the only one who has the right to claim back all interests and privileges conceded to the former German Government."[1]

So Alpheus H. Snow argues against the falsity of the assumption that the Peace Conference in 1919 had the authority to dispose of German rights to Japan. He says:

> So long as China was neutral, the concessions to Germany doubtless remained in force. The military operations of Great Britain and Japan, outside the leased territory, and probably also within it, were violations of China's neutrality. By China's co-belligerency with Great Britain and Japan (as from August, 1917) these violations were doubtless condoned. On the declaration of war by China, Germany's privileges of all kinds in Shantung lapsed, and her state property in the leased territory reverted to China. The action of the Allied and Associated Powers is, therefore, not a transfer of Germany's sphere of influence to Japan, but the attempted institution by the Allied and Associated States other than China of a new sphere of influence in favour

[1] "China's Claims at the Peace Table," p. 15.

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wording of the Versailles Treaty. According to the latter, all German rights are handed over in 1919 to Japan with no stipulation (in the treaty) that anything is to be restored to China. According to the Chino-Japanese Treaty of May, 1915, (a) all German "rights, interests and concessions" in Shantung were to be left, with China's consent, to subsequent agreement of the German and Japanese Governments; (b) the leased territory of Kiaochow, though "left to the free disposal of Japan," is to be restored to China under certain conditions; (c) "the buildings and properties of Germany" in Kiaochow are to be disposed of by subsequent arrangement of "the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government."

The one who signed for China this agreement of 1915 was Lou Tseng-tsiang, who was also the chief Chinese delegate to the Peace Conference at Paris. The Japanese delegates at Paris felt pretty safe in holding to the great principle professed by the Allied nations—sacred observance of all treaties. This assured them a hold on its Treaty of 1915, a treaty to Japan's advantage.

Japan had further safeguarded her position by secret Agreements with three Allied Governments in February and March, 1917. By these all German rights in Shantung were to be ceded to Japan—for favours received.

It was thus no easy task for Woodrow Wilson, in secret conclave, to outvote his colleagues from London, Paris and Rome. It was no easy task to insist on abolishing secret agreements of all kinds; if he looked for success, it should have been through strong action taken at the very beginning of the conference, and not at the very end. Neither was it an easy task to vote for China as against Japan in insisting on the nullification of the Chino-Japanese Agreements of 1915.

It can thus be seen that the Chinese have suffered three delusions. (1) They were deluded in putting trust in

American nelp, should they enter the war. (2) They were deluded in putting trust in American help, along with the help of Great Britain, France and Italy, should they present their case against Japan at the Peace Conference. (3) Later they were deluded by putting trust in action of the United States Senate, and so augmenting the antagonisms between China and Japan. The Chinese are now disillusioned; but only in part. They are still under the delusion that Japan, and Japan alone, has worked harm to China.

We are now able to examine specifically the decision which was made as to the respective claims of China and Japan concerning German rights in Shantung and other parts of China. Both the Versailles Treaty made with Germany and the Covenant of the League of Nations show clearly the results attained by exclusive negotiations of victorious Powers.

I. The Articles of the Treaty, under the separate head "*Shantung*" (as if Shantung were distinct from China), deserve first attention. They present a fairly accurate indication of the conferees' conception of justice and law, when applied to an historic but unmilitary nation like China and to an equally historic but strongly military nation like Japan. The result is a profit and loss account, in which the profit is to Japan and the loss to China. The cause of righteousness is even more a loser. Why should China, first a neutral and then an associate in arms on the Allied side—fighting for justice and freedom as against despotism—be made to lose? Why should President Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau decide *against* China and *for* Japan, after inducing China to forego the securities and impartialities of neutrality and to join the Allies in the world contest?

The Articles in the Treaty bearing on Shantung (the province known as the "sacred" province of China, from

being the home of China's Sages, Confucius and Mencius) are numbered 156, 157 and 158. The word "China" is only used once and then only in an incidental way. The words "Germany" and "German" appear seven times. The word "Japan," a talisman, is used six times. Though everything mentioned pertains to Chinese territory and China's national sovereignty, the conferees at Paris recognize only two dominating factors, Germany and Japan, the one of the past and the other of the future. A person from Mars—Mars in Europe or Mars in the heavens—reading the clauses would not suppose there is any China, or, at least, that Kiaochow or Shantung had ever been a part of Chinese territory.

Article 156 reads as follows:

> Germany renounces in favour of Japan all her rights, titles and privileges—particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines and submarine cables, which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the province of Shantung.
>
> All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinan-fu Railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary stock of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are to remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto.
>
> The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and incumbrances.

This Article, then, relates to three things: (1) to German rights in the territory of Kiaochow leased by China, including the port of Tsingtao; (2) to German concessionary rights from China in railways, mines and their further exploitation (a fine word for a righteous treaty), and (3) to German rights in submarine cables.

Article 157 relates to German State property in the territory of Kiaochow. It reads:

The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as the rights that Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expense incurred by her directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and incumbrances.

Article 158, as if to fill out some possible defect, enlarges on Japan's magnificent acquisition—her "spoils of war" at China's expense as much as at Germany's expense. It reads:

Germany shall hand over to Japan, within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the archives, registers, plans, title deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochow.

Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.

In all this Germany, not the victorious Allies, is compelled to designate Japan to be, what may be called, the "mandatory" of all German rights in Shantung. China, evidently, is one of the backward nations, though kindly invited to sign such a Treaty.

Assuming that it is lawful to deprive Germany of her rights bestowed by China, the disposal of these rights as determined by the Treaty must now be studied.

(1) The *Kiaochow transfer*. By the Treaty this territory passes to the control of Japan. This transfer is obligatory. Any subsequent retrocession to China is not obligatory, for it is not in the Treaty. Germany, too, is required to sign

the Treaty, confirming such a transfer—transfer of a lease of territory, situated not in Germany, not even in Japan, but in China, and of which China alone is proprietor. Germany merely held a temporary lease, and the lease had to do only with administrative jurisdiction, and was not a lease or a sale of landed property. "Under the deed of conveyance," as a Chinese student at Columbia University has well expressed it, "the lessor's sovereign rights were expressly reserved during the period of the tenancy." By the terms of the contract it was assumed that if Germany ever relinquished the leasehold, it would revert to China, the original and real owner. The trouble with the Treaty at this point is not so much that possibly by Japan's good grace the poorest portion of the territory may yet come under Chinese administration—(the best part being an International "Settlement," with China left out, and Japan predominant, or an out-and-out Japanese "Concession" existing alongside)—but that Japan is confirmed in her claim that *her* wishes and not those of China are to be respected, and that *the right of conquest* still rules in modern international law. The Treaty not only enforces the cession of Kiaochow to Japan, but confirms a bad principle, supposed to have no place in a model treaty.

The Treaty, moreover, practically condones Japan's illegal method of effecting the conquest. It seems strange that moralists and legalists—and they thronged Paris—who complain of Germany's violations of international law should have so readily countenanced a clear violation of law on the part of Japan. It is also strange that, under advice, the Chinese delegates omitted reference to these violations, a matter that should have appealed to the conscience of the Supreme Council. The Chinese dwelt much on the point that the Agreements made with Japan in 1915 had been signed under duress, but the Big Four, being engaged in making a Treaty also to be signed under duress,

could not be expected to give serious consideration to such a plea.

It may here be noted to China's credit that when the Japanese claims became known at the Peace Conference, the Chinese delegates, according to Thomas F. Millard,[1] made the following proposal:

> China would assent to have the German concessions in Shantung ceded directly to Japan in the treaty of peace, thus saving Japan's "face" in the matter.
>
> Japan to promise, same also to be written in the treaty, to restore Shantung and Tsingtao to China in two years.
>
> China would agree to repay Japan for all expenses incurred by Japan in the military operations required to take Tsingtao from Germany.

This proposal was rejected by the Japanese delegation. While it showed good spirit on the part of the Chinese towards an aggravating neighbour, it is my opinion that it was too flabby a proposal to merit success. The Chinese delegates from the start should have maintained a strong position by pressing points that were strong in law, equity and reason.

In connection with this possible restoration of territory to China, not by the Treaty but by Japan, there have been many misconceptions and misrepresentations, such as always tarnish truth in periods of war. Even President Wilson in his many speeches upholding the League of Nations has unwittingly misled the public. Thus at Denver, September 25, 1919, he spoke of "the provision in regard to the transfer from the German Empire of the Shantung province to Japan." Even the Chinese delegation at Paris, or Mr. Millard, in the statement above, falls into the same error, as to what Japan is to restore to China. The restoration of Shantung is not in the Treaty. Shantung was not

[1] In New York *Times*, July 25, 1919.

a province of the German Empire, but of China. All that is transferred to Japan is the territory or administrative rights of Kiaochow, being 100 kilometres from the Bay of Kiaochow on all sides.

Another misstatement, emanating from the Japanese delegates, is that Japan, in return for "economic rights," will restore "Shantung in complete sovereignty." It was never known before that Chinese sovereignty had been taken away. As for the Japanese they had disclaimed any infringement of China's sovereignty. Either Japan has been deluding the world as to her intentions, or she is now assuming to give to China that which was already China's and not Japan's. She affects a generosity by giving up that which she had never acquired, and China gets back that which she has never given up.

(2) The *economic concessionary rights.* All these with all the property "are to remain acquired by Japan." The Treaty confirms far more than did the Chino-Japanese Agreement of 1915. It was this allocation of the spoils of war that the Allied Ambassadors in Tokio had secretly agreed to early in 1917. There is even no private understanding that ultimately these rights shall pass to China, although the Japanese first secured them, in 1914, by military force and military occupation. This illegal acquisition of another's property, this triumph of Force, and these secret machinations of Governments on the same side, are all condoned and confirmed by the Treaty of Peace.

As the Chinese Government was one of the contracting parties when granting the railway and mining concessions to Germany, in the form of joint German-Chinese Companies, it would seem as if these German rights and German property on Chinese territory should pass into Chinese hands in case it should be necessary for Germany to relinquish them. But Japan said, "No, possession is nine points

of the law." And the peace conferees said, "Japan is strong, let her have what she wants."

Here, then, were two strong points for the Chinese to press. One may be stated thus: "We cannot agree to Japan's unheard-of and illegal seizure of German property within our domains. We do not claim this property for ourselves. It belongs to the Germans. In any case it does not belong to Japan." The other point may also be stated thus: "We had no part in the secret intrigues going on in Tokio. We disapprove of such secrecy and such intrigue. We resent the intrusion on our national dignity and sovereign rights. We demand a just settlement."

But the Chinese again omitted what was China's strongest point and Japan's weakest.

The Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway in its construction cost $14,500,000. The money invested in the mines already in operation is reckoned as amounting to $4,000,000, though no exact official statement has been issued. It is known, however, that the coal mines in 1914 produced upwards of 1,500,000 tons, and that one iron mine, just opened at the beginning of the war, was capable of producing ore with 66.4 per cent of iron. Japan acquires all this "free of charge." With this as a beginning Japan will find the task of developing mines and maintaining railways much easier than have the Germans. There is a start with a bonus. There is even no royalty to be paid the Chinese Government. "Her railway and mining concessions will yield at least $40,000,000 a year."[1]

As to any favours to be extended to China hereafter there is no mention in the Treaty. China's rights are not important enough to be noticed or guaranteed. The Treaty is even less considerate of China in this respect than the Agreement made in September, 1918, by the Japanese Government and by the militaristic, pro-Japanese Government

[1] Charles Merz in *Asia* for September, 1919.

of Peking. Concerning this Agreement K. K. Kawakami[1] writes:

In the above-named instrument Japan agreed to (1) withdraw all troops along the railway lines, (2) entrust the Chinese Government with the policing of the lines, (3) defray the expenses of such policing from the funds of the railway company, (4) employ Chinese for the operation of the lines, and (5) abolish the civil government established by Japan for the administration of Kiaochow and the railway zone.

Young China, however, takes exception to Japan's retention of economic rights, judging Japan of the future by Japan of the past. "Japan," it is said, "will keep the oyster and return to us only the shell."

Dr. Arthur J. Brown, by no means unfriendly to Japan, writes:[2]

While the Germans had employed less than a hundred of their own nationals on the railway, including the officials of the Company and had used Chinese for all the other places, the Japanese staffed and operated the railway exclusively with their own people. They now talk of joint control by Japanese and Chinese, but no one in Shantung believes that the Chinese share of the control would be anything more than nominal.

Besides acquiring by the terms of the Treaty valuable concessions already undertaken—concessions granted by China to Germany alone—Japan acquires what is called "the exploitation of the mines." In the condensed draft first made public it was glaringly stated as "the rights of exploitation." Some of us had dreamed that Woodrow Wilson would be able to persuade his diplomatic comrades to abandon the baneful policy of exploiting weak nations,

[1] In *Asia* for September, 1919.
[2] In *Asia*, September, 1919.

but, instead, we find *exploitation* incorporated as a principle in the Treaty of Peace. Among the schemes of exploitation are two new railway lines to reach into the two other provinces, Kiangsu and Chihli, and near to a third province, Honan. Knowing how Japanese-controlled railways in Manchuria have been managed to the weakening of China's political strength and the retarding of foreign commercial enterprises, the prospect for Chinese and other nationals in the provinces directly south of Peking is by no means assuring. Mr. Kawakami[1] says:

> The cost of building these two lines is estimated at $35,000,000. Of this total $10,000,000 was advanced to China in September, 1918, when the agreement was made. It should be emphasized that these lines are not to be built or owned or operated by Japan or Japanese interests. They are to be built by China herself, and will be owned and operated by her. Japan's only part in the enterprise is to advance the necessary funds, which is absolutely legitimate.

In calculating on the future it is indeed only fair to recognize the bare possibility of Japan's adopting a conciliatory, co-operative policy towards the development of China, just as the equally energetic Germans have pursued for nearly two decades. Even so, Japanese by advancing the capital hold first mortgage on the railways. It is this method of exploiting China, in which all concessionaires participate, that serves to enslave China.

(3) *Japan's possession of German State submarine cables.* This is a new feature of the peace settlement that goes beyond the Arrangements made by Japan with China in either 1915 or 1918. It is a loss to China only in the sense that it adds to Japan. In the first place, I see no justice in taking these cables away from Germany. In the

[1] In *Asia*, September, 1919.

second place, I see no justice in transferring them to Japan rather than to China, should it be necessary to take them from Germany. As England, France and Japan insist on controlling the land end of all cables that touch their soil, so China should have control of these particular cables that connect Chinese ports, Shanghai, Tsingtao and Chefoo. Moreover, by previous arrangements these submarine cables are all linked with the Chinese telegraph system. They concern China and no outside country.

(4) *All German State property in Kiaochow,* i. e., in Tsingtao, is acquired by Japan, "free and clear of all charges and incumbrances." Why by Japan and not by China? This, too, goes beyond the Agreement of 1915, which stipulates that their disposal, along with that of other German property, shall be by "mutual agreement" of the two Governments, Chinese and Japanese. For Japan to possess such valuable property on Chinese sovereign territory places her in a stronger position than China. The only country to have first place in China should be China.

(5) *All German official documents* bearing on the territory of Kiaochow are to be handed over to Japan. Most of these documents which do not concern Germans among themselves, concern China. None probably concern Japan. But Japan is to come into possession. She is a kind of super-state, as by appointment of the Peace Conference.

Beside all these astounding dispositions of what was once German, beside the recognition by the Treaty of Peace of various illegalities, of the principle of conquest, of the spoils of war, of the reign of Force, of secret compacts, and of the continued prevalence of exploitation, the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, one and inseparable, tacitly confirm Japan in her position of supremacy in China. This is in addition to previous confirmation in the Lansing-Ishii Exchange of Notes in 1917. For Japan to secure such recognition is all-important. China, on the

other hand, is slighted, ignored, deserted. The Chinese are disappointed, chagrined, and, in some cases, indignant.

Dr. Arthur J. Brown[1] mentions that while at the beginning of the war there were only 3,740 Germans in all China, the Japanese at Tsingtao increased from a few dozen to 50,000 by the end of 1917, and at Tsinan-fu, the provincial capital, to 22,000. "Colonies of varying size," he says, "are to be found in other important cities, and traders, engineers and other Japanese on various quests are in evidence, in almost every part of the province," where, by the way, they have no right to be, as by all treaty arrangements not yet annulled. He also says: "Politically, their ascendancy is absolute. It is true that outside Tsingtao Chinese officials theoretically have 'unimpaired sovereignty'; but the average official finds a Japanese 'advisor' at his elbow and that it is the part of prudence to heed the 'advice' that is given." He then quotes from a local observer:

> This province is quite under the power of the Japanese. There is scarcely a department that has not been entered by them. They are in strategic posts and positions everywhere. Non-residents of China cannot conceive of the situation. Foreign gold bribes unscrupulous leaders to fight each other. The boundary of the "leased territory" is being illegally extended.

More important in the eyes of the Japanese than the ultimate disposal of Kiaochow has been a commanding political principle, and that is, that all matters affecting the relationship of Japan and China do not lie within the purview of the Peace Conference or the League of Nations and must not even be mentioned, but must await some future conference of Chinese and Japanese. And the Supreme Council saw fit to bow to this assumption. Where, then, was advantage to accrue to China through personal represen-

[1] In *Asia* for September, 1919.

tation at the Peace Conference—the *beau ideal* of all the dreams when in 1917 China threw herself into the war maelstrom?

Mr. David Fraser, the Peking correspondent of the *Times* of London, writing of the claims of the Chinese delegates, says:[1]

> They did not explain that the real point at issue was not Kiaochow, or the economic rights of Germany, but the fact that these things in the hands of Japan meant something quite different from what they meant in the hands of Germany.

C. T. Wang, the second Chinese delegate at the Peace Conference, in an article in the *Outlook* of August, 1919, speaks of Japan's hold on "China's vastly rich mineral resources," and her training of "the great reservoir of man power" in China, and asks, "Can you not see that there would be a menace to the world much more serious than Germany could ever be?" He then refers to the way Japan, by her railway schemes jutting from Shantung, will flank the two grand trunk lines from Tientsin to Nanking and from Peking to Hankow. He also cites the railway system being worked out in Manchuria and Mongolia. He sums up most clearly:

> That means that Peking will be isolated. . . . At any time the Japanese can close their pincers and nip Peking.

That this discussion may be fair to Japan, I here quote from a speech of Kuo Tai-chi, an advisor to the Chinese delegation, given July 25, 1919, in New York City. He said:

> Shortly before the Fiume question came up in Paris, two Japanese officials came to me personally with an offer that was

[1] *North China Herald*, August 2, 1919.

obviously inspired by the higher Japanese authorities. Their offer in brief was this: If China would agree to the indirect restitution of Germany's former rights in accordance with the 1915 treaties, Japan would agree (1) to relinquish the right of establishing an exclusive settlement in Kiaochow, (2) to operate the trans-Shantung Railway jointly with China, (3) to renounce any claim to spheres of influence in Shantung, thus taking the lead in this matter among the Great Powers, and (4) to invite other foreign capital to aid in the building of the two projected railroad lines connecting northern and southern China.

This offer was obviously more modest than what Japan actually got through the treaty. A week after the offer was made the Fiume question came up so as to obscure everything else, but the Japanese saw that they could use it to get more than they expected. They threatened to withdraw from the conference, and it was pointed out that if she did so, England, through her defensive alliance with Japan and as a result of the pact of London, might be compelled to follow suit. Thus she forced a decision in her favour through simple bluff and intrigue.

It is to be doubted whether the Chinese were wise in putting aside the proposals as here made. They were, as Mr. Kuo says, "more moderate" than appear in the final draft of the Treaty. In a word, it seems more and more evident that China got less from the Peace Conference than she would have got, or will yet get, by direct negotiation with Japan.

II. To complete this study, attention must be given to a few minor blessings bestowed on China in another part of the Versailles Treaty. They are Articles 128-134, inclusive, under the separate head "*China,*" as if China and Shantung were in different parts of the world. I only give a summary, for that is all these Articles deserve.

(1) Germany renounces in favour of China "all benefits and privileges" from the Protocol of September, 1901, after the Boxer uprising, and "any claim to indemnity." This

relief actually came to China when she declared war on Germany, August, 1917, but the Treaty makes it appear that the relief was granted through the thoughtfulness of the Peace conferees. The Chinese had indeed asked that they be relieved of the Boxer indemnity to *all* countries, but all that the Allied countries can now promise is that Germany shall be forced to renounce her share. Others may follow later. Thus far only the United States and Germany see eye to eye!

(2) "China will no longer be bound to grant to Germany" any advantages from the Chinese tariff arrangement of 1902, or the arrangements of 1905 and 1912 regarding the Whang-Poo River Conservancy. This automatically occurred when China declared war, and needs no mention in the treaty. It only remains for China and Germany to make new treaties after peace is restored, as has already been done by proclamation of the President of China. The Chinese sought for revision of all treaties with all countries and for complete control of China's own tariff. It may be that the German Republic will set an example to all the rest of kind treatment of the Chinese nation.

(3) All German State property in the once German "Concessions" of Tientsin, Hankow or elsewhere in China (except of course Kiaochow) is acquired by China. This is most considerate. Why did not Japan ask for all of it? There is one limitation to China's sovereignty; she must not touch the public or private property of Germany within the Legation quarter of Peking, a quarter which is an eyesore to all Chinese.

(4) The astronomical instruments seized by official Germany in 1900 and 1901 are to be sent back to Peking. Several years ago the German Government offered to return the instruments, but the Chinese politely declined. Now the great restitution will be made.

(5) Germany relinquishes to China the German Concessions of Tientsin and Hankow. China in acquiring them must "open them to international residence and trade," thus granting more than the Japanese, under the Treaty, need grant in the territory of Kiaochow. The Chinese have longed for the extinction of all extra-territorial jurisdiction at the treaty-ports. A start is made in the ex-German Concessions of two treaty-ports.

(6) Germany is forbidden to present any claims against China or the Allied and Associated Nations in connection with the internment and repatriation of Germans, or the liquidation and sequestration of German property in China. Properly handled, the Chinese Government ought to get quite a sum of money by this dubious transaction duly legalized by the Allied and Associated Governments. The two Allied nations, Britain and France, reap an even greater harvest. And no German can find redress under any known law of these advanced nations.

(7) German State property in the British Concession at Shameen in Canton reverts to Great Britain. This is only a drop in the bucket of the British treasury, but it helps to soothe the thirst for gold.

(8) The Medical and Engineering School established by the Germans in Shanghai, and unfortunately located in the French Concession, must be given over to the joint control of the French and Chinese. As the German educational work in Tsingtao is to be directed by Japanese, that in Shanghai will be directed by Frenchmen. The Chinese will be "assistants." The future will reveal results. The astounding fact remains that German scientific skill for the benefit of the Chinese is by Treaty placed under a ban.

Comparing what China got under the section entitled "China," and what Japan got under the section entitled "Shantung," it seems to me much as if the Big Three—the greatest men in the world—had given Japan a most sump-

tuous repast, and at the close had handed as a "tip" a few dimes or paper rubles to China, standing by in "watchful waiting."

III. The *Covenant of the proposed League of Nations,* incorporated as a part of the Treaty, also affects China, equally to her disadvantage.

(1) In Article 21 of the Covenant it has been inserted that *"regional understandings"* shall be exempt from control of the League. These words with special mention of the American Monroe Doctrine were introduced into the re-draft with the idea of satisfying those Americans who felt that the form of Covenant was endangering this traditional American Doctrine. But if reference was needed, there should have been a distinct and sole reference; the Monroe Doctrine should not have been made subordinate to any superior idea called "regional understanding." What the American Senate asked for was a "specific exemption" of the Monroe Doctrine, but here in the League it is wrapped up in a new terminology, originating in a British brain, "regional understanding." The Japanese can now claim that whether they have any Monroe Doctrine of their own or not, to be applied to Eastern Asia, they certainly have a "regional understanding" with the United States, in the Lansing-Ishii agreement, as to Japan's "special interests" in China through "territorial propinquity." Quite probably Japan has also an understanding with Great Britain and France. The phraseology is a most unwise selection for preserving a particular American policy.

(2) An indirect harm to China was the rejection of the clause which the Japanese desired to have introduced into the preamble: "by the endorsement of the principle of *equality of nations* and just treatment of their nationals." This is generally spoken of as "the no-racial discrimination" clause. Japan has not sought for what is commonly

called racial equality, but for equality of nations, with no discrimination against one on account of race. This was an eminently fair proposal, prudently and moderately phrased. The Japanese laid great stress upon its adoption. It was heartily supported by the Chinese, for China and Japan are the only two countries of the world which are discriminated against merely because of nationality or race. Even when the principle was rejected, the Japanese reserved the right to bring it up before the Assembly at some future time. This was one reservation which did not need to be submitted to the Peace Conference for approval or disapproval. The principle is distinct from the right which every nation possesses to make its own laws concerning immigration, only that those excluded are excluded because of a general requirement, based on character or other quality rather than on nationality or race. By adoption of the principle, Japan and China would have been satisfied. Moreover, President Wilson's principle of religious liberty might also have been adopted at the same time. On the other hand, by rejection of these two great principles, the League lost much of its power for good, and the Japanese delegates were placed in an ignominious position. They were mortified still more, because, having been honoured by a seat among the ruling Five in the Supreme Council, their presence after the first few sessions was no longer sought. They were further offended by the insistence that Japan adopt the mandatory system as to the late German colonies north of the Pacific, instead of being allowed actual possession as they claimed to be their just dues. The result was that they insisted on being satisfied in all their demands concerning German rights in Shantung. If Japan had lost out here, it is needless to say her delegates would never have dared to return home, the Japanese nation would have been aroused, the League would have been rejected and the German Treaty with it, and Japan would

have made a separate treaty with Germany, in which the clause of no race discrimination would have been incorporated. Thus failure to be just on one matter—just to both Japan and China—ended in being glaringly unjust to China.

There seems to be a difference of opinion as to what Japan would have done, if her claims as to Shantung had been rejected. Secretary Lansing before the Senate Committee asserted that even if the Shantung agreement had not been made, the Japanese signature to the League of Nations would have been obtained, as also the Chinese; but President Wilson reached the conclusion that the Japanese signature would have been lacking.[1] E. T. Williams, one of the expert advisors, thoroughly familiar with Chinese questions, also expressed the opinion that "Japan probably would have refused to sign the treaty," if she had not been awarded the Shantung settlement. "An impassé would have resulted,"[2] he said.

IV. To complete an understanding of the feelings of the Chinese, as well as of the Japanese, it is necessary to know just what the *Chinese delegates claimed* or wanted. They presented desiderata rather than claims. They asked, perhaps, too much, but their much asking was in proportion to their great faith in the League idea and in the justice of the Peace Conference. Their requests included seven important particulars:

1. Spheres of influence and special interests. "The Powers are to declare that they neither possess nor claim" any of these, and "are ready to revise all treaties, agreements, notes and contracts establishing such."

2. Troops and police. "All foreign troops and police on Chinese soil to be immediately withdrawn," especially Legation guards.

[1] Press notices, August 20, 1919.
[2] Press reports, August 23, 1919.

3. Foreign post-offices, wireless stations and telegraphs. "All the post-offices to be suppressed before January 1, 1921, and no telegraphic installation to be established afterward."

4. Consular jurisdiction. On China's promulgation of five new codes by end of 1924 and creating new tribunals, extra-territorial jurisdiction is to be abandoned.

5. Leased territories. "These are to be restored to China."

6. Foreign municipal Concessions. "All such are to be restored to China at the end of 1924."

7. Autonomy in respect of customs tariff. "After a time to be agreed upon mutually, China is to have the right to fix her own tariffs."

All these were just requests. Their fulfillment depended on all the Treaty Powers, and not on Japan alone. If Great Britain, France and the United States had complied, Japan would have followed suit. Japan's excessive demands would have disappeared. China would have been helped forward on the path of progress, independence, self-determination and a national spirit. President Wilson, in an address delivered at Pueblo, September 25, 1919, confessed that China had not been treated rightly, but trusted to the League to rectify what the past and present had failed to accomplish. Better men in the future were to come to China's rescue. I quote in part:

> You have heard a great deal, something that was true and a great deal that was false, about that provision of the Treaty which hands over to Japan the rights enjoyed in the province of Shantung in China. In the first place, Germany did not enjoy any rights there that other nations had not already claimed. For my part, my judgment, my moral judgment, is against the whole set of concessions. They were all of them unjust to China, they ought never to have been enacted, they were all exacted by duress from a great body of thoughtful and ancient and helpless people.

There never was any right in any of them. Thank God, America never asked for any, never dreamed of asking for any. But when Germany got this concession in 1898, the United States made no protest whatever. . . . Immediately following that concession to Germany there was a concession to Russia of the same sort, of Port Arthur, and Port Arthur was handed over subsequently to Japan on the very territory of the United States. Do you remember that when Russia and Japan got into war with one another, the war was brought to a conclusion by a treaty written at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and in that treaty, without the slightest intimation from any authoritative sources in America that the Government of the United States had any objection, Port Arthur, Chinese territory, was turned over to Japan? . . . Article X says that no member of the League, and that includes all these nations that have demanded these things unjustly of China, shall impair the territorial integrity or the political independence of any other member of the League; and China is going to be a member of the League. . . . I for my part have a profound sympathy for China and I am proud to have taken part in an arrangement which promises the protection of the world to the rights of China.

This is all very well to say; the promises are glowing. But China has had promises before—when she declared war to please the Allies, and when she appeared through official representation at the Conference in Paris. What did the promises amount to? Why postpone an act of redress? President Wilson took part in the arrangement not only of a League of Nations but of the Treaty of Peace. The Treaty was the first-fruits of the League. That Treaty compelled Germany to renounce all that was hers in Shantung in favour of Japan. And China was deserted. "By their fruits ye shall know them."[1]

It was said that compromise was unavoidable. But on matters of principle there can be no compromise. This

[1] See Appendix V.

Treaty, as a lesson to Germany, was to be a treaty of justice. High moral ideas had been proclaimed by the head of the American nation and had been accepted by both sides in the deadly conflict as a basis for negotiation. The Covenant of a great League was drafted, safeguarding peace and upholding righteousness. And at the end the Chinese are told, "Yes, we have all done wrong. There is no help for it. We promise by an oath on the Covenant that we will not wrong you in the future."

When the decision of April 30, 1919, was made known to the Chinese delegation, and consolation was offered in the remedial powers of the League of Nations, if the Chinese only remained patient, one of the delegates gave this apt reply:

> Sirs, your assurances do not give us any ground for hope. In the first place the League of Nations as yet has no existence; secondly, if it is organized its power and authority are problematical; thirdly, in any event the real ruling power of the League will be the same nations that made the decision in the Shantung case and wrote the terms of the Treaty and the Covenant of the League; fourthly, it is not logical to assume that a League that is created in conjunction with the Treaty, and by the same body, is intended to reverse the provisions of that Treaty; fifthly, it is only the weak nations that are told to depend on the League for justice, while the strong Powers refuse to depend on it for their own security and rights, but state openly that other guarantees are necessary.

What happened a few days later when the Treaty, embodying the Covenant, was signed, is that the Chinese delegates, having been humiliated and wronged, were absent, and all because their requests as to how they could sign in honour and self-respect were spurned as had been all their requests at the Peace Table before the Supreme Council. I quote the Chinese Statement to President Wilson, June 28, 1919:

Our country has given way step by step in our claim. At first, we wanted to embody a reservation in the Treaty itself; it was not granted. Then we modified our demand to mentioning it in an annex; it was also disallowed. We further asked that a declaration guaranteeing restitution be given us independently of the Treaty; again not granted. At last we even offered to accept a mere declaration without any guarantee; our offer was again rejected. We were obliged to say that as a final compromise we would accept a letter from each of the Great Powers, simply stating that our signature on the Treaty would not prejudice any readjustment that we might propose in the future. Up to this noon all our requests have been entirely rejected to our disappointment. . . . It is to our surprise and indignation that the Plenary Council should have acted in such an autocratic way, without showing even an infinitesimal degree of consideration toward the honour and dignity of our country.

China made many requests to the Peace Conference, and from the standpoint of reason and the sense of right argued well. China had, indeed, a hearing. Secret agreements made by China's military faction and Japan were brought to the light. China opposed Japan, antagonized Japan and trusted America, Great Britain and France. After all this, it is not China, but Japan in China, that is stronger than before the war, yea, before the framing of that Treaty which is to assure the world a reign of justice under lasting peace.

Japan cannot alone be blamed. Even the United States must be held responsible, especially the Executive Branch of the Government. The American Minister in Peking for more than two years buoyed China up with assurances of American succour. The President of the United States, chief exponent of right principle at the Peace Conference, failed to satisfy China's hopes or the world's sense of justice. The whole procedure from February, 1917, to June, 1919, has been detrimental to American prestige and in-

fluence in China. The Japanese may be blamed, but not by Americans.

Having failed at Paris with the executive and diplomatic agents of the three mighty nations whose word is law, a few of the Chinese delegation had recourse to the United States Senate, like a drowning man clutching at a straw. As early as May, 1919, they urged the Senate to assist in securing a revision of the Shantung settlement "by speedily passing a resolution affirming the same to be inconsistent with the national honour and interests of America, an incredible injustice to China, and a danger to the world peace." After much agitation the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations presented to the Senate a majority report favouring as an amendment the substitution of "China" for "Japan" in the three Articles 156, 157 and 158. With my knowledge of the Oriental temperament, this drastic alteration seems unnecessarily offensive to the Japanese, while it will accomplish nothing for China.

Later on, November 18, 1919, the Senate adopted by a majority vote fifteen reservations, the seventh of which reads:

> The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157 and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said Articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.

Still later the words at the close referring to China and Japan were omitted, and the reservation as such was again adopted by a majority vote. Either form being linked with all the other reservations and then with ratification of the Treaty as thus modified requires a two-thirds vote to be effective. The reservation, however, defends American prestige in the estimation of the Chinese, and so far is a patriotic move. But no one need suppose that China will

be rescued thereby from her present entanglements. If China is rescued, it will not come from the Versailles Treaty, even as thus modified, neither will salvation come, I am sorry to admit, from the United States Government. China's rescue depends, strange to say, on a changed Japan.

After all the discussion that has taken place, in the Senate, in the White House, on many a platform and in the secular and religious press, the conscientious-minded man must be amazed at the way America's chief delegate at Paris failed so conspicuously to match principle with practice. Such an one must all the more be amazed when he sees the stand taken by the President, even in February, 1920, in reference to the Adriatic or Fiume question, and how he remained indifferent on the Shantung or Tsingtao question. Both questions concern two allies in the late war. Both may equally well be settled by the same principles. This is what the President promulgated February 10, 1920:

> The American Government, while no less generous in its desire to accord to Italy every advantage to which she could offer any proper claims, feels that it cannot sacrifice the principles for which it entered the war to gratify the improper ambitions of one of its associates, or to purchase a temporary appearance of calm in the Adriatic at the price of a future world conflagration.

Substitute the word "Japan" for "Italy," and "Shantung" for "the Adriatic," in the above, and the problem of Eastern Asia is well stated.

Note also these words:

> It [the American Government] is unwilling to recognize an unjust settlement based on a secret treaty, the terms of which are inconsistent with the new world conditions, or an unjust settlement arrived at by employing that secret treaty as an instrument of coercion.

Apply this to the China-Japan question, and what would the plain Chinese reasonably infer? But the President even more aptly, and without any change in language, states the truth as adapted to China and Japan, just as well as to Jugo-Slavia and Italy. The words may be pondered as to whether their significance is the same in Eastern Asia as in Southern Europe:

> If substantial agreement on what is just and reasonable is not to determine international issues; if the country possessing the most endurance in pressing its demands rather than the country armed with a just cause is to gain the support of the Powers; if forcible seizure of coveted areas is to be permitted and condoned, and is to receive ultimate justification by creating a situation so difficult that decision favourable to the aggressor is deemed a practical necessity; if deliberately incited ambition is, under the name of national sentiment, to be rewarded at the expense of the small and the weak; if, in a word, the old order of things which brought so many evils on the world is to prevail, then the time is not yet come when this Government can enter a concert of powers, the very existence of which must depend upon a new spirit and a new order.

How the Chinese nation, yea, how the whole world would be stirred with new moral vigor, if it could realize that such words were to be applied as much to one question and to one portion of humanity as to another! If President Wilson has had a duty to speak positively to Italy and the European Allies, how much greater his duty to warn Japan and to help China, bearing in mind that it was the American Government which thrust the war issue into China and assured the Chinese of the dawning everywhere of a new era.

It has been well said that nothing is settled until it is settled right. And there are many wrong settlements in this Treaty even more than in the League. The following

brave words of Dr. Felix Adler[1] form a fitting summing-up on the basis of high ethics:

It is sometimes said that we must be satisfied with the beginnings of a League of Nations, and trust to future development to improve it. But if it begins with the seeds of mischief in its very constitution, future development can only serve to ripen the evil seeds into full-blown fruition. It is said that half a loaf is better than no bread, and that compromises are unavoidable. But no bread is better than a fraction of a loaf if that fraction contains poison; and compromise, while indispensable as to the means by which policies and principles are effectuated, is wholly inadmissible in respect to the principles themselves. To give way in first-rate matters of principle is not to compromise but to capitulate.

The great men of mighty nations, who were assembled in Paris, in the memorable year, 1919, thought perhaps in their hearts, as they arranged so delicately the sad obsequies for China, that she was now laid away to rest, never again to breathe the breath of life.

China's national entity and her glory were indeed badly shattered by the potentates of peace who met in Paris. But was her life wholly extinct? Is there hope for China in the future?

[1] *The Nation*, May 24, 1919.

CHAPTER IX

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF CHINA

THE obsequies of China have taken place, but she is not yet dead; she is not even asleep. She has only suffered a severe operation and is now convalescent.

The feeling of the Chinese over the decision reached at the Paris Conference concerning the demands of China and Japan is well expressed by a statement from a delegate to Paris, the seventy-fourth descendant of Confucius, a statement sent out by the Associated Press from the home of Confucius, September 6, 1919:

We trusted Mr. Wilson entirely too much. We sent a note to President Wilson asking him how he could reconcile assurances he had given to China before she had entered the war with the decision. He sent a representative to us expressing his sorrow and he suggested that he would help us when the League of Nations was formed.

On the morning of the day set for the signing of the Treaty, after China had been refused the right of signing with reservations, crowds of students patrolled in front of the hotel of Lou Tseng-tsiang, our chief delegate, who had been suffering ill-health and was again confined to his bed. The question of signing had not been decided when the delegates gathered in his room. He was asked for the last time if he would consent to sign and he replied with tears streaming from his eyes:

"I signed the Twenty-one Demands. Can I, must I, also sign this?" It was the only answer he gave and the delegates understood. That is why when the Conference was called to order the seats of the Chinese were vacant.

Facts are hard things to face, but they must be faced by China if she hopes for rehabilitation, prosperity and contentment. Facts are of the past and shape the destiny of the future. That is the reason so few Chinese are hopeful. They feel themselves in bondage to Fate, for facts are fatalistic. A *fait accompli* is irreversible. Wrongdoing, more of the nation than of the individual, cannot be wiped out, though it may be condoned or forgiven. Wrong done to a nation—to China, for example—is a blow, not only at national existence, but at the indispensable quality of hopefulness. There is not any such thing as return to *status quo ante*. Considering, then, what has happened to China these last five years, all the calamities unnecessarily imposed upon her by outside nations, how can we Westerners expect to find buoyant, sanguine, joyful Chinese?

The people of China through hereditary influences are stoical and patient. They bow to the inevitable. Let me give to them, and to every one else interested in China's future, this philosophy of an ancient Greek Stoic: "When what thou willest befalls not, thou then must will what befalleth." To this let me add the philosophy of Christianity, that over all is a kind Providence, overruling evil, "making the wrath of man to praise Him," and so shaping human events that for him who follows the will of God "all things work together for good." As I look at events that have just hurried by, this philosophy is the only consolation and stay for the millions of China, distracted and keenly disappointed. "Some trust in horses and some in chariots"—some in Governments and some in Presidents—but, let the Chinese now say, "we will trust in the Lord our God." On the negative side, the Chinese will do well if they no longer look for succour to outside nations, not even to the American Government, and on the positive side, let them rely on Heaven and then on themselves. "Heaven," it is said, "helps those who help themselves."

A people who have pushed ahead for so many centuries are not going to be wiped off the map. A few selfish, grabbing, callous officials have not the power to write over China, "Mene, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin." If China escaped the fatality of the Boxer folly, how much more is it possible to escape the fatality of the Great War's folly. China, indeed, presents a bewildering maze, but no more so than most of the countries of Europe. "Where there's a will, there's a way."

A correspondent of the Far-Eastern Bureau writes: "It is unfair to say that China must suffer because 'it is her own fault,' and 'China ought to help herself.'" He then proceeds to denounce Japan for solitary, outstanding culpability. In my opinion, China, to be sure, "ought to help herself," and she *will* suffer—not *must* suffer—because it is *partly* "her own fault." Let not the Chinese any more than others be imposed upon by the fallacies of self-complacency. As for their sufferings, there is a way of escape.

In giving a forecast of China's future, I outline in part what is probable and in part what is possible.

In general, all the elements that have brought misfortune to China and that retard the free action of China's development, should be reversed in the reconstructive policies of the future. It is not restoration—going back to the past—that is needed in China, but reconstruction—a remodelling, the building of a new structure.

(1) In particular, in this new structure, there must dwell a *new soul,* vivified by the highest moral energies. During the war period, and even from the overthrow of an alien dynasty in the first revolution of 1911, the Chinese have laid emphasis on the unessential and subsidiary qualities of national prosperity, rather than on the essence of the inner life. And, unfortunately, this attitude of mind has been encouraged by outside environment. The Chinese have been thinking, discussing, wrangling about such mat-

ters as forms of State—a monarchy or a republic, parliamentary government, centralization in the President or the Cabinet, and provincial autonomy. They have divided into two opposing factions over the war issue, and then over militarism versus democracy. All the time corruption has been rampant in the government. Persuasion to action by the free use of money played a part when China severed relations with Germany, and later in the negotiations of 1918 between China and Japan over loans and concessions, the sale of arms and military conventions.

"China," says an American resident in Shantung, "the land richest in natural resources, richest in territory, has *already* become the power of heartless, militaristic Japan, sold out to her by her own corrupt militaristic clique, sedulously, incessantly solicited with Japanese gold."[1]

If Japan and other countries, in their war-propaganda, in their political ambitions or through military necessity and commercial advantages, have appealed to the baser instincts of Chinese officialdom, and are to this degree blameworthy, the Chinese themselves must bear the blame for a quick readiness to be enticed, and for the existing enslavement that appalls the Chinese mind. Conservative officials of the old-time *régime,* though prejudiced against foreign innovations and the material improvements of the Western world, were as a whole more upright, patriotic and public-spirited than the new type of progressive officials. I regard the crux of the question of China's permanency to rest with this moral factor.

The *China Press,* an American paper in Shanghai, for June 10, 1919, used these words:

> First and foremost, if China is ever to rise out of her present shameful condition, every one of her sons must be taught that treason to his country is man's greatest crime. . . . The Peking

[1] *Far-Eastern Fortnightly,* September 29, 1919.

officials have not only sold the wealth of the country, but they have betrayed her integrity. The worst enemies of China are not in Tokio but in Peking.

It is not political reform or any kind of superficial, material reform that can save China in her present entanglements; it must be a downright moral reform, it must be spiritual reformation. Here is a task for Christian missionaries; they have had their interlude of magnifying war, let them now revert to fundamental principles of the religious consciousness. And the Chinese will respond. No greater opportunity for appeal to the conscience, to reason, to the sense of fairness, exists anywhere than among the Chinese people. Their future is promising, if they with the aid of foreigners build their new structure with righteousness as the corner-stone.

(2) China's future lies in the *abandonment of militaristic* methods and in the pursuit of peace and international conciliation. If there is any one object which Americans, and to a certain extent the Allied peoples, have proclaimed to the world more than any other, it is the overthrow of Prussian militarism. But men are learning gradually that some other tag beside "Prussian" must be affixed to that enemy of mankind, *militarism.* In reality the Allied nations have been more keen on destroying the Prussian species of the genus militarism than in destroying the genus itself. It is recognized that the strongest Allied nation in the Orient has been Japan, and that Japan is the prototype both of militarism and of its Prussian form. It must also be recognized that Japan, because of her superiority in a military way, has been accorded a permanent position in the Supreme Council of the League of Nations as "one of the five great Powers." Is it any wonder, then, that young Chinese, fired with a new national spirit, should come to believe that China, in order to be preserved, must also be-

come military? Prof. John Dewey, writing of the conditions in China after the war, says:[1]

> At present the militaristic faction whose power was confirmed by the happenings of the summer of 1917 is still in control of the government. . . . They have welcomed the demonstration offered at Paris that Might still makes Right in the case of weak nations, so that in a strange and subtle way the diplomatic victory of Japan in particular and of imperialism in general has been a vindication of their own anti-democratic and militaristic policy.

One of the younger class in China, a representative at Paris of the Canton Government and of Christian adherents, in a speech in New York City, July 25, 1919, spoke these sensible words:

> We hope our defeat will serve to arouse the sentiment of all China, to the end that she will depend upon herself and that her sorrow will be her national salvation. The war started as a conflict of Right over Might, but I do not see that the end of the war justifies that idea. Germany is crushed, but there is another Germany in the Far East, and perhaps this will not be the last war, for there surely will be another if justice is not done now.

It would have been better, so far as China is concerned, if Americans and other democratic peoples, instead of concentrating their energies and hate on the overthrow of Germany had fought for the overthrow of *militarism* and had refused for any reason to give any countenance to it, whether found in Germany, in Japan, or in the military faction, the governing body of China. By the support given to such a body of men in China by such nations as the United States and Great Britain, and by China's participation in the war and her advocacy of all kinds of war-measures, the view now held is that China, too, must build up

[1] *The New Republic*, September 10, 1919.

a strong army and navy, in order to find a place in the family of nations, and perhaps later on become one of a future Big Six in the Supreme Council of the world. But this view is superficial. The craze for war and disbelief in the power of ideas cannot last forever. Even the Covenant of the League intimates a coming universal disarmament, making a start with the Central Powers. Let the Chinese consider how much greater the gain of their country would have been, if they had remained at peace at home and abroad and had pursued all peaceful pursuits. Their direful experiences from the war should make them turn away from war in disgust, and forego hereafter the military ambition. That extreme lover of universal peace termed a pacifist may be a fool in virile America, but he fits in well to life in China, where the indigenous religion known as Taoism teaches both *pacifism* and *passive-ism*.

Let it be borne in mind that if China should begin to spend millions on a vast army and a strong navy as a distinctively national movement, the Japanese under existing conditions would assume direction, or, in case of a navy, would wait until it became a valuable prize and then capture it. Or, if China should join with Japan in a defensive and offensive military alliance, the development of China's military capacity under Japanese guidance would prove the menace of the future and the opening of the next war. Is this to be the result of the world's wisdom which arises from the horrors of the last World War? Are the Chinese to continue to be infatuated by the war spirit and along this line go to their doom?

(3) There are great possibilities for China if *reunion* is brought about by the opposing governments centred in Peking and Canton, and commonly designated as the North and the South. The fourth revolution of China has been going on for over three years. During the period of the Great War no reconciliation was possible, for the military

autocratic Government at Peking was receiving the commendation and recognition of all the Powers, and was therefore in too sure a position to talk peace with the "rebels" of the Canton Constitutional Government. When armistice was granted to the Central Powers and a Peace Conference opened in Paris, another Peace Conference began in Shanghai between chosen representatives of the opposing factions. They met and discussed all manner of questions, but came to no agreement. It looked as if this Shanghai Peace Conference was a camouflage for the Allied Powers so that no objection might be raised to China's appearing at the Paris Peace Conference. When the Treaty of Peace was signed at Versailles, the Peace Conference at Shanghai took a vacation. When the President of China proclaimed a state of peace with Germany, renewed efforts were put forth to bring together China's opposing factions. At the outset the hindrances seemed too great. But Chinese leaders should persist till civil strife has come to an end, and China is again a united land as she was from July, 1916, to February, 1917, under the leadership of President Li Yuan-hung.

Professor Jenks[1] says, quite correctly:

> The Japanese policy in China has been, clearly, to keep conditions unsettled by fomenting disturbances and hostilities between the so-called North and South factions, and to keep China weak. This is not a matter of suspicion or careless observation on the part of prejudiced Americans. It is a matter officially known, reported upon and recorded in our State Department, and supported by the overwhelming testimony of Chinese, American and British officials both North and South who are fully conversant with the facts.

This task, then, set before the Chinese is an easy one as compared with the attainment of even a modicum of their

[1] In *North American Review*, September, 1919.

aims at the Paris Peace Conference. The first thing is to hold themselves aloof from Japanese blandishments as extended to either side in the civil strife, and to determine that the Chinese must draw near to each other—an internal *entente cordiale*—before they draw near to others, who have State interests of their own. The second thing is for the two factions to agree on a perfectly legitimate compromise, vastly different from all the Paris compromises, that both the old Parliament holding over at Canton and the National Council peculiarly chosen for Peking alike dissolve themselves and that new members of the National Parliament be elected according to the Regulations drawn up under the Provisional Constitution and voted upon by the old legitimate Parliament. Other divisive questions can easily await the reconstructive period. The only fear is that the Military Governors and their militaristic comrades, having had a taste of power and having felt the glamour of gold, will put self ahead of nation. Even here, appreciating as I do the moral substratum of Chinese character, I believe in the efficacy of persuasive argument when brought to bear on the higher instincts of these same military men.

(4) Another task set before the Chinese is to seek friendly *co-operation with the Japanese,* rather than to intensify the spirit of alienation and antagonism in either people. This is, of course, a double task, as great for Japan as for China, but for the moment I emphasize China's part in the laudable undertaking. That which makes it hard for the Chinese to adopt this policy of reconciliation is the plain fact that China has been woefully wronged by Japan in these years of perilous association. Another hindrance comes from the prevailing unwillingness among the strong Powers to be reconciled to their own enemies in war. A third obstacle comes from the atmosphere which the Chinese daily breathe from British and American environment in

China, that Japan is the wrongdoer, that Japan is the future world-menace, that Japan must be fought sooner or later, and that Japan cannot be trusted. Let me give two or three illustrations.

At the end of May, 1919, the Peking Missionary Association, composed of British and American missionaries, passed a resolution to be dispatched to the Peace Conference, expressing in a most commendable spirit and in moderate language "the deep disappointment and apprehension caused in all the best sections of Chinese opinion" over the Shantung settlement in the peace treaty. Where these missionaries erred was in their limited horizon. They saw clearly how Japan should not gain at China's expense, but they overlooked all the wrong which their own British and American Governments had wrought upon China in days gone by, especially during the period of the war, and their backwardness to release to China powers and privileges accorded Japan. I here quote from a letter written by an American missionary in Shanghai:

> The poor Japanese are now the Pariahs of Shanghai. They are absolutely boycotted by Chinese and Americans, and many of the English. So far as Shantung is concerned, I don't see the justice of condoning the secret treaty of England, France and Co., giving Shantung to the Japs, then frothing at the mouth at Japan for proposing to abide by the treaty. It is so funny to hear English people out here blaming America and especially Wilson for the Shantung tragedy. They have not one word of criticism for England's giving away Shantung to Japan, but criticize American weakness and Wilson's hypocrisy as the cause of the débâcle.

Another illustration is a Resolution of the Anglo-American Association in Peking, telegraphed to the New York *Times*, June 7, 1919. The British and American Ministers are reported as being present at the meeting. The Resolu-

tion is more strongly worded than that of the missionary body. The implication is that the wrong and the danger come from the gain which Japan acquires. This is true, but what about English and American complicity? I quote a few sentences:

> We express our solemn conviction that this decision will create conditions that must inevitably bring about extreme discord between the Chinese people and Japan and raise a most serious hindrance to the development of economic interests in China and other countries . . . conditions, which are not only subversive of the principle of national self-determination but also a denial of the policy of the open door principle of equal opportunity will greatly be accentuated, if Japan, a near neighbour, be now substituted for Germany, whose centre of political and economic activities was on the other side of the globe.

The real question to put before men's consciences is this: Why was not a call made to the home governments by these good folk in Peking that England and America appoint a day of prayer and humiliation for their national complicity in international wrongdoing? Moreover, was it quite playing the game for the representatives of England and America to pass censure on an Ally, when in war and peace they were all supposed to be working together in a holy cause and by the use of holy means? As for China it is her mistake and danger to concentrate all her wrath on one nation.

A third illustration is found in the action in the month of May, 1919, of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, who sent to Peking a telegram, suggesting that an envoy be sent to Tokio to negotiate for the return of Kiaochow, and that friendly relations continue with Japan. This action brought the wrath of the Chinese onto the heads of these

two men, for it was a time of intense excitement over the decision of the Paris Conference.

My own conviction, looking at the facts as they are, is that the Chinese, while not grovelling in the dust to Japan, would do well not to stand aloof from a better understanding and *rapprochement* with Japan. Japan by the events of war, fortunate for her though unfortunate for China and, as will be seen, also for others, has acquired a predominant position in China. It is of no benefit to China to increase the estrangement. She must exert herself to cement the old bonds of friendship and to regain her rights by direct approach to Japan. Sooner or later, this direct negotiation will come about, and the Chinese might as well conform gracefully.

The dilemma in which China is placed has been made conspicuous by the offer of the Japanese Government, made January, 1920, to negotiate with China as to the restoration to China of the Kiaochow territory and the carrying into effect of the Versailles treaty bearing on Shantung. The general sentiment of the Chinese people as voiced by the student class is to stand aloof from such direct negotiation. At the same time no sign of relief, no cloud on the horizon as large even as a man's hand, is anywhere to be seen. Hollington K. Tong[1] while plainly opposed to direct negotiations, presenting the argument for the other policy, says:

> Another view taken by the pro-direct-negotiation Ministers is that following its ratification by Germany and the principal Allied Powers, the Treaty of Peace has come into force, and its Shantung provision has likewise become effective. China is too weak to oppose the Allies' arbitrary decision and the United States has resumed her former "too-proud-to-fight" attitude and taken up her hermit life once again, leaving European and Asiatic affairs singularly alone, until possibly another world-wide

[1] *Millard's Review*, January 31, 1920.

war menaces her own shores. In the meantime, Japan has possessed herself of all the German rights in Shantung and is not disposed to relinquish them in China's favour although she is willing to return an empty shell in the form of Kiaochow by negotiations. If her overtures for the restoration of Kiaochow were rejected, Japan would continue functioning in that territory and might one day perpetuate her possession of it as she has done in Korea.

It really comes down to one question: Acknowledging that relief from other sources is futile, has the Chinese Government such capable men today as to dare to meet Japan in the contest of diplomacy with a prospect of success, or at least with gain surpassing either an antagonistic or passive and stationary attitude? I am confident that while China may not gain all that she deserves by right, she can gain more by direct negotiation than by reliance on Powers which have evolved the Versailles treaty of peace.

What makes it doubly hard for calm-minded Chinese to consent to a *rapprochement* to Japan is that Japan prior to China's consent to enter on negotiations about ex-German rights in Shantung, has begun to discuss the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Now such an Alliance, which concerns Chinese affairs, is an offense to all public-spirited Chinese, who have felt the glow of a new national life. How inconsiderate, then, is the proposition of Dr. Henry Van Dyke, made in Tokio, June 7, 1920, that the United States join the Alliance? Do Americans realize that China is still a treaty-making power, and that the Chinese, remembering their glorious past, have sentiments of national dignity which resent persistent humiliation from others?[1]

(5) It is also desirable, as well as probable, that the *Chinese and Germans renew their old friendships.* During

[1] See Appendix VI.

these past years of German enterprise, commercial, educational and religious, many Chinese have become good friends of the Germans. During the war China's Allies annoyed China more than China's enemies did. Prof. John Dewey [1] has said, quite correctly:

> The German nationals in China were upon the whole more popular personally than those of any other country unless perhaps those of the United States. For however arrogant Germany was as a nation, Germans taken individually were sufficiently bent on successful business to be unassuming, friendly and attentive to native wishes and customs.

I regard it that a great opportunity lies before China in renewing and improving the old relations with German friends and with the German Government. It is very likely that Germany will go much further than the Allied nations or even the United States in granting China's expressed desires for larger scope in the development of the Chinese spirit and in the exercise of authority and control in affairs political and economic. The Chinese, moreover, will be quick to make amends for the personal and business injury which they have done to Germans through compulsion of zealous rivals.

Already, April 27, 1919, a presidential mandate was issued from Peking that the citizens of nations having no treaties with China, as newly-created nations, will be denied the extra-territorial privileges foreigners have hitherto enjoyed, and will be placed under Chinese law. They in return will be granted residence, like the Chinese, away from the circumscribed area of the treaty-ports. It is within possibility that the new German Government will, in the new treaty to be made with China, fall in with this worthy desire of the Chinese to their mutual advantage.

[1] In *The New Republic*, September 10, 1919.

(6) China, moreover, must guard herself against any attempt to break, in future, *ties of friendship with any nation.* To be at peace with all the world produces a better temper of mind than irritating ainmosity towards any particular nation. The diplomacy which China needs is that of good-feeling. She can very well leave all hate and rancour, all clamour and bitterness, to "outside nations." She has enough territory and population to look after for many a year, so that no need exists for again mixing in the bewildering, complicated problems of the Western world. With renewed devotion to Chinese interests, the Chinese people of all classes will find it helpful to cultivate the international mind, the cosmopolitan spirit, with no barriers of sentiment, though barriers of boundaries must ever remain, each nation dwelling securely within its own "bounds of habitation."

(7) Whether China should favour a so-called *international consortium* or not, I am not so sure as to speak positively. I am dubious of the scheme. In the first place it is an exclusive scheme, much like the League of Nations. Britain, France, the United States and Japan are the financial factors. In the second place it is an extraneous scheme. China is not included, except in taking the terms of this foreign combine. In the third place the group of bankers, backed by their respective governments, may easily evolve into a Debt Commission, controlling China's finances, and then controlling China.

If all the railways of China could be nationalized and brought into one system under direction of the Chinese Government and aided by foreign experts, China would fare better than under a scheme of internationalization.

Comparing China's indebtedness with that of other countries, she has an easy task in straightening out her financial affairs. Let civil strife come to an end, and the nation be united as one man, then in a few years by honest adminis-

tration all debts may be paid off, concessions redeemed and China made strong. China does not need foreign capital for the development of her resources, until the time when complete direction shall be in Chinese hands under Chinese laws. Putnam Weale in his latest book [1] has given utterance to these sentiments:

> There should not have been a constant policy of frightening the Chinese with visions of a Foreign Debt Bureau under foreign control on the Egyptian-Turkish model. A real Chinese service of the national debt, in place of the present semi-foreign pawnbroking methods. A proper currency system, with token coins and banknotes maintained at parity—these things would be far more beneficial to the world at large than spheres of influence or personal victories signalized by the appointment of favoured nationals to sinecures.

The new President of China in an interview with Carl W. Ackerman [2] gave the Chinese view of this question:

> Some Western people hold the view that it would be a great benefit to China if the railroads, present and prospective, could be internationalized until such time as China could take full control of all the leased zones and concessions, and likewise be internationalized as a temporary measure. From the point of view of China, however, a very different policy receives general indorsement, namely, that, with the view of preserving her territorial integrity, all railroads, leased zones and concessions should revert to her absolute and complete control, internationalization being unthought of.

(8) In a special way the Chinese should build up a large *merchant marine*. The Government would do better by helping the China Merchants Steamship Company or the China Mail Company than by adding on more cruisers

[1] "Truth about China and Japan," p. 118.
[2] New York *Times*, January 17, 1919.

and torpedo-boats to be generously donated to neighbour Japan sometime in the future. When I went to China in 1882, I had the pleasure of meeting the head of the China Merchants Company, Tong King-Sing, one of the most public-spirited and unselfish men that China has ever had. He had just returned from a tour of Europe and the countries of the Americas, with a view of extending trade and communication along the ocean routes. At that time the Chinese had more shipping than the Japanese. Since then the Chinese have lagged behind, while Japan with astounding energy has become one of the great shipping nations of the world. The Chinese merchants still retain their skill, industry and thrift. In the Philippine Islands they have seven-tenths of all the trade. In the other islands of the Pacific and along the Malay Peninsula the business magnates as well as the little shopkeepers are Chinese. When lecturing through the Philippines to Chinese audiences in 1918, I urged this duty upon them as one way to make China strong. The ships plying along the coast of China, or between China and the near trading neighbours, and, later on, the far-away countries of the world, should be a part of this new merchant marine of China. If Chinese merchants and officials at home lack the enterprise, then those who venture abroad and become successful—men mostly from Amoy and Canton—should make the start in this new line of business, raise capital and form companies, and thus stimulate the whole Chinese Government to plans of self-development, sure in the end to bring about true, fully-evidenced self-determination and national independence. The innate capacity of the mass of the Chinese should make one hopeful as to the future of China.

These are a few suggestions as to China's relief from distress, which I humbly offer as one whose life interest centres in that land of splendid record and great potentialities.

CHAPTER X

JAPAN'S FUTURE INFLUENCE IN CHINA

FROM the facts narrated in the previous chapters the reader is able to form his own judgment as to the future of Japan's influence in China as made possible by events of the Great War and the joint participation of China and Japan. I only fear that, without further comment and the presentation of other facts, the judgment rendered may not be wholly fair to Japan. It is only "impartial justice" that can satisfy.

It is extremely hard to speak well of Japan, when one considers what she has done in Korea and in China, particularly during the tragic days of war. But even an opponent or an enemy has his good points. Even a bad policy gains its strength from the good that is in it. Misrepresentation only succeeds because it appears in the garb of truth.

Most modern writers on Sino-Japanese questions have little that is good to say of Japan. I may cite Putnam Weale, J. O. P. Bland, Thomas F. Millard, Professor Jeremiah W. Jenks, *Millard's Review* and the Far-Eastern Bureau. The one writer who has evidently tried to be fair all-around is Dr. Arthur J. Brown in his "Mastery of the Far East."

Japan is manifestly placed at a disadvantage by one's preconceptions as to China's losses and Japan's gains resulting from the war. She is at further disadvantage through many bad policies pursued through the war in haste to make sure her future position. But Japan has also adopted and tried to carry out many sound measures and

good ideas, joined as they are with an intense nationalism and the growing imperativeness of self-preservation. I here quote from Dr. Brown:[1]

> If one is to err at all, it is better to do so on the side of charity, to magnify good qualities rather than to minimize them. It is unreasonable to expect an Asiatic people to exemplify within sixty years standards of Christian character and conduct which Europe and America but imperfectly exemplify after fifteen hundred years. The Japanese have many fine qualities. They have also some grave defects. So have we. It is easy to pick out flaws in any people under heaven, including our own.

This is fair talk emanating from a missionary Secretary. One way to be fair to Japan is to divide with others the responsibility for what has taken place in China, and to share the blame for evident wrongs inflicted on China. This I have tried to do. Here and there I have held accountable Allied action, especially that of the British and American Governments, and to a minor degree the military clique of the Peking Government. I have had little occasion to blame the action of the Central Powers, so far as China's well-being has been affected during the period of war. Germany has received her full quota of condemnation for what she has done elsewhere. Above all, it is well to be reminded that the decision reached at the Peace Conference was not rendered by the Japanese delegate, but by the three chief men sitting at the Peace Table, and that the German Government gave assent through unavoidable coercion. The responsibility of Japan and China consisted merely in presenting their respective claims.

This effort or desire to discriminate may account for the fact that I have been able to retain the friendship of many Japanese, even when I have criticized Japanese treatment

[1] "Mastery of the Far East," p. 242.

of China. Mr. Kawakami rightly says:[1] "If she [China] singles out Japan and makes her the sole object of attack, her purpose is obviously sinister."

Another element of fairness is to recognize the assumption that as between Japan and all Western nations, the former has a prior position in Eastern Asia, but as between Japan and China the former has prior position in her own bounds but not in the confines of China, not even in Manchuria and Mongolia. Britain's obstruction to Japan's inroads into China is due, not to concern for China's interests but solicitude for British interests. American suspicion of Japan's motives must be traced to the future relations or possible war between the two countries, not to a thought of the destiny of China's national existence. No Japanese resents criticism of Japan's conduct towards China, if it is out of consideration, primarily, for China.

Again, the Japanese resent the assumption that Japan must forego spheres of influence in China, while other nations retain the same for themselves. Still more do they resent the idea that Western nations, besides expanding on other continents and even in large portions of Asia, have also first place in China; or on the other hand, that Japan not only may be excluded from British colonies and the countries of North, Central and South America, but has no right to expand on the mainland of Eastern Asia.

Senator Phelan on October 16, 1919, said in the Senate, "If she [Japan] must expand, then her expansion in Shantung, by agreement with China, is more acceptable to us than her expansion in America both North and South." It is with the idea that Japan must be given scope somewhere, that censure from other nations irritates Japanese susceptibilities. So, too, the query arises as to why Americans should seek to be greater than the Japanese in China and Siberia, when they have the leadership in the New World,

[1] "Japan and World Peace," p. 155.

and now claim the privilege of joint decision in the affairs of Europe. Is Japan to be content with a second place, even in territory near to her own doors? Is world ambition suitable alone for Great Britain, France and the United States?

Mr. Kawakami, referring to this idea, says:[1]

If she [China] proposes to discuss Japanese railway concessions at the Peace Congress, why not also discuss more extensive concessions granted to other Powers? While China's hands were tied by the constant revolutionary uprisings in recent years, Russia and England steadily encroached upon Mongolia (1,300,000 square miles), and Tibet (500,000 square miles), and yet China does not propose to bring this grave matter before the Peace Congress.

Dr. Arthur J. Brown, who throws out the same idea, says:[2]

Some Americans talk as if they had a right to the control of the Pacific. If they were familiar with the history of their own country, they would know that the United States did not possess a clear title to any territory bordering on the Pacific Ocean till 1846. Why should we regard our claim to the supremacy of the Pacific as superior to that of nations which have occupied territory on that ocean for more than two thousand years? It may be that the Japanese are over-ambitious and offensively self-assertive. I suspect that they are and that we ourselves belong in the same category.

One of the latest writers on the problems of Asia, Herbert Adams Gibbons, writes with discrimination of Japan's priority in Eastern Asia. He says:[3]

Japan has no aggressive intentions against America or Europe. The ideas of Japan about the future of Asia and the islands of

[1] "Japan and World Peace," p. 157.
[2] "The Mastery of the Far East," p. 252.
[3] "The New Map of Asia," p. 476.

the Pacific form a different problem—a totally different problem. If we expect that we Americans and Europeans are going to continue indefinitely to keep Asiatics out of our continents and out of Africa as well and at the same time pretend in most places to superior and in many places to equal rights, politically and commercially, in Asia, we shall precipitate a great struggle that may have its repercussions in our own hemisphere. The "Yellow Peril" is far from imaginary so long as Europe asserts the right to dominate and exploit Asia. But if we reconcile ourselves to treating Asiatics equitably *in their own continent* (they do not ask more than that!), we shall not need to prepare for "the next war" with Japan.

Another factor is the feeling which Japanese naturally have that for far-away nations to concern themselves with what Japanese and Chinese have settled between themselves is an act of presumption, if not of out-and-out interference.

What the peoples of the Western world must now take into account is that as the result of the war, into which Japan and China were invited to enter, Japan, as a matter of fact, has now the position of predominance in Eastern Asia. No Western nation, except through war, can dispossess Japan. Western nations may feel chagrin at the altered status of East and West, but they are reimbursed by wider scope and larger power in other parts of the earth's surface.

Dr. Iyenaga has written:[1]

> Japan wants her position in the Far East recognized and appreciated, and to her should be confided the maintenance of peace and order there.

This fact of Japan's predominance, as I have said in previous chapters, must be faced by the Chinese. So, too,

[1] New York *Evening Post*, June 30, 1917.

the Japanese may recognize the fact, but in the recognition they do well to place a curb on their vanity and ambition, lest in the use of this new power they work injury to China, which in the end will prove a boomerang to themselves.

If Japan can only be wise, act decently, preserve moderation, and become altruistic, considerate and helpful, she and China can come together in bonds of spiritual alliance, to their mutual advantage. The test for Japan is in her attitude, not towards expansion, which is a legitimate ambition, but towards *territorial aggrandizement*. Instead of following the example of Western nations and seizing Chinese territory, will she help China to retain that which is her own, and so become a benefactor?

Enlightened Japanese, especially those who are the heads of great mercantile houses, are fully conscious that the territorial ambition has so aroused the resentment of the Chinese that through strikes of student bodies and a boycott of Japanese goods relentlessly and persistently adhered to, Japan in a commercial way is a loser and in a moral way is being disgraced in the estimation of the rest of the world.

Besides this propensity to get possession of that which is another's, whether under the name of suzerainty, protectorate, colony or complete absorption, there are other phases of influence to which Japan has as much right as other nations.

The first form is *commercial* influence. This, of course, is unobjectionable, so far as China is concerned, if so be it is co-operative with China and repudiates the aid and intrusion of the Japanese Government. Mr. Kawakami, after referring to Japan's necessity of finding "a field of activity" in Eastern Asia, says:[1]

> With this in view, Japan is eager to convert herself into a great industrial and commercial nation. If she fails in this at-

[1] "Japan and World Peace," pp. 163-166.

tempt, she must eventually perish from congestion, stagnation and inanition. And in order to become a foremost industrial nation she must have the essential materials of modern industry.

To her great disadvantage, Japan has little of such materials in her own country. The volume of iron ores produced at home is but a fraction of what Japan actually consumes. . . . That is why Japan is anxious to secure mining concessions in China, before China's mines and colleries, unutilized by herself, will be all but mortgaged to Western nations—nations which have already secured vast colonies in different parts of the world, and which have plenty of raw materials and mineral supplies in their own territories. . . .

For three years—from the fall of 1914 to the summer of 1917—Japan's shipyards and iron-works were enabled to work almost entirely with material furnished by steel mills in America. But in July, 1917, the United States, too, declared an embargo upon steel, and the activities of Japanese shipyards and iron-works came suddenly to a halt. . . .

The American embargo intensified Japan's national desire, long uppermost in the minds of her industrial leaders, for the independence of her steel industry from foreign mills. . . . Unless Japan succeeds in entering into a satisfactory agreement with China for the further development of China's iron resources, her industrial structure will never be placed upon a secure foundation. . . .

Whether Japan succeeds in this attempt is not a question of aggrandizement, but a question of life or death. With her growing population forbidden to seek opportunities in countries where profitable employment awaits their toil, with her food products inadequate to supply her own need, Japan must perforce become an industrial country. Surely the Western nations, which have agreed among themselves to exclude the Japanese from their own territories will not conspire to block Japan's way in that part of Eastern Asia where she seeks nothing more than the means of self-preservation.

This reasoning is reasonable. It appeals to one's sense of fair-play. If Japan, indeed, "seeks nothing more than

the means of self-preservation," she will be sure of the world's commendation, and China will no longer stand aloof with a feeling of dread suspicion. As between the industrial and commercial requirements of Japan and those of all Western nations, Japan deserves sympathy even from her many competitors. But when the profit is exclusively Japan's, with China left destitute, or when China is being exploited by Japan more than by all the other countries put together, as seen in the contracts of 1918, then Japan's reasonable claim for self-preservation is weakened by an undue amount of self-assertiveness and voracious ambition. Just a little self-restraint mixed with a little altruism will safeguard the reputation of Japan.

Dr. Arthur J. Brown, referring to bad features of Japanese commercialism, sums up the matter thus:[1]

> Rebates, adulteration, evasion of customs, short weight, unfair crushing of competitors and kindred methods are not so unfamiliar to Americans that they can consistently lift hands of pious horror when they hear of them in Asia.

The next form of influence is *political*. This may, or may not be a menace to China. There is no harm in Japanese, as other nationals, exerting an influence on the political life of China, but not for the purpose of weakening or destroying, or of absorbing China into the Japanese State, as Korea has already been absorbed. The temptation of land-grabbing is so great that all influences which are political are generally looked upon with disfavour—except in one's own case. For China's sake, I appeal to the Japanese to set the pace for other nations in right, praiseworthy treatment of a neighbour's property, rights and jurisdiction. The conduct pursued by Japan during the war cannot but leave an impression on Chinese and Europeans and Americans as

[1] "The Mastery of the Far East," p. 289.

being of a high-handed, grasping character, meaning something else than friendly co-operation or legitimate expansion. Thus far, then, the Japanese are handicapped in the estimate formed by public opinion.

Most Japanese writers, in the effort to defend the action of their Government in reference to Shantung or to allay the fears of critics concerning Japan's ultimate aims, are prone to deny the political character of Japanese ambition. This is, however, untrue to the facts, and an entirely unnecessary argumentation for re-establishing the confidence of their fellow-men. A nation that holds international relations is of necessity actuated by political motives. Dr. Iyenaga is one who does not disclaim these motives, though he seems to resent the political motives of others. He writes:[1]

> Let me say quite frankly that Japan will resent an attempt at extending the political influence of the United States in China. Our political interest in China is greater than yours. China is closer to us. But there is no disposition on the part of Japan to close the open door or to create inequalities in the terms on which the United States may engage in Far Eastern trade.

Thus Americans, according to this opinion, may exert commercial influence in China, but not political. Japanese may exert both kinds of influence.

Mr. Kawakami also writes on the same matter:[2]

> To Americans, unable to understand Japan's singular position in the Far East, it perhaps makes but little difference whether China is dominated by England, Germany, France, Russia or Japan. From the Japanese point of view it is different. With the history of European diplomacy in the Near and Far East before them, the Japanese cannot but shudder at thought of the day when China shall be held fast in the grip of Western Powers.

[1] New York *Evening Post*, June 30, 1917.
[2] "Japan and the World Peace," p. 171.

With this prevalent feeling of intelligent Japanese I have fullest sympathy. The Chinese, too, if they had been treated with fair consideration, would undoubtedly have gone so far in sympathetic approach as to favour even an offensive and defensive alliance. This would have been political action of an extreme kind, but without detriment to China, if arranged under proper conditions of equality and practicality. There is far more reason that Japan have an alliance with China than with Great Britain or Russia. Miss La Motte, who is one writer who can see two sides to this Oriental question, like Mr. Gibbons already cited, says:[1]

> And the Japanese, facing race discrimination and exclusion from most of the European countries, and many of their colonies, as well as America, cannot afford to have China under European control. It is a question of self-preservation.

Here the same word, self-preservation, is used as in the writings of Mr. Kawakami. The word states what is supreme in Japanese thought.

The *Outlook* (of New York), while usually a supporter of the Japanese side in the questions of the Far East, condemns the policy of "political domination" as compared to "peaceful commercial penetration." It says:[2]

> The first of these would lead her to continue in the road which she is now travelling. It would aim at a more or less complete control of Chinese finances, both public and private, exclusive concessions for the building of railways, the development of mines and the erection of factories. . . . This programme is that of many Japanese, for they learned their diplomacy from the predatory policies of certain European governments in the last half of the nineteenth century. Japan's ancient feudal system prepared her for bureaucratic militarism. This policy of ruthless domina-

[1] "Peking Dust," p. 223.
[2] The *Outlook*, May 14, 1919.

tion would, however, mean sorrow for China, turmoil for the world and ultimate disaster for Japan.

Why this domination by Japan should mean "turmoil for the world" any more than domination insisted upon by Western nations is hard to see. Whether it brings sorrow or not to China depends on the degree of the domination, which may supersede merely that of other nations or may go further and take the place of Chinese rule on Chinese soil. This latter seems to me most unlikely. Japan's political influence, in all probability, will stop short of actual military occupation of the whole vast territory of China. Should the Japanese Government continue its predatory policy, in imitation of Western nations, then North China, with the militaristic Peking Government, is likely to come under the protectorate of Japan, but all South China will secede from the present Government which is thus subservient to an alien nation, will form a real Republic, and become a distinct nation, progressive, enlightened, democratic and prosperous.

The third form of influence is *moral.* For any nation to aspire to such influence is most commendable. It looks, however, as if the Japanese were more ready to exert an *immoral* influence on the Chinese people than a *moral* one. It looks, too, as if the Japanese Government countenanced the immoral conduct of its subjects, for the purpose of weakening the stamina of the Chinese people. If the Japanese Government really stands for morality in personal life and honesty in public life, it must make quick use of the strong arm of the law and put a check to the inroads of immorality into China.

Two powerful and disastrous evils have been introduced by the Japanese into those parts of China where they have been exerting authority. The one is the social evil, the other the morphine or drug evil. The former is not of the

degrading, repugnant, brothel type, but made glaring and attractive, of the elegant, palace type. Vice is flaunted in the eyes of the Chinese, and is too alluring to be resisted. I quote from a late article on the condition in Shantung by Dr. Arthur J. Brown:[1]

Morally, conditions have become distinctly worse under Japanese influence. The Chinese are far from being a moral people, but vice was never so rampant in Shantung as it is now. The social evil has a closer relation to Japanese officials than among any other people of my acquaintance. When the Japanese enter a country like China or Korea, they build houses of prostitution just as they build court houses, post-offices and railway stations. They set aside sections for brothels, erect handsome buildings, provide them with music and electric lights, and make them as attractive as any place in the city. Nor are retired locations selected. An elaborately equipped vice district was opened last winter in Tsinan-fu opposite one of the Mission compounds. . . . A particularly embarrassing situation has developed at Tsingtao. One of the early acts of the Japanese was to select a spacious tract for a "red light" quarter and to put several blocks of buildings upon it. The site chosen was close to the Presbyterian Mission compound, with its residences and schools. . . . Conditions substantially similar, although on a smaller scale, exist in practically every Japanese colony in Shantung. Even where the number of Japanese is very small it includes prostitutes.

The other vice, that of morphine, is equally a disgrace to Japanese civilization and a menace to China far beyond the opium menace of the British or the beer menace of the Germans. I quote on this point from an English physician in Tsinan-fu, as cited in Dr. Brown's article:

I know the wholesale debauchery of the Chinese that is going on at our very doors in morphine shops and houses of ill-fame opened and run by the Japanese. Since their seizure of Tsingtao

[1] *Asia* for September, 1919.

they have been transporting literally tens of thousands of cases of morphine into China through this port, all of them labelled "Government stores." These are received and distributed by Japanese agents, with the result that hundreds and thousands of Japanese "drug shops" and peddlers are taking this accursed drug all over the country. . . . The methods in which this morphia is being used are even more sinister. Every one of these drug shops and most of these morphia peddlers possess one or more hypodermic syringes, and for the matter of a few cash the poor Chinaman gets an injection.

There is no palliation for either of these curses inflicted on China. If the Japanese permitted them in their own land, outsiders could not complain, but it becomes a scandal, a complaint, a clear case of culpability, when the Japanese, under the guise of military measures or in the name of legitimate peaceful penetration, inflict upon China, already cursed enough, these two curses from Japan. The Chinese may well rue the day when Japan first issued an ultimatum to German Tsingtao, and at the call of England drove out the Germans.

But the Japanese even here are not the sole offenders. As to the social evil, notice the British municipal rule in the "Model Settlement" of Shanghai, where thousands of young Chinese girls, called "singing girls," throng the busiest thoroughfares of the business section in the night-hours, and ply their trade of song, amusement and lust.

As to the morphine habit, it takes the place of opium, but with more fatal consequences, and, in fact, Japanese morphia is the offspring of British Indian opium. The Chinese in waging their gallant war against opium are to-day beset by the hostile action of two strong Allies, Britain and Japan. Now that British trade in opium directly with China is forbidden, the indirect method is utilized. The Japanese are the purveyors. In both opium and morphia they act as agents through ports in China under Japanese

control. A correspondent to the British official organ in Shanghai writes:[1]

The chief agency in the distribution of morphia in China is the Japanese post-office. Morphia is imported by parcels post. . . . A conservative estimate would place the amount of morphia imported by the Japanese into China in the course of a year as high as eighteen tons, and there is evidence that the amount is steadily increasing. In South China morphia is sold by Chinese peddlers, each of whom carries a passport certifying that he is a native of the Island of Formosa and therefore entitled to Japanese protection. . . . Through Tairen morphia circulates throughout Manchuria and the province adjoining; through Tsingtao morphia is distributed over Shantung province, Anhui and Kiangsu, while from Formosa morphia is carried with opium and other contraband by motor-driven fishing-boats to some point on the mainland, from which it is distributed throughout the province of Fukien and the north of Kuangtung. Everywhere it is sold by Japanese under ex-territorial protection.

The same writer then shows Britain's part in the sale to Japan of Indian opium:

In the Calcutta opium sales Japan has become one of the considerable opium purchasers of Indian opium. She purchases for Formosa, where the opium trade shows a steady growth and where opium is required for the manufacture of morphia. Sold by the Government of India [the British Government, remember], this opium is exported under permits applied for by the Japanese Government [another Government, please notice], is shipped to Kobe and from Kobe is trans-shipped to Tsingtao. . . . It is smuggled through Shantung into Shanghai and the Yangtsze Valley. This opium is sold in Shanghai and the Yangtsze Valley. This opium is sold in Shanghai at $500 [Mexican dollars] a ball, forty balls to the chest, a total valuation of about $20,000 a chest. There is reason to believe that between January 1

[1] *North China Herald*, December 21, 1918.

and September 30, 1918, not less than 2,000 chests of opium purchased in India were imported into Tsingtao through Kobe. Upon this amount the Japanese authorities levy a tax, which does not appear in the estimates, equivalent to 2,000,000 pounds sterling. . . . At both Dalny and Tsingtao these offices are wholly under the control of the Japanese.

It is a matter of chagrin to right-minded Americans, zealous for the good name of their country, that clandestine trade in morphia has also been carried on by Americans, through connivance with Japanese. According to the *Japan Chronicle* (English edited) 113,000 ounces of morphia were shipped from the United States to Kobe for trans-shipment to China in the first five months of 1919. It is a criminal offense to ship this drug direct to China, but not to Japan. The Covenant of the League of Nations, however, enjoins on all members of the League to exercise control over "the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs." Surely the American people are not willing to be partners in drugging China with opium as used in its worst form.

To be true to the facts, a great deal of opium has been brought the last few years into Japan via Siberia from Persia, the agents being a motley sort of traders, subject to no law, though possessed of passports of different governments.

The chief agents, however, in introducing morphia into China are the Japanese, and the ports through which it passes into Chinese territory are mostly those under control of Japanese authorities.

It is shameful, unfortunate, unwise, that the Japanese Government in collusion either with the Indian Government or evil-minded Americans, should perpetuate, rather than help to exterminate, this curse of China, opium and morphia. Cannot the high-minded men of Japan, embued with

the great moral precepts of Eastern Religions, see how much Japan as well as China is losing by these immoral practices? If the Japanese are friends to China, they must at once put forth efforts, in conjunction with the best in China, to drive out these vices which are sapping the life-blood of the Chinese people.

It is clear, then, that Japan in her approach to China, with a desire for closer and more cordial relationship, has at the present crisis in world affairs certain distinct responsibilities, as well as rights. Let me specify:

(1) Men of moral and religious conviction in Japan, whether advocates of democracy or imperialism, must join hands with kindred minds in China for the spiritual rejuvenation of both these ancient nations of the Far East.

(2) The Japanese must abandon their harsh, high-handed, intermeddling in China's political affairs, and show themselves sincerely friendly, helpful and fair. It is quite possible that Japanese merchants, bankers, educationists and reformers will insist on a saner policy of adaptation and co-operation.

(3) How much greater the achievement, with permanent advantage to both Japanese and Chinese, if the present estrangement gives place to a fellowship based on restored confidence.

(4) Japan is fitted to be the leader of Eastern Asia, but her leadership will be null and void without a hearty, spontaneous following. The Chinese can be taught to follow, but not ordered or bullied. A combination of the peoples of Eastern Asia, under Japan's leadership, for their liberation and uplift, seems to me a worthy object and not a terror to the rest of mankind, but it can never be brought about, unless Japan, its Government and people, reverse their policy of the past five years.

(5) Whether Japan ever adopts a republican form of state does not matter, but it is good policy for her to en-

courage at home the spread of democratic ideas, which means the rights of man, and to foster among other Asiatic peoples the same liberalizing spirit, which can never be restrained for any length of time. Mr. Gibbons writes thus:[1]

> Internal signs of democratic evolution in Japan are encouraging. If America and Europe make a sincere effort to form a society of nations on the basis of equality, the growth of democratic feeling and liberalism in Japan will undoubtedly lead to anti-militarism. A new era will open for the Far East—an era of Korean autonomy, if not independence, and of reapproachment between Japan and China. It behooves us to study carefully recent events in Japan.

(6) If Japan, in these days of secret, selfish diplomacy, acts with chivalry, and hands over to China the whole territory of Kiaochow for Chinese administration, and not for Japanese or for any international ex-territorial jurisdiction; and if in addition she withdraws from the railway and mining occupation in Shantung, for either German or Chinese possession, she will establish herself in the affections of the Chinese and will assure herself a moral predominance. Through the boycott raised by the Chinese against the Japanese, the latter's trade diminished 50 per cent. The Chinese may have been mistaken in overlooking the complicity of Western nations in war intrigues and in the peace settlement, but they recognized clearly the main fact that it was Japan's claims, successfully won, that brought shame and danger to China.

The American Minister to China, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, on arriving in San Francisco, October 9, 1919, after resigning from his official position, stated[2] that "Japan holds a wonderful trump card if she will only play it, which is the return to China of those things wrung from her by Ger-

[1] "The New Map of Asia," p. 477.
[2] The New York *World*, October 10, 1919.

many." The Japanese may not be likely to accept this advice from one who assured the Chinese of aid against Japan, but they can respond to these words of the *Outlook*:

> The Japanese must win the confidence and friendship of the Chinese. That they have not succeeded in doing. They have so far been confronted by the almost unanimous distrust and hate of their neighbours—an attitude which augurs ill for the future. A necessary preliminary step would seem to be the voluntary return of Tsingtao to China, the cancellation of part or all of the concessions wrung from her in 1915, the strict repression of Japanese purveyors of morphine and all other predatory traders, and a hearty willingness to co-operate with the Powers in any joint attempt to rehabilitate China.

(7) The Japanese must treat the Chinese with respect, not with contempt or superciliousness, which always nullifies the best intentions. If the Chinese, under outrages received, speak with anger of Japan, the Japanese have been wont to look with condescension upon China. If the Japanese, more advanced in Western knowledge, change their attitude towards China, they will be met with hearty response. In too many ways the Japanese have adopted the worst features of Western civilization, so contrary to the teachings of Buddhism and Confucianism, which entered Japan from China. One of these bad qualities is the overbearing attitude in social and political intercourse. An American who lives in Shantung, under date of July 23, 1919, writes:[1]

> The one thing noticeable to all foreigners in the Far East is that the honeyed words of Japanese leaders, as to solicitude for the welfare of China, inspired by their Government's cunning press propaganda, are always at variance with the arrogant, cynical, cruel, sinister Prussian policy of despoiling China—that

[1] *Far-Eastern Fortnightly*, September 29, 1919.

policy pushed relentlessly, and every day, with new and undreamed-of aggressions and brutalities against the sovereignty of the Chinese Government and the right of the Chinese people; against their own persons, legitimate pursuits and their soil.

Personally I have not come in contact in China with this class of Japanese, but the testimony of others as to the repulsive side of Japanese life must be accepted as true.

A more favourable view of Japanese characteristics and possibilities is given by an English writer, H. M. Hyndman. These are his words:[1]

That Japan should use the present terrible state of affairs in Europe to impose upon the unwilling population of China—possessing even by the admission of the highest Japanese statesmen qualities superior to their own—is a policy which ought to be resisted as soon as possible, if the Chinese themselves desire help against this aggression. The Japanese are not popular in Asia, and their unpopularity has undoubtedly increased during the past four years. On the other hand, whatever their differences may be, Asiatics understand one another at bottom far better than they understand or trust or like Europeans or Americans. This the United States is beginning to comprehend.

J. W. Robertson, a publicist in Tokio, recognizes that whatever the difficulties, Japan is to be leader in Asia. He sums up thus:[2]

Japan in her best manifestations is the hope of Asia. Her friends trust that she may be so guided as to be the light of Asia. The great experiment in the adaptation of Western ideas and methods to Eastern traditions and conditions must not fail. That Japan shall succeed in her gallant attempt, for which she has sacrificed so freely, is a great American, a great British, a great world interest.

[1] "The Awakening of Asia," p. 155.
[2] New York *Times*, March 23, 1919.

The Great War has, indeed, enlarged the possibilities of Japan in all Eastern Asia, especially in China, but her real future, whether one of growing strength or one of decline, will be determined by the way she abandons policies proved by the war to be bad everywhere, by her readiness to sanctify opportunity for purposes of the common good, and to do to China as she would have China do to Japan.

I close with an extract of a Japanese writer, Mr. Ichihashi:[1]

> China is close at hand and possesses what Japan needs; therefore, a friendly attitude on the part of China is most earnestly desired by Japan. . . . There is a set of foreign residents in China who have inherited the old Occidental prejudice against Orientals. These men think they would lose their monopolistic power, be it commercial or racial, unless they fight Japan's activities in China. Another obstacle in the way of co-operation between Japan and China is the fact that in the past Japan has made blunders in dealing with China. These have caused many of the Chinese to lose confidence in the Japanese. Some actually distrust them and still others fear Japan. Japan must acknowledge her past blunders and endeavour to rectify them. . . . When confidence has been restored between China and Japan then the two nations can co-operate in the true sense of the word with mutual benefit. Moreover, Japan should adopt some positive measures of service for the benefit of the Chinese. Japan's friendship must be substantiated.

[1] "The Industrial Plight of Japan," in *Asia* for September, 1919.

CHAPTER XI

THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN NATIONS IN CHINA

THE relative influence of all nations in China, commercial, financial, political and missionary, has been greatly changed by the war. The elimination of German influence, whether permanent or only temporary, has for the moment enhanced the already growing influence of Japan. The result has been the supremacy of Japan in the Far East not only over Germany, but over Great Britain, the United States, France and Russia, all of whom connived at bringing about the change, and also over China, who preferred to retain the *status quo*. The movement set on foot by Westerners to direct the animosity of the Chinese toward Japan, made manifest in the greatest boycott of Japanese goods that China has ever been able to carry out for a considerable length of time with unflagging energy and unanimity, has been the one factor to minimize Japanese influence. This assault on Japan's influence has been almost as pleasing to Western peoples as was the previous assault on German influence. Whether Japan will retain her exclusive domination, or will have to yield to new conditions, and take an equal place with the other great Powers; and whether China, by the separate action of one nation or the joint action of all, as in a big financial consortium, loses control of her own affairs—becomes an Egypt, a Turkey, a Persia, an India, a Korea or a Filipino subject nation—or by the helpful, reformative influences of others is able to regain sovereign rights and national autonomy as in past centuries—these two things and many others must remain conjecture. In previous chapters I have pointed out what

is probable or at least desirable as to China's permanency and Japan's leadership.

As to the influence of Entente nations and of the United States, it must be recognized that they are handicapped by the wrong done to China at the Peace Table. As factors of moral power they are far below their past record, which has been none too good. By the decision reached at Paris, the three nations, the United States, Great Britain and France, have left on the Chinese mind a more unfavourable impression than the two Central Powers. Herbert Adams Gibbons touches on this supreme mistake of the victorious Powers in the following language:[1]

> In the discussion and solution of no problem before the Conference of Paris were the insincerity and bad faith of the great powers more apparent than in the disposition of the Shantung question. The facts of history were distorted, the principles for which the Entente Powers and the United States declared they had fought were ignored. The Powers showed their inability to rise to the high level of international morality essential for the creation of a society of nations. Instead of trying to lay the foundations of a durable peace in the Far East, the statesmen of the Entente Powers and the United States decided for the continuation of a policy that has provoked several wars and given rise to injustice and oppression. For the European Powers and Japan, the solution proposed for the Shantung question was the holding fast to traditions and practices of the past. For the United States, it was the abandonment by our government of the idealism and disinterestedness that for more than half a century have characterized American diplomacy in the Far East. The solution of the Shantung question incorporated in the Treaty dictated to Germany is the triumph of the policy of economic exploitation through political blackmail against which John Hay and his predecessors in the American State Department struggled with skill and a large measure of success.

[1] "The New Map of Asia," p. 385.

Briefly we may now consider the future prospects in China of Western nations. As for Russia, China's nearest neighbour, her power has departed, though it will doubtless return in future years. Japan in Siberia will be of more concern to China than Russia in Siberia. Already the Japanese, through many concessionary privileges from various Russian leaders, have pre-empted the resourceful regions of Eastern Siberia. Americans, striving as best they may, can never outstrip the Japanese in those regions of Northern Asia. Japan's position in Siberia is more assured than her position in China. With the disappearance of Russian influence, the Japanese have been laying plans for also pre-empting the ground in Outer Mongolia and Northern Manchuria. As yet the Chinese Eastern Railway running across Northern Manchuria, and built by Russian capital, has not been seized by Japan instead of controlled by China, co-partner with Russia in the Railway Company. Harbin, also, is still regarded as a Chinese-administered town, taking the place of Russian administration. Thus Japan's only check in these regions is from China, not from Western nations.

As for France, she is not eliminated as is Germany, neither has she disappeared as a factor to be reckoned with as Russia, but it will be some time before she can do more than retain the railway concessions which she had before the war. She will not have the capital, unless underwrit by American capitalists, to develop new concessions, and as for general trade she has never been so conspicuous as even smaller nations, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland.

As for Italy, honoured as one of the Big Five for her military power alone—a rather poor standard in the New Era—she, too, from lack of capital will be of small account in the international relations of China.

There remain, then, three Western peoples of strong com-

mercial capacity, with an instinct for venturesome enterprise, whose future possibilities demand more minute consideration, as an offset to the present predominating influence of Japan. These are British, Americans, Germans.

(1) First, then, *British* future influence in China.

Before the war no one outside nation was *dominant* in China. But, clearly, Great Britain was *predominant*. By calling for the intrusion of Japan, in order to oust Germany, predominance passed to Japan. Should the Anglo-Japanese Alliance continue, for political reasons, Japan's predominance in China will not be greatly modified, much less endangered, and China will then have to reckon with a combined menace rather than a divided menace or a menace of one. Should the Alliance be allowed simply to terminate at the expiration of the Agreement—in 1921—then Japan will either seek, for her own safety, to draw nearer to Russia, whatever the Government, and to Germany, or will be isolated except as she succeeds in combining the Orient against the Occident. While, then, a section of the Japanese is anti-British and a very large section of the British in China is anti-Japanese, yet, politically, it may be expedient to both the British and Japanese Governments to renew the Alliance. In conjunction with this, the Japanese will not forego the aspiration for predominance in China, and, as in 1916, they made a separate alliance with Russia, so at a fitting time they may form an alliance with China or with some other Power of suitable potentialities.

In political influence the action of the British Government in appealing to Japan to join her in the great struggle, and the subsequent machinations with Japan to bring China into the war, naturally leave an unfavourable impression on the Chinese mind; but the British in China, and especially the press propaganda, have had the requisite ingenuity to lead the Chinese to overlook Britain's

part, and to concentrate attention on Japan's part in the varied complications to China.

A Britisher is still Inspector-General of Chinese Maritime Customs and another the head of the Salt Gabelle. If Japan forges ahead, some Japanese will in a few years legitimately supersede the British in these positions—unless competent Chinese are deemed worthy.

In a missionary way the British have exerted most beneficent influence, and will continue so to do, and more and more in hearty union with American missionaries—a noble example of Anglo-American alliance. This combination may be reckoned upon to resist any immoral or unjust influences coming from Japan.

In a commercial way the British will find more intense competition from the Japanese and Americans than in former years from Germans, Japanese and Americans. The British, moreover, will be more efficient competitors than in the past. England has commercial preparedness.

Isaac F. Marcosson has made special investigations of England's preparedness for trade-war. He shows the great changes, the new life, brought into the Board of Trade and the new British Trade Corporation of which at the time Sir Albert Stanley was sponsor. He says:[1]

> It would take a book to explain the entire trade exploitation scheme of the Board of Trade. . . . England is giving many evidences of her determination to take every possible leaf out of the book of German efficiency. In the Board of Trade is a special German department to study German newspapers and German economic literature. A pet sponsorship of the Board of Trade is the encouragement of organization of specific industries for the foreign field. . . . No undertaking is quite so significant or so far-reaching in its effects as its establishment of an adequate commercial intelligence department. . . . After the war the commercial intelligence department will take over the staff of records

[1] *Saturday Evening Post*, January 26, 1918.

of the war trade intelligence and statistical departments. No ally could be more powerful. . . . Meantime England is being converted into a monster Trust.

The Far Eastern section of this mammoth Trust has been going through the same course of thorough preparation. A school in Chinese has been in operation for some four years in Shanghai under the superintendence of a gifted Welsh missionary. Young men of the big English firms, who might have been conscripted, were exempted, that they might be lieutenants in the coming trade war. German trade secrets, as well as the trade itself, have been zealously seized, except where Japanese and Americans have come in ahead. It is just possible that in attempting to trip up the German merchants, the English merchants may themselves be tripped.

Francis H. Sisson, Vice-President of the Guaranty Trust Company, after a visit to Europe, returned with a glowing report of England's financial strength.[1] He speaks of the "returns from investments abroad and the receipts of British-owned ocean carriers." England's "power of production has been increased by about 50 per cent by the speeding-up process induced by war needs." The following summing-up is made by Mr. Sisson:

All in all, the outlook for industrial progress in England is favourable. The manufacturing capacity of the country has been greatly increased during the war. Even more notable have been the improvements in port and warehouse facilities. Ships are being turned out rapidly, and the British merchant marine still exceeds in tonnage that of any other nation. A system of preferences which unites the various parts of the Empire commercially more closely than ever before will give the vast colonial resources a new significance for the development of British industry and trade. . . . The recent removal of restrictions on the exportation of capital for investment will naturally result in an ex-

[1] Reported in New York *Sun*, October 19, 1919.

pansion of the export trade and a stimulation of domestic production. Much depends upon the spirit and temper of a people. Their record of achievements in industry and finance has amply demonstrated the capacity of the English for doing big things in a big way, and for meeting emergencies with the requisite energy and ability.

Perhaps the only threatening drawback to this portrayal is the overturn of the industrial system and commercial enterprise by a big upheaval in the labour section of Britain's life, united with revolutionary schemes among other peoples.

Comparatively speaking, Great Britain has come through the war catastrophes more unscathed than other belligerents, unless we except the United States. Moreover, she is more ready than all others for world domination. "The British Empire has expanded from about 11,500,000 square miles to about 15,000,000. The character of the British control ranges from actual annexation to military occupation or political domination."[1]

As a whole, and more than ever in the past, British merchants have all the push which guarantees success. They started early to reap every advantage possible from the war situation. On the one hand, hardly had armistice been declared, when British merchants in China brought pressure to bear on the Chinese Government to carry into effect, even when hostilities had ceased, the closure and liquidation of all German firms. On the other hand, British merchants at home, as soon as the Treaty with Germany was signed, hastened to renew such trade with Germany as would be of profit to British interests. Thus an English newspaper report for August, 1919, reads:

The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, the British India Steam Navigation Company, and the Well Line, will

[1] New York *Independent*, September 27, 1919.

this month and onwards have steamers loading in Hamburg, Bremen (if sufficient offers) and Rotterdam in connection with their service to India.

Major Sanford Griffith of the Inter-Allied Commission on Industrial Restitution, writing of British commercial preparedness in Germany, and just as applicable to other parts of the world, says:[1]

The British have invested too heavily in German industries to share the enthusiasm of French soldiers for further crippling Germany. Substantial trade relations with Germany mean more to the English than with any other country on the Continent, and are a necessary preliminary to extended trade relations with Russia.

Thus capturing German trade, the British outstrip all others, including even Americans.

British merchants in China begin the new campaign with certain peculiar advantages. They have long-established firms, with branches at all the great centres of Asia and Australasia. They are for the moment free of the German competitor. In reputation for honourable and fair dealing with the inhabitants of Asiatic countries, they hold a commanding position for inspiring confidence, if not always affection, and need fear no comparison with their Japanese rivals—or shall we call them Allies? It is evident that, in a political and commercial way, for bringing about the exploitation of China and other Asiatic countries, Great Britain and Japan must reckon with each other.

(2) Next to be noticed is *American* influence in China.

When the Great War opened, and early began to entangle China, Americans had a decided advantage over all others for expanding their influence, in perfectly legitimate ways, to the profit and security of China. Both the American

[1] *The Globe*, March 26, 1920.

Government and the American individual, through many years of creditable conduct, were looked upon by Chinese as the truest friends of China. The return of a part of the Boxer indemnity for educational purposes evinced not only a sense of justice on the part of the American Government, but feelings of generosity in accord with the general sentiment of American people. Early in the Wilson Administration American bankers withdrew from the "Five-Power Consortium," dominating loans to China, since the Administration regarded that guarantees of security to American bankers by the American Government rather than by the Chinese Government were a form of interference in China's political affairs. This action, criticized by American bankers, made an impression on the Chinese of America's regard for China's sovereign rights.

These advantages and opportunities were not properly utilized by Americans in China, as the war waged far and wide, and other nations were absorbed in plans near the centres of conflict. Financially Americans were the only ones able to make loans to China. The American banking group of J. P. Morgan and others were bound not to act separately from the original "Five-Power Consortium." Other bankers hesitated to make the venture, even from motives of national prestige. When Chicago bankers stood ready to make loans on proper security, they misunderstood the Chinese situation by approaching the Chinese, not directly as welcomed business men, but through the American Legation. Instead of open reference to Parliament, which alone can sanction a loan and whose members would gladly have favoured American advances in money, private or confidential or secret negotiations were carried on with the militaristic Premier, who afterwards fell under the spell of Japanese financiers. As an amusing incident, when I wrote in my Peking paper an article making inquiries as to these mysterious conferences, just as I had previously

probed Japanese proposals in finance, I was placed before the United States Court for China under charge of libelling Paul S. Reinsch, the American Minister—a case, however, which like two other charges never came to trial.

The Wilson Administration has since reversed its position on "dollar diplomacy," and in 1920 assisted in forming a larger consortium, with bigger groups of national bankers from the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan. This perpetuates the "special alliance" theory in the world of finance.

While, financially, American bankers were losing their golden opportunities in China all through the war, Japanese bankers, financiers, merchants and diplomats were quietly progressing, with even more than customary secrecy, to gain a dominant financial position in China, and with this a political position.

Even greater, so it seems to me, and as is confirmed by facts already described, was the failure of Americans to use their outstanding influence to keep China in a state of peace. Instead of this, American reputation was lowered by the effort to induce China to sever relations with Germany. Harm to America's good name has since developed by the failure to make good the assurances of help which were given by the American Minister to the Chinese Government. The expression of assuring words became an expression of assuring friendship. But when at the Peace Table, no American assistance was given to China, not even by President Wilson, the high hopes of the Chinese reversed themselves into intense disappointment.

Prof. John Dewey, after personal investigation, sums up the status of American influence in the following language:[1]

Our prior behaviour has left with many Chinese, especially those who have not been in the United States, the impression that

[1] *The New Republic*, December 3, 1919.

we are not, in our foreign dealings, a very practical people, that we lack alertness, quickness of decision in emergencies, promptness of action and especially persistence. We are thought of as, upon the whole, a well-disposed people, but somewhat ineffectual in action.

Hsu En-yuan, Vice-President of a new China-American Bank, also says:[1]

About once every five years American men of big business and finance become interested in China, but this interest does not last. Something always happens to frighten the bankers away. First it is a change in political affairs at home; then international politics is to blame; then, again, the business and financial representatives sent to China become impatient at the delays and intrigues always present in Chinese affairs, grow tired of the interminable negotiations and go home.

On the whole, American men of enterprise have greater opportunities in China than the British, but it looks at present as if the British by well-laid plans going back several years would outstrip Americans. Americans have also a better chance than the Japanese, who through antipathy aroused have been losing commercially, and yet it looks as if a few years hence the Japanese, like the British, would outstrip Americans.

Only by large schemes persistently adhered to can American merchants secure a first or even a second place in the new form of competition. In opportunity America is first; but not in achievement.[2]

America's influence in China has been retarded not only by a mistaken policy, but by obstruction from associ-

[1] New York *World*, February 23, 1920.

[2] In securing the friendship of the Chinese people, the great generosity of the American public in the China famine more than makes amends for the wrong done to China by the settlement of the Versailles Treaty.

ates in war. During the war period it was almost a crime for an American to criticize the Allies. Now that war is over, and loyalty to truth may reassert itself, it is well for Americans, who plan for influence in the Far East, to know, on the basis of past conduct, just what help, if any, American merchants may expect from our late associates in arms. About the time the United States was contemplating relief to the Entente Allies in Europe, these same Allies stood in the way of American enterprise in China. The greatest American syndicate, that of Siems-Carey, was negotiating with the Chinese Government for concessions in different parts of China. The French Legation objected to railway concessions thus negotiated in South China; the British Legation objected to other railway concessions in Central China; the Japanese Legation objected to a conservancy concession along the Grand Canal, in or near to Shantung, and the Russian Legation objected to railway concessions in North China. Again, after hostilities had ceased, when the secret arrangements of this same syndicate with the Chinese Government had been made public, like Chino-Japanese agreements, the British Minister, learning that a concession had been granted for a railway running south from Hangchow in the province of Chekiang, at once hastened to the Chinese Foreign Office and entered an emphatic protest.[1]

So far as experiences in China are concerned during the period of the war, American enterprise met interference not from Germans, but from the European Allies. What may be expected in future is hard to say, but, in general, co-operation with Germans will be no harder than with the British or the French. As something idealistic, I recommend the cultivation of friendship on the part of Amer-

[1] A new illustration is the opposition of the British and Japanese Governments to the Chinese desire to allow in China an American wireless station.

icans with all peoples, the English of course, and also others.

In matters of ordinary trade Americans will still have their opportunities, unaffected by Governmental policies. Great corporations like the Standard Oil Company, the British and American Tobacco Company (really an English-chartered concern), and Singer Sewing Machine Company, are bound to succeed by their wise methods of sending agents and goods direct to the interior towns of China. At the same time, the competition in all branches of trade will be more acute than in former years.

In religious and educational enterprise Americans have unique opportunities. Their fine record in the past is not going to be upset by any misconceptions of American diplomacy, unless they advocate and support American policies which are detrimental to China. Officially Americans have lost greatly in China; in commerce and missions, particularly the latter, Americans face a bright future. Between British and American missionaries there is a close bond of sympathy. They all wish well to the Chinese people, and to the experiment of a Republic.

As a distinct matter for consideration is the annoyance and opposition which American merchants, educationists and missionaries have received from Japan. This has received abundant testimony from Americans in Shantung and the strong protest of different American organizations in Shanghai and Peking. The preferential policy applied in Manchuria before the war has been accentuated during the prosecution of the war. The clash that has come between Japanese ambition and the interests of all others, including the Chinese, is not surprising, considering the engrossing cares of war assumed by Europeans and Americans. One slight benefit apt to arise is that the victorious nations may now be convinced that the displacement of Germany by Japan has resulted in no good, but in decided

harm. The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai thus repeats the growing sentiment of intelligent Chinese:

> Germany's control in Shantung province, while irksome, had nothing of the present effect, because Germany was on the other side of the world, and the weight of the iron hand in China was light.

As to restrictions placed on American enterprise by the Japanese, Charles Hodges writes:[1]

> American trade, confronted by Japanese competition over the Pacific markets, is face to face with the most highly co-ordinated government-backed business in the world.

And again:

> The American business world must realize that their trade with China is jeopardized wherever the Japanese secure a foothold, be it only "economic rights" or a leasehold.

And again:

> That is the whole meaning of Japan's determination to duplicate in Shantung the grip she has gotten on Manchuria—a grip which is constantly tightened against American interests in the regions affected. Japan is a business adversary of ours; she will not be swerved from this objective unless she is forced to abandon this scheme to bind the Far East economically to Japan's political ends.

(3) Lastly I consider the future influence of *Germans* in China.

Any other people except the Germans, called upon to face such world-wide and multifarious restraints as the Versailles Treaty of Peace has imposed on Germany, would

[1] *The Far-Eastern Fortnightly*, September 1, 1919.

lose heart. The difficulties which beset the Chinese are as nothing in comparison. The complete eradication of German business and the liquidation of German property everywhere throughout the world, except in a few neutral countries, is the most amazing performance ever sanctioned by professed adherents of high moral aims. I recognize the desirability of overthrowing the military machine and the absolute authority that existed in Germany, or that exists among other peoples, but I candidly confess I see no justice in the attempt to destroy Germany, Austria and Hungary, industrially, economically and commercially.

H. W. Massingham has stated the case in all the intensity of an aroused English conscience. I quote his words:[1]

> Is it a legitimate use of military success in modern Europe for one Power to pile up against another a series of perquisitions, requisitions and inquisitions which deprive her of millions of people of her blood and soil, of about half her coal supply and three parts of her iron ore, of all her greater ocean-going marine, of her colonies, of her foreign treaty rights and concessions, of free use of her railways, free disposal of her industrial products, and the effectual right of taxation, which destroy her power to save and limit her power to work? Who gave this jurisdiction of life and death? What conception of the civilized and the moral order does it advance? . . . Under the rule of Paris Germany surrendered every absolute political right of nationhood, including the deep underlying human right of self-respect. . . . Within the period of the treaty she ceases to be self-determined.

As for myself, I do not write of the barriers to German rehabilitation at home, but limit myself to the combined movement to eject from China, German enterprise, commercial, educational and religious, for generations to come. It cannot be done. Men's consciences will protest sooner or later. For the best interests of the victors, for the welfare

[1] In *The Nation* of New York, May 24, 1919.

of the Chinese, a welcome must yet be given to those so suddenly and unjustly repatriated. It is cowardice for great Powers like the United States, the British Empire, the French Republic and the Empire of the Mikado, to call for the annihilation of German enterprise, initiative and efficiency, along with disarmament and the overthrow of the Monarchy. Seventy millions of people who held out for more than four years against the strongest military combination the world had ever known cannot be kept within a vacuum.

William G. Shepherd, under date of August 25, 1919, writes thus to the New York *Evening Post* from The Hague:

> However one looks at matters in Germany, it appears, at this close range, that the German commercial firms, so far as within them lies, are doing more to set the sails of their business properly than are the business men of any of the other European countries.

Under date of August 28 the same correspondent writes:

> In her purchasing, Germany is using a coin that no other nation seems to be employing. She is paying for what she buys in the coin of work.

What, then, is possible for German enterprise in the Far East in the near future?

(a) The Chinese are going to receive back their German friends. If the heads of the great German hongs come back empty-handed, the Chinese compradores who have associated with them, and other Chinese merchants who have become rich through German business connections, will advance the capital and provide the rooms for re-starting business. The Chinese merchant is noted for his appreciation of kind deeds and true friendship.

(b) The Japanese will also seek to make amends for the

hardships thrust on the Germans in their midst. Commercially, the Japanese will link hands with the Germans, if not by ocean routes, then across the land route of Eastern Europe and Northern Asia. If the English P. and O. and the Glen Line refuse to carry goods between Hamburg and Shanghai, then the Nippon Yusen Kaisha or some new line of steamships will seize the opportunity and facilitate communication.

(c) German business men are not going to be withheld from Russian Europe and Russian Siberia at the mere behest of old-time enemies. To use one's genius in checkmating German enterprise in Eastern Europe, as in Western, will not long succeed. Every people have a right to trade somewhere on God's earth. German business capacity is needed in Russia. The advance in that direction follows a natural law. In due time German and Japanese enterprise will meet somewhere in Russian Siberia.

(d) A better spirit will yet come to British and French and American capitalists—who are of necessity internationalists—and they, as of yore, will again hold dealings with the great minds of Germany and Austria, who take big views of big projects along lines of concordant action and mutual well-being. Dr. Alonzo E. Taylor before the American Manufacturers Export Association in the month of October (1919), after serving on the Economic Council of Allies, said:

> Every one now realizes that if Germany is ever to pay the bill she must be allowed to be a going concern. If England, France and Italy want that reparation they have got to help her to earn it. In these circumstances talk of paralysing German industry is idle.

I know how far the Powers, great and small, were ready to go in the punitive spirit towards China after the Boxer

cataclysm of 1900, and I know how a better spirit of forgiveness, conciliation and goodwill at last prevailed among all the nations in contact with China. This better spirit will reassert itself before many days have passed after the five defeated nations have duly signed their doom. Retaliation is not a single-handed force, but reciprocal. Its advance is that of geometrical progression. Its presence is *persona non grata* to lasting peace.

The natural relationship before the war in both trade and missions in China and elsewhere was that between Britons, Americans and Germans. To re-unite on this basis will still be for the good of them all.

Should Germany be excluded from this natural fellowship, she must then turn elsewhere, and that means to Russia and Japan.

The hope of the world is in cultivated fellowship among all peoples, allowing to each its fullest development, no people infringing on the rights of another. Thus may peace be lasting. Thus will China be secure. Thus will Japan be satisfied. Thus will the dread of a second war, arising in the Pacific, pass from the mind, and men everywhere may give themselves to the occupations of peace, charity and justice.

> "Peace calls to man to follow her henceforth forever,
> In brotherhood that binds all lands and tribes,
> Peace never was the Child of War.
> But was before War was,
> And shall be after it,
> Reigning triumphant down the happy years
> Around the globe." [1]

[1] James Harcourt West.

CHAPTER XII

VITAL PRINCIPLES VERSUS SPOLIATION

DURING the period of the World War, President Wilson announced many great principles, eternal verities, which can be gainsaid by no one. Greatest approval has come from peoples the world over who are most oppressed. Men's conceptions have for once been idealized. January 8, 1918, the President enunciated his Fourteen Points, four of which were of general application. July 4, 1918, he enunciated four factors of world peace to take the place of World War. September 27, 1918, he enunciated five requisites of permanent peace, and also five issues of the war, all of a highly moral character. There is no trouble with the principles.

Having dwelt on the political problems in China and on plans of reconstruction for China amid her war-entanglements; and having stated a large number of facts and shown their bearing on China, it is now possible to deduce a few principles that pertain to China's political future and to her relations with the rest of the world. Whether she is to be captive or free, independent or with no longer a national entity, is still unknown. Much depends on an appreciation of all the facts, on a true perspective to be formed in the mind, and on adherence to correct and well-tested principles. The author in his statement of things as they are, holds to certain definite opinions, which may almost be called convictions, and which are here outlined as guiding principles. These principles issue forth from a knowledge of the facts already recounted, and are the outcome of actual experience. There are ten specifications of principles which bear particularly on China.

(1) The first may be stated thus: The war as fought in

Europe, in Africa, in Asia, on land and on all the seas, should have been, as professed, supremely a *war for principle* rather than a war to subjugate particular nations. Still more does this necessity exist in re-establishing a world peace. By concentrating animosity on some one people, good and evil have been marked off according to territorial boundaries. Good men in enemy nations are condemned with the bad, while bad men and bad policies among our Allies or in ourselves are condoned. If the United States had lead the way in siding with Right wherever found, and opposing Wrong wherever found, the sound ideas of President Wilson, who spoke for the best everywhere, would have had better chance of being effected.

Loyalty, for example, has been gauged by the degree of one's hatred to the "enemy," whether combatant or non-combatant, at home or abroad, rather than by devotion to those principles which are formulated in the National Constitution, and in the sacred traditions of the past, and which change not in war or peace. Too much has it been taken for granted that he is the best patriot who hurls tirades at other peoples, rather than the one who aims to live out in daily life the truest and best in his own country as in all humanity.

Suppose, again, that the supreme motive had been the overthrow of militarism, or the war spirit, wherever found, how would it have been possible for liberty-loving Americans, Englishmen and Frenchmen, to countenance the militarism of Japan or the military autocrats of the Chinese Government? How possible to form plans in our own Governments for military and naval expansion? The Bishop of Oxford, addressing the clergy of Boston, uttered these words of sober counsel:

> I am always dreadfully afraid of the intoxicating power of militarism. I know what it means. . . . Are we in no danger

of militarism? I can conceive of no disaster comparable with this—that we should win a great victory and be able to dictate to the military autocracy of Germany a peace the most desirable that we could imagine; that we should have them under our feet, defeated before all Europe, and that then we should return to our several countries, ourselves having imbibed that very disease from which we were seeking to deliver the world.

And suppose that China catches the disease, will it be good for mankind, an aid to Righteousness?

It is currently reported that when Viscount Ishii as Minister of Foreign Affairs at the close of 1915, was approached by Great Britain, France and Russia to join with them in urging China to enter the war, he said[1] that Japan could not view without uneasiness "a moral awakening of 400,000,000 Chinese," that is, along military lines. Whether he used these exact words or not, and whatever his own assumption, I agree that it was no child's play to arouse the vast Chinese population to such form of moral awakening as was contemplated by an ambition for feats of arms.

I give one other illustration. Suppose that the supreme object of the war had really been to overthrow autocracy, and to make the world safe for democracy. A greater result would have been achieved by applying the purpose to all peoples than by a sole desire to overthrow the constitutional Government of Germany or to bring about the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. As a matter of fact under modern forms of government and with the growing impact of liberalism, the autocracy of any one ruler has been made impossible, whether with the Kaisers of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Tsar of all the Russias, the Mikado of Japan, or even the Sultan of Turkey. It is very much to be doubted whether it will be better to encourage the overthrow of enemy Governments and the upheavals of revolution than to work together for the maintenance of

[1] Professor Jenks in *North American Review*, September, 1919.

law and order under the natural development of the democratic spirit. The evil to be uprooted is the autocratic spirit wherever found, whether in a mob or in a monarch, in an Emperor or a bureaucrat. The essential idea of democracy is human freedom. Under this spirit how would it have been possible for the democratic Governments of the world to have accorded highest honour, not to the democratic aspirations of Young China, but to Japan with its repressions in Korea and its coercions in China? How, too, would it have been possible to give support to the Military Governors of China, mostly a group of provincial autocrats, or to the military Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, most autocratic of them all, and at the same time to refuse a modicum of praise for Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Mr. Tang Shao-yi and all the supporters of the democratic, constitutional, parliamentary Government centred at Canton? What controlled diplomatic action was only this: "Whosoever joins with us in fighting the Germans is a true friend and a worthy ally." The question of advancing democratic ideas in either Japan or China or of helping the democratic form of government in China was of minor consideration. If, on the other hand, the main thought had been to safeguard the Republic of China, no encouragement would have been given to embroiling China in the war, and in all probability the result would have been a firmly-established Republic in the Orient.

The great moral mistake in all of these matters has been that along with wide profession of fine principles there has been a proneness to make use of those methods and to nourish that spirit which were condemned in our late enemies. The war gospel has been this: Cast out devils by Beelzebub. But St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, after itemizing the sins of the Gentiles, made special application to his own people; he asked of them this question: "Thou that makest

thy boast of the law, through breaking of the law dishonourest thou God?"

(2) It is essential to bear in mind that since November 11, 1918, the victorious nations should have been striving to make peace, and to do this they should have placed foremost the inner *spirit of peace.* Back of all peace is conciliation. Failure to reconcile, no matter which side is at fault, means a failure to make peace. There may be peace-terms but no peace spirit. The breathing of hate and the pronunciamento of fierce anathemas may be of the very nature of war and military necessity, but they have no place in a world of peace within the limits of widespread and lasting conciliation. "To conquer with arms," said President Wilson, addressing Congress on armistice day, "is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make permanent conquest. I am confident that the nations that have learned the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-possession to its ordered practice are now about to make conquest of the world by the power of example and friendly helpfulness."

But what do we find? Not so much that a dozen wars are being waged after the signing of the Treaty of Peace, but that leaders of political thought and guides of the Church continue to endorse or inoculate the old war phraseology of hate and enmity. Worse than general unrest, yea, that which breeds this unrest, is unholy, un-Christian, unwise adherence to the war spirit. To love peace is to have peace. The whole temper of mind, the very phrases one uses, all need to be changed and sanctified.

So contrary to the true spirit of peace, of conciliation, and "friendly helpfulness," is that which has occurred in China since the declaration of armistice, very largely under British initiative. And these Britons were mostly Chris-

tians, with a few Jews; none of them were Buddhists, not even Moslems. I confess that even in wartime I have failed to see the reason, the duty, or the pleasure, out there in China, to vent wrath on the Germans, whose friendship we all had prized in former days. How much less fitting was any such uncharitableness, when once war had terminated. So far as life in China was concerned, war had terminated November 7, 1914, when all the German combatants became prisoners of war to Japan. To illustrate my point, I take the liberty of quoting from a private letter, dated August 23, 1919, written from Shanghai by a devoted Christian:

I never shall forget the events following the signing of the armistice. In my ignorance I supposed that there would be a cessation of petty hostilities here in Shanghai. But it was only the beginning. There was a big victory procession ending with the burning of the Kaiser and other notables, after they had "kotowed" to the Allies. This will give you a key as to the parade itself, which did not please any Chinese with whom I spoke. "I thought it would be a Peace parade," said one Chinese, "but it was only a Hate parade." I had arranged Christmas decoration for my house with letters of evergreen across the upper veranda, "On earth, peace, good-will to men." But there wasn't any peace in Shanghai and there wasn't any good-will. I was ashamed. Almost at once, and with very short warning, the Germans were evicted from their houses unless they were living in houses owned by neutrals or Chinese. Being winter time, this worked great hardship. Next came the cutting off of telephones for Germans. This also worked hardship, especially for the Paulun Hospital and German doctors. The German School, including its apparatus, was confiscated, and then soon commenced the deportation of the Germans. To me the saddest thing about that was the gusto, the lack of sympathy, the evident enjoyment of their humiliation shown by the foreign community and even by the missionaries. In some cases the proceedings seemed to me very stern. A large number of old Shanghai residents (German) were given less than twenty-four hours' notice to get

ready to leave. A tragic procession of about a thousand were passing along the bund on a Sunday morning during divine service. The Te Deum was chanted and the thanksgiving Psalms. No word of prayer for our enemies, now vanquished.

There were two incidents that made a deep impression on me. One was the repatriation of the German pastor's family. They have two darling little children. The little four-year-old child could not understand why they had to leave their pretty home and why her mother was crying. She was told it was because of the English. "Mother," she asked, "do the English know anything about our God, the dear Lord Jesus?" At the church, where they had last been stopping, they were hurriedly getting their packages of condensed milk, water, bedding, etc., ready, while the pastor was trying to make arrangement disposing of the church services and other matters. And so they were not off the place by 8:30 A.M. (though the prison-boat was not to sail till the next day). Soon came a batch of Shanghai Volunteers dressed in Scotch Highland fashion, armed with swords and rifles, and followed by the foreign police. The little children looked up so wonderingly at these big Englishmen all ready to bind and carry away their father, the gentle pastor. The Volunteers looked ashamed and ill at ease.

The other incident was of a lady, daughter of an American missionary. She was ill with influenza and the physician had advised against her sailing, but she refused to leave her husband. He had also been exempted by the Chinese, who alone were responsible for the repatriation. But the Municipal Chief of Police, English, said if he was not out of the house within two hours the Volunteers would carry him to the ship. On receiving the information he expressed his hatred of us Shanghai Allies. His intensity was frightful. I could not really blame him, as I realized that his properties were to be confiscated and auctioned off and he and his wife allowed to take home about three hundred taels (ounces of silver) apiece. He had been very wealthy and had a luxurious home. When I multiplied his hate by that of about 60,000,000 Germans, and that of Frenchmen, Belgians, Americans, Austrians and countless others, I was overwhelmed by the thought of the hate of the world.

All this, remember, after the deeds and demands of war, when world peace is to be re-established. All this in Far Cathay, under British administration, in the sight of discerning Chinese.

As a word of hope comes the news from the very centre of the war in Europe that a Franco-German Association is being formed to affirm before the world the ardent desire for international peace by means of mutual reconciliation, rallying to the cry of "War against hate! War against war! Live peace and brotherhood among the peoples!" May this vision of holy prophets become the vision of suffering and oppressed Asia, as well as of distracted Europe.

(3) Correct conceptions of the situation in Eastern Asia must be *free from preconceptions* based on the situation in Europe. It is impossible to get a true perspective of conditions in the Far East, if the eye looks merely on conditions in Europe or America. Observation true to the facts must be all-around, and, as far as possible, free from the bewilderment of passion. There must be poise of judgment. It is only natural to have misconception of the doings and inter-relations of the Chinese on the one side, and of all other peoples, Western or Japanese, on the other, if there is already a preconception either for or against some particular people as shaped by bias incident to warfare in Europe or on the high seas. Preconception breeds misconception. Animosity to German ways of waging war has caused many an American, otherwise fair-minded, to conclude *ipso facto* that everything done by Germans in China has been bad and that their extinction ought to be viewed with favour by Chinese and by every one else. So, too, prejudice directed against Japan may lead one to overlook all the misdeeds of the Allies and the United States as perpetrated, somewhat under cover, in both China and Japan. To understand the situation, to appreciate the wrongs done to China and by whom, both in war and at the

Peace Table, it is all-important that all predilections—the pro and anti spirit—be shaken off, leaving the mind in a state of clarity and unruffled judiciousness.

One of President Wilson's axiomatic truths is this: "The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned." No doubt the President was thinking particularly of the Germans as "those to whom we do not wish to be just." As to the Far East, the Pacific, and America's Oriental problems, he would probably include the Japanese in the same category. As for myself, I desire to be just to all, to the Germans as well as to my kin of Scotland and England, to the Japanese as well as to the Chinese people, whose interests I have tried to serve.

Americans—and I mention no others—can never grasp the intricate problem of the Far East if they continue to read into the study the bugaboo of pro-Germanism or the agitation of anti-Japanese-ism, or the war criterion of pro-Ally or anti-Ally. The war is over, the muzzle is off, let all men see the nations, the Governments, the diplomats, as they really are.

Already surprise and chagrin have come to Americans and Chinese by the disclosures of the Allied connivance with Japan to deal with China as they saw fit, unknown to both the Chinese and Americans. Other disclosures which have been made in these pages may possibly have displeased those whose minds are already made up, or have passed judgment before trying the case. But truths sometimes hurt as well as soothe.

The conduct of the two groups of warring nations in their dealings may be stated thus: With China the principles as proclaimed by President Wilson have been better

adhered to in China by the officials and subjects of the two Central Powers than by the European Allies, by Japan, or even by America. Or it may be stated thus: The policy and conduct of the Allied group in China has been very nearly the reverse of what they professed in Europe.

(4) A very simple rule is this: *Know the facts,* the more the better, and accept the truth as derived from facts. This is inductive philosophy as applied to search for truth.

> "Truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again,
> The eternal years of God are hers,
> But Error, wounded, writhes with pain,
> And dies among his worshippers."

One of the great injuries wrought by war of any kind is the subjection of the moral to the military, as seen in the compulsion, oftentimes legislative, and largely executive, for misrepresenting the facts, for hiding the truth, for misconstruing the aims, speech and conduct of those abroad who are foes in war and those at home who dare to disagree and criticize.

It will take many a year to know the real situation of the European nations prior to the war and during the war. As to the real intent of the Japanese, the real heart of the Chinese, and the real doings of Allies and Americans in China, much light has been thrown by public discussion, but even yet fallacious arguments are being used, some point is being unduly stretched, Japan is an enigma and China a conundrum. As to the real soul of the nations arrayed against Germany, or at least of their leaders, President Wilson on Memorial Day gave in France this startling account of what he had learned:

> You are aware, as I am aware, that the airs of an older day are beginning to stir again, that the standards of an old order are trying to assert themselves again. There is here and there an

attempt to insert into the counsel of statesmen the old reckoning of selfishness and bargaining and national advantage which were the roots of this war, and any man who counsels these things advocates a renewal of the sacrifice which these men have made: for if this is not the final battle for right, there will be another that will be final.

These are serious facts. The more such facts are made known, the better it will be for the peace of the world, for law and order, for justice and good-will.

(5) In normal times every enlightened State, every progressive people, every man of faith and courage, is under obligation to see that all men everywhere are accorded *liberty of conscience, liberty of thought and liberty of speech.* As to the latter I put it thus: The right, and with the right the responsibilities, of *legitimate free discussion.* Abnormal times, as those of war and revolt, place restriction on the individual for the sake of the nation, a group or a cause. The world is now trying to become normal again, and so once more free.

I think I am right in asserting that the British people have held to their free rights all through the war more than have Americans. Men who were opposed to Britain's entrance into the war, or who believed in the rule of reason, refused to hide their sentiments, after war became a national problem. The United States, however, as "land of the free and home of the brave," sadly stultified itself, as soon as it joined the fray of the Old World. "Conscientious objectors" have received longer sentences in the U. S. A. than have those in England.

These two countries have in past years had a great reputation among the Chinese as defenders of liberty, contrasted with such countries as Russia, Roumania, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and Germany. France, too, has been known to be the home of "liberty, equality, fraternity." These three

nations, however, have inflicted on China such things as Trading with the Enemy Acts, "black lists," censorship, boycotts and spies. They have forced China to take extreme measures of old-time oppression. For example, in Peking there were three papers published in English. Of these, two were closed down by the Chinese Government, one under pressure of the Japanese Legation, and the other of the British and French Legations. (I myself was editor of one of these.)

What I wish to emphasize is the duty in all lands to revert to the normal condition of liberal institutions, and wage war by moral forces on all oppression, tyranny, slavery.

July 4, 1919, President Wilson spoke these words on the ship *George Washington:*

> We told our fellow-men throughout the world when we set up the free State of America that we wanted to serve liberty everywhere and be the friends of men in every part of the world who wanted to throw off the unjust shackles of arbitrary government. Now we have kept our pledge to humanity as well as our pledge to ourselves.

Time has again come for men to have convictions, and with convictions the courage, the right, the chance to express them.

It was James Russell Lowell who wrote:

> "They are slaves who will not choose
> Hatred, scoffing and abuse
> Rather than in silence shrink
> From the truth they needs must think;
> They are slaves who dare not be
> In the right with two or three."

(6) I believe it a cardinal duty, made clear by the experiences of the war, that in whatever country one finds his

lot in life, *the interests of that country must be made supreme.* Just as all aliens residing in the United States should in times of emergency place America's interests first, or return to the land whence they came, so all foreigners in China should place first, not the interests of their own country, but the interests of China, or, under the stress of patriotism, return to their native land, at least till the interests of all shall work injury to none. Missionaries and educationists in China ought especially to observe this rule; otherwise their work will be looked upon as political —to denationalize those whom they profess to aim to bless.

We Americans have learned to detest German propaganda under the Stars and Stripes. On principle, ought we not to frown down every other form of propaganda, whether Russian, Soviet, Bolshevik, Polish, Italian, English, Japanese? If we Americans want no more German spies, have we really any place for all the kinds of foreign spies who frequent our shores, even when honoured with the name of Intelligence Officers and Naval Attachés? An Exclusion Law for foreign spies might not be bad for our free land.

Now apply the same principle to China. What shall we say when the Japanese and British have in their archives complete maps of every part of China, and complete reports of every district in the country? What are we to think of political and diplomatic advisors, drawing pay from the Chinese Government, but in the momentous days of war making supreme the war schemes of their respective countries, and using their confidential position to bring China into the fray? Can we commend conduct in China which we condemn in our own land?

(7) Closely linked with the above principle is another—that the time has come for all nations to allow *China a greater part in her own development.* In President Wil-

son's speech of April, 1918, when he enunciated the Fourteen Points, he said:

> What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in, and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation, which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair-dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.

The Chinese are a practical people; they are quick to detect pretence and to abhor inconsistency. Now that peace has come, it behooves the nations which have been associated with China in war—some rather dubious companions—to make good their professions by disowning secret compacts to China's disadvantage, by restoring, one and all, territory that has been pressed from her in various ways, particularly the foreign areas, foreign administration, and foreign dictatorship at treaty-ports. Dr. Sidney L. Gulick, while advocate for Japan, is no less a friend of China, as these words show:[1]

> China should be given fair-play and opportunity to become a great self-governing democratic nation. As rapidly as possible she should be given complete control of all her own affairs, with judicial and tariff autonomy. To these ends, not only Japan, but England as well, and France, and every other nation, should undertake to restore to China their respective "rights"—secured in too many cases by force, intimidation or fraud; they should withdraw their troops and police. By the application of the principles of amortization China should be enabled to purchase back all railroad and mining concessions.

(8) In harmony with the above, all schemes termed international for reshaping China should *include all nations*, and not merely the "Five Big Powers," and, what is more,

[1] In *Christian Work*, August, 1919.

should *include China.* In Shanghai, for instance, there is an International Settlement, where most of the population is Chinese, but in which not one Chinese has any part in municipal affairs. Most of the Municipal Councillors are British, with whom are associated one American and one Japanese. Is it not an insult to the Chinese nation to allow a Japanese to serve on this select body, while from all the educated Chinese, graduated from Yale, Columbia, Cambridge, Paris or Berlin, not one is deemed to have the qualifications for municipal office?

So, too, as an offset to Japanese designs in Tsingtao, Americans have proposed an International Settlement, which, according to their theory, is to be dominated by Americans and British, from which Germans are to be excluded, and in which Chinese are given no important place. Should an International Settlement be formed there under present circumstances, the Japanese would dominate.

So the proposed consortium is to consist of bankers from America, Great Britain, France and Japan, and possibly Belgium and Russia. Even if the consortium idea be adopted, what about other nations? What about Holland? What about Germany of the future? And what especially about China?

Too many schemes, contracts, conventions, have been drawn up in the past dealing with China, and China left out. There should have been no Lansing-Ishii agreement, but a Lansing-Wu Ting-fang agreement, both guaranteeing and recognizing the "special interests" and "prior position" of China, and no other country.

(9) *"The interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest."* This is so good a formula that I transcribe it from what one may call Wilson's "Analects," more than a match for the "Analects of Confucius."

Recognition for the sacred character of the Chinese State, which today is weak, is, on this theory, no less a duty than

that accorded Japan, which today is strong. Smaller States are to have as much "say" in the new dispensation as the Great Powers. The rights of one nation are as great as those of another. Big nations are not to domineer over small nations. The strong are not to arrogate authority over the weak. To begin with, suppose a start be made with China. She is called weak, because her military power is inferior to others; but she is great in ideas, philosophy, ethics, religion, political theories, great achievements, art, literature, commerce and personal character. She deserves the esteem of mankind; let her have it, in all the glow of intelligent recognition. As to the words quoted from President Wilson, let them be lived out in the political intercourse of the nations that are, and of those that are yet to be.

(10) The final principle is that of *universal brotherhood.* This means the gradual elimination of racial, religious and national discords that impede the progress of the human race. It is co-operative fellowship among all peoples, not merely those that are free, but even more those that are not free, in a spirit of concord and friendship, educationally developed, and for the combined task of preserving, each in its own sphere, law and order, justice and liberty. This is a task of peoples, not of governments, a spiritual enterprise, not a political or military one. Such was the world-wide fellowship, of which prophets of old dreamed, and which the greatest of all prophets proclaimed in the Kingdom of God. The message of such an idea, again and again passed on from heart to heart along the centuries, is that which I believe suitable to China, and to all the nations of the world. As President Wilson said in Manchester, England, "There is only one thing that can bind peoples together, and that is common devotion to right."

This is something different from giving approval to the Covenant of the League of Nations as drawn up at Paris,

and which already has aroused many discordant notes and deep-seated forebodings. Along with others, I was captivated with the original idea, the impulse of souls longing for peace. But candidly, as the months go by, I fail to see how China or the United States will receive good from such a League, in the future any more than in the immediate past.

The New York *World* has made the surprising statement that there is more to be criticized in the Treaty than in the League. With this I agree, and I am astonished that in the United States so little criticism has been given the Treaty. Both the League and the Treaty fall far short of the great ideals set forth by President Wilson. The end is that of a decline. Judge the League by the Treaty and then judge the Treaty by its treatment of China. "A chain is no stronger than its weakest link!" The Treaty as a whole must be judged by the section headed, "Shantung." I quote from the President of China, Hsü Shih-chang, at the beginning of the year 1919:[1]

> The proposal of President Wilson for making the League one of the terms of peace and for the cancellation of the doctrines of spheres of influence and balance of power in Europe and elsewhere naturally receives the whole-hearted indorsement of China. If the proposed League becomes a fact, the nations of the world should stand on an equal plane, and secret diplomacy will then naturally be deprived of its sanction. *If this is not so,* the principle involved in the proposed League will not prove really effective or a source of benefit to the undeveloped Powers.

The President of the Republic of America may well listen to the President of the Republic of China. The Chinese, we may rest assured, will no longer applaud a League, or a Treaty, or even any of the professed principles, that have

[1] New York *Times,* January 11, 1919.

treated the claims and aspirations of their country in such a shameful fashion as disclosed in the final settlement.

For one I disapprove of the proposed League, because it is one of Governments, not of peoples, because it represents imperialism not democracy, because it was conceived in secret conclave of a select few and not in open court, because it sanctioned "special alliances" and not "the common interest of all," and because it is more a League of War and Force than a League of Peace and free, individual and national initiative. I commend to the attention of all Americans these words of President Wilson spoken before the actual deed was done, September 27, 1918:

> Only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.

I also commend the words of J. A. Hobson, written after the deed was done, February 8, 1919:[1]

> Nowhere does the breath of democracy enter its frame. Everywhere the arbitrary and despotic will of the five big fighting Powers of the Entente holds sway. Everywhere the functions of the League are to be administered by this little group of war Ministers, so as to continue their domination over Europe and to extend it even beyond the ultimate limits of the League.

The true principle, not illustrated in this League, or probably attainable in any political project called a League or Alliance, whether "holy" or not, is taught in the calm discriminating language of Washington's Farewell Address:

> Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent

[1] *The Nation* of London, February 8, 1919.

controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

This principle I have from the very opening of the war held paramount for China—that it was unwise, and ever will be, to "implicate" herself in "the vicissitudes" of European or American "politics," "combinations and collisions," revolutions and wars.

As for the American *people*, the British, the German and the Japanese, I am confident that they will all ever be ready to give China a helping hand. They need no League of Governments to force them to right action.

The first mistake of the negotiators of peace was that the great and true principles accepted by vanquished and victors were not introduced definitely into the Preamble of the Treaty as a "Whereas" to subsequent Articles, and as a basis of what was expected, namely, *mutual negotiation*. The second mistake was that the association of nations for preventing war and establishing peace was not left to the calm conference of *all* nations, after the termination of the present war, and as a natural evolution and historical development of the Conventions of the Hague Peace Conferences. The present League seems to ignore recognized international law as already established, and sets out to reconstruct the world as a *de novo* transaction. Moreover, the League has too little of the legal and judiciary quality and too much of the quality of political disputes and nationalistic ambitions. "In my opinion," says Oppenheim,[1] "the organization of a new League of Nations should start from the beginning made by the two Hague Peace Conferences." This is the reason I would rejoice to see the

[1] "The League of Nations and its Problems," p. 36.

present League vanish into thin air, and all nations get back to the solid foundation of a third Hague Conference for completing the eminently just, sane and judicial work already accomplished, worthy of hearty recognition.

David Jayne Hill has well said:[1]

> The experience of the war has taught us that henceforth no nation can preserve its seclusion and live apart. Actively or passively, its life is affected by the needs, the animosities and the purposes of other nations. Whatever our theories of national policy may be, we cannot escape some kind of relation with every other nation in the world. The important question is, what shall be the basis of those relations? Shall we base them upon a combination of world power, or shall we base them upon the principles of free co-operation under the regulation of accepted law? . . . It is of vital importance to recognize the indisputable fact that this Covenant (of the League of Nations) not only makes no advance in the development of International Law, but wholly overlooks the status attained by it, through the work of the great international congresses since the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

These, then, are the ten principles which have shaped themselves in my mind from the opening of the awful struggle in August, 1914, as bearing indeed upon world problems of friend and foe, and particularly upon the destiny of China. For one and all let this be our prayer:

> "Faith of our fathers, we will love
> Both friend and foe in all our strife,
> And preach Thee, too, as love knows how,
> By kindly words and virtuous life;
> Faith of our fathers, holy faith,
> We will be true to Thee till death."

[1] *North American Review*, October, 1919.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

[Note: A full discussion of Japan's violation of international law was attempted in an article by the author in the *Yale Law Journal* for December, 1915.]

THE NEUTRALITY OF CHINA

In the December number (1914) of *The North American Review* an able legal argument on "The Neutrality of Belgium" appeared from the pen of Prof. A. G. De Lapradelle of Paris. The argument proves to be an indictment of Germany. Others may, perhaps, advance an argument which may be an indictment of both Great Britain and France. Our purpose in writing, is to make use of the sound legal principles, advanced by this distinguished Frenchman, to indict Japan for her violation of the neutrality of China. To discuss the subject, Japan must suffer criticism.

There is a marked difference between the character of Belgian neutrality and of Chinese neutrality. Belgium represents what is known as perpetual neutrality, when the neutral nation "renounces the right to make war" and is in turn "protected from all hostilities." China represents simple or temporary neutrality, wherein there is less guarantee of protection from others, while its sovereignty as a state remains intact. In the case of perpetual neutrality, it is imposed on the neutral state; in the case of temporary neutrality, it is inherent in every sovereign state. The rights and duties of neutral states, as recognized in international law, not only apply to perpetual neutrality but also to every non-belligerent state. We desire, therefore,

to apply the ordinary and well-known principles and laws of neutrality to the situation in China, when Japan proceeded to wage war on Germany.

Scarcely had war in Europe been declared when the Chinese Government issued regulations for the observance of neutrality, in accordance with the law of nations. Realizing that the great warring powers of Europe had interests or leased territory in China, the Chinese Government desired two things, that the war be limited to Europe, and, that if any conflict arose in China between the warring nations, the neutrality of China might be respected. To bring this about, negotiations took place between the foreign Ministers chiefly concerned, especially the British and German. The German representative, knowing that Tsingtao was open to attack, and thus likely to involve China, was willing, with the consent of the German governor-general at Tsingtao, to consent to three things: first, that the German squadron remain away from Tsingtao; second, that the small gunboat and torpedo boats still in harbour be interned; and, third, that Tsingtao with the Shantung Railway be placed under Chinese jurisdiction or be neutralized, until the end of the war. The German Legation also promised to abstain from hostile operations, if Japan remained neutral.

The Chinese Government, anxious to avoid danger of complications, determined upon a policy of equal treatment, namely, that no obstacle should be placed in the way of belligerent action within any territory leased to the nations at war, and not neutralized, that is, to Germany, Great Britain and France. Any fighting within these leased territories at Kiaochow, at Weihaiwei, at Kowloon (opposite Hongkong), and at Kuangchowan would not be regarded as fighting on Chinese territory; thus would China's neutrality be preserved.

China approached both Japan and the United States and

asked them to remain neutral in the Far East. Japan, after some delay, decided to reject China's proposal, and to yield to Great Britain's request for aid. If Great Britain needed Japan's help on the seas, she did not need it on Chinese soil. Even if an attack on Tsingtao was found to be unavoidable, the fighting should have been confined to the leased territory, going back for more than 30 miles from the shore, a restriction which the British contingent faithfully observed.

If the Alliance forced Japan to enter the war, it should also have forced her to "preserve the independence and integrity of China," for which the Alliance was ostensibly formed.

Tsingtao, or the larger leased area of Kiaochow, lies on the south side of the long Shantung promontory. On the north side, running from east to west, are three ports, Weihaiwei, leased to Great Britain; Chefoo, a treaty-port; and Lungkow, only a Chinese harbour, but at the time not yet a treaty-port. In all this section of the country, Germany had no railway or other established interests. The German "sphere of interest" runs west of Tsingtao. It should also be noted that Lungkow is on the side of the Pehchihle Gulf opposite Port Arthur, which is leased to Japan.

Very early in the war Japanese cruisers and transports entered the harbour of Lungkow and remained there beyond the 24 hours' limit, while troops forcibly landed and occupied the town, and later on marched across Chinese territory to the rear of Tsingtao. The Chinese customs and post offices were taken possession of, and a military telegraph and railway were stretched across the country, without regard to the rights of the Chinese people and despite repeated protests of the Chinese Government.

May we be allowed to quote Professor De Lapradelle:

"Furthermore, to demand of Belgium to allow the German troops to pass through Belgian territory was not only

contrary to perpetual neutrality, it was contrary to temporary neutrality." What Japan did was contrary to temporary neutrality; the law of nations was broken. No Western nation apparently regards the matter of any consequence.

"The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, on the rights and duties of neutral states, signed by Germany and Belgium [by Japan and China], is explicit on this point: 'Art. 1. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral power.'" What is a sacred obligation in Europe should be a sacred obligation in Asia as well, especially since Japan is an honoured Ally of Great Britain.

"To ask passage of her troops was for Germany to associate Belgium with her in the war, to expose her, in the improbable case of her assenting, to a just punishment by the Powers from such treason to her duties. If the neutrality of Belgium had been temporary, Germany could not, without forcing her to enter into an alliance with her, have demanded passage; such a concession would have been on the part of the neutral state an act of belligerence." The same principle applies to Japan's conduct towards China.

The Chinese Government barely escaped becoming a belligerent on Japan's side. Japan *forced* a passage, and China protested; this was safe and proper. Following the advice of Dr. Ariga, the Japanese legal advisor to the Chinese Government, and with the approval of the British Minister, China consented to a war zone. The Japanese legal expert cited as precedent the Russo-Japanese War, when Manchuria east of the Liao River was made a war zone.

China was placed in an awkward position; not more so, perhaps, than neutral countries in Europe. China had one

of three courses open to her. One was to defend her neutrality, and resist by force of arms the passage of Japanese soldiers. Such action would not conflict with international law, for the Hague Convention of 1907, Article 10, says: "The fact of a neutral power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act." Such resistance was what Belgium made, and in so doing she had the promised help of Great Britain and France. If China, in resisting Japan, had looked to Great Britain and France for help, she might have looked in vain. She might have expected help from Germany, but in that case the ties between Japan, Great Britain and France would have been knit the stronger. In fact Japan treated the rules of The Hague as "a scrap of paper," so far as her relations with China were concerned. If China had resisted, Japan would beyond doubt have declared war upon China as well as on Germany, and China's dangers would have increased a thousand-fold. She would have suffered more than Belgium suffered when she decided to resist Germany. China, knowing the danger, was wise, therefore, in not adopting the method of resistance.

A second course to pursue was simply to protest, and to record her protest for future deliberation and decision. China was advised to adopt this method, but she was finally persuaded to adopt another method, namely, that of protesting and also granting a war zone. By so doing, she, in accordance with recognized principles, practically became a belligerent on the side of Japan as against Germany. The precedent cited from the Russo-Japanese War was in reality no precedent; the circumstances were in no wise the same. In that war, Russian troops had already for several years occupied Southern Manchuria; in the present case, German troops had never gone outside the limits of the German leased territory. In the former war, Russia as well as Japan had agreed to the proposition of a war zone; in the

present war, Germany had not given her consent, and was not even consulted. In the former war, the war zone was of equal benefit to Russia and to Japan; in the present case it was to Japan's advantage and to Germany's disadvantage. Though it now appears from these and other reasons that China should never have consented to a war zone, through which Japanese troops were permitted to pass, the consent was given that conflict with Japan might be avoided. This yielding of China to Japan's wishes has not been appreciated by Japan; rather, the leniency has been made a pretext for Japan to assume the rôle of sovereign on Chinese soil.

The forced passage of Japanese troops from Lungkow to Tsingtao was called a "military necessity." The absurdity of such a claim is readily seen, when one considers that on the one side were less than 5,000 Germans, a poorly-fortified garrison, facing Japanese and British men-of-war, with 30,000 Japanese soldiers equipped for action, and the whole Japanese army within a few hours' call. There was no military necessity, but only a political necessity to carry out a political strategy for the occupation of the province of Shantung.

The first violation of China's neutrality was soon followed by a more pronounced violation. Japanese troops marched outside the war zone, took possession of the railway station at Weihsien, to the west of Tsingtao, and then occupied the entire railway as far as Tsinan-fu and also all the mines worked by the Germans. The occupation continues. The military guard was not removed after Tsingtao was captured.

Defenders of Japanese action hold two positions which are irreconcilable the one to the other. The claim is made that the railway was a German Government railway, and another claim is made that the Germans had first violated China's neutrality by the transport of troops and muni-

tions of war. If the railway belonged to the German Government, then the transport of troops and munitions would have been legitimate, and therefore no infringement of *Chinese* neutrality.

As a matter of fact the railway has been built and is the property of a German-Chinese Company, incorporated in Germany, just as other companies or syndicates have been incorporated in other countries. The railway and mines were "concessions" granted by the Chinese Government through treaty arrangement with the German Government; it was clearly stipulated that, as in the leased territory of Kiaochow, there were "no treacherous intentions towards China" on the part of Germany. The company was a German-Chinese Company, a private and not a government company; the territory through which it runs is Chinese and neutral territory, over which China's sovereign rights are retained. By special agreement with the Chinese Government only Chinese soldiers were to act as railway guards.

Taking, then, the position that the railway was on Chinese, not on German territory, were the Germans the first to be guilty of violating China's neutrality? From the outset the Chinese Government determined to make no discrimination between one belligerent and another in the matter of travel by land or by sea. If belligerents traveled as civilians, in civilian dress and without weapons, the Chinese authorities would present no objection. Chinese action was one of impartiality, the essence of neutrality. German action conformed to the Chinese arrangement just as much as the British, the Russian and the French, and far more than the Japanese.

With reference to the transport of munitions of war by Germany, no protest was entered at the time by any belligerent, and China, a neutral Power, was under no obligation to lay upon herself additional burdens, because of war be-

tween other nations. There was, moreover, no question of the Chinese selling contraband. If there were any arms transported over neutral territory, they were already in German possession, and before Japan declared war. So far as international law has established a clear principle, seizure by an enemy can only take place "on the high seas." No enemy thinks of capturing contraband of war on neutral soil.

Even if China was "liable to penalty," the wrong kind of penalty was inflicted by Japan, namely, forceful, military occupation of the Shantung Railway in neutral territory, and the refusal to China of the right of management, control and protection. Japan drove out not only Germany, but China as well. Continued occupation from Tsingtao to Tsinan-fu, like continued occupation from Lungkow to Tsingtao, is a continued infringement not only of China's neutrality, but of China's sovereignty, and this in the face of an alliance guaranteeing China's independence and autonomy.

In this additional violation of China's neutrality, Japan made the same excuse as in the previous case, namely, "military necessity"; but this was only to conceal her real purpose, that of political aggression. It was plain that in capturing Tsingtao there was no need of occupying the railway westward as far as Tsinan-fu. In fact the obligation to defend China's neutrality or to consult China's wishes carried no weight with Great Britain's chosen Ally, Japan.

It is somewhat difficult to understand the feeling of Americans regarding the rights of nations and the wrongs done by one nation to another. Americans seem to condemn Germany for violating the neutrality of Belgium, but seem at the same time to overlook Japan's infringement of China's neutrality. The length of territory thus violated by Japan in China is twice the length of that violated by

Germany in Belgium. Americans seem to applaud Great Britain for claiming that her purpose was to defend the weaker nations, and so the neutrality of Belgium, and yet at the same time seem to countenance her action in abetting Japan's violation of the neutrality of China. They pity Belgium for what she suffers in resisting Germany, but they do not show even interest in the political misfortunes which threaten China at the hands of Japan, although China has scrupulously refrained from giving offence or from committing any act of war. They lament the reported German atrocities to Belgium, but they practically ignore the good which Germany has wrought, in missions, in science, in education and in trade, for the Chinese people. Americans declare that Germany should pay for the losses she has inflicted on Belgium, but they excuse the harm, the loss, the encroachment which China continues to suffer at the hands of Japan, abetted by Great Britain. Does it mean, then, that Americans regard these questions of international intercourse, not from the standpoint of high principle, law and justice, but from a standpoint prejudiced by natural preference?

"If Belgium [China] is now suffering more than any people has ever suffered, it does not mean that in the mass of legal institutions that of neutrality is particularly fragile or more particularly imperfect, but that international law is at this moment too weak to resist the audacious onslaught of those Powers whose military pride has perverted their sense of right and whose devouring ambition has corrupted their sense of justice." How can we hope that the careless unconcern of the Great Powers towards the rights of China can fail to bring upon themselves unlooked-for suffering in the generations yet to come? Every country professing to believe in international law should come forward to the defence of China and the indictment of Japan.

APPENDIX II

A CHINESE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION ON THE WAR AND EDITORIAL COMMENTS

The Proclamation of President Feng Kuo-chang, August 14, 1917, declaring war against the two Central Powers is a most important document. It deserves careful reading, that China's aims in participating in the Great War may be fully understood. It is as follows:

On the 9th day of the 2nd month of this year we addressed a protest to the German Government against the policy of submarine warfare inaugurated by Germany, which was considered by this Government as contrary to international law, and imperilling neutral lives and property, and declared therein in case the protest be ineffectual we would be constrained, much to our regret, to sever diplomatic relations with Germany.

Contrary to our expectations, however, no modification was made in her submarine policy after the lodging of our protest. On the contrary, the number of neutral vessels and belligerent merchantmen destroyed in an indiscriminate manner was daily increasing and the Chinese lives lost were numerous. Under such circumstances, although we might yet remain indifferent and endure suffering, with the meagre hope of preserving a temporary peace, but in so doing we would never be able to satisfy our people who are attached to righteousness and sensible to disgrace, nor would we justify ourselves before our sister States which had acted without hesitation in obedience to the dictates of the sense of duty. Both here as well as in the friendly Powers the cause of indignation was the same, and among the people of this country there could be found no difference of opinion. This Government, thereupon, being compelled to consider the protest

as being ineffectual, notified, on the 14th day of the 3rd month, the German Government of the severance of the diplomatic relations and at the same time the events taking place from the beginning up to that time were announced for the general information of the public.

What we have desired is peace; what we have respected is international law; what we have to protect are the lives and property of our own people. As we originally had no other grave causes of enmity against Germany, the German Government, if it had manifested repentance of the deplorable consequences resulting from its policy of warfare, might still be expected to modify that policy in view of the common indignation of the whole world. That was what we eagerly desired, and it was the reason why we felt reluctant to treat Germany as a common enemy. Nevertheless, during the five months following the severance of the diplomatic relations the submarine attacks continued in operation as vigorously as before. It is not Germany alone, but Austria-Hungary as well, which pursued this policy without abatement. Not only has international law been thereby violated, but also our people are suffering injury and loss. The most sincere hope on our part to bring about a better state of affairs is now shattered. Therefore, it is hereby declared, against Germany as well as Austria-Hungary, that a state of war exists commencing from 10 o'clock of the 14th day of the 8th month of the 6th year of the Republic of China. In consequence thereof all treaties, agreements, conventions, concluded between China and Germany, and between China and Austria-Hungary, as well as such parts of the international protocols and international agreements as concern the relations between China and Germany, and between China and Austria-Hungary, are, in conformity with the law of nations and international practice, all abrogated. This Government, however, will respect the Hague Conventions and her international agreements respecting the humane conduct of war.

The chief object in our declaration of war is to put an end to the calamities of war and to hasten the restoration of peace, which it is hoped our people will fully appreciate. Seeing, however, that our people have not yet at the present time recovered from sufferings on account of the recent political disturbances

and that calamity again befalls us in the breaking out of the present war, I, the President of this Republic, cannot help having profound sympathy with our people when I take into consideration their further suffering. I would never resort to this step of striving for the existence of our nation unless and until I, considering it no longer possible to avoid it, am finally forced to this momentous decision.

I cannot bear to think that through us the dignity of international law should be impaired, or the position in the family of nations should be undermined or the restoration of the world peace and happiness should be retarded. It is, therefore, hoped that all of our people will exert their utmost in these hours of hardship, with a view to maintaining and strengthening the existence of the Chinese Republic, so that we may establish ourselves amidst the family of nations and share with them the happiness and benefits derived therefrom.

The same day in the *Peking Post*, of which I was editor and proprietor, I extended my congratulations in the following brief statement:

We congratulate the President of China, Feng Kuo-chang, on issuing with the aid of his Cabinet Ministers a Declaration of War that is dignified and stately in form, without hatred and animosity in spirit, adhering to the basal principle of international law, and actuated by high and enduring aims. In spite of the declaration being one of war against hitherto friendly States—which for many reasons we regret—the Chinese Government deserves credit for the way an unpleasant act is gracefully performed. The two enemy countries are not denounced in fierce and excessive terms; and possibly future Allies are not exonerated or applauded. Amid all minor motives there looms aloft this magnificent CHIEF object, to which as citizen of an allied country we give our sincere allegiance: TO PUT AN END TO THE CALAMITIES OF WAR AND TO HASTEN THE RESTORATION OF PEACE.

The next day I published a longer editorial, advising at the end that China act out her noble professions. I reprint

it here as illustrative of a continued interest in China's well-being:

We Americans know the sensation of being transferred over night from the state of neutrality into a state of war, from being advocates of peace into advocates of belligerency, tempered with mild doses of democracy. Some who had only pretended to be neutral and impartial found no great difficulty in the passing transformation; others of us rolled over to the other side less gracefully and so got into trouble.

As to China, it does not much matter whether she goes to war against two distant countries in Central Europe or remains at peace. So we told President Feng the other day. Under present circumstances no large number of the German navy will attack Chinese ports and fortresses and no startling crowd of China's brave Generals and soldiers will find passage to the western front. It does not look as if the Chinese and their newly-created enemies would have much of a chance to get at each other. Most probably the first time they meet will be at the Peace Conference. There is more likelihood of China being able to send tea to England than to send Kiangnan guns to France.

Merely to declare war—which is all that a war declaration means—is nothing very dangerous or alarming. Of course, it is a serious affair in point of democracy's safety, when war is declared without regard to Parliament, but that is internal politics, not external.

What creates a little sensation of fright is the associations that get tagged on to war's declaration. President Feng and his Proclamation are clear enough on this matter—no obligations to the enemies of Germany and Austria-Hungary. This, too, was the American attitude, but any number of Americans are more keen on linking up with France or Great Britain or the Russian Provisional Government (seldom is Japan mentioned) than on fighting Germany.

It will be harder with weak China. If she withstands all form of pressure, she will deserve to be called one of the Great Powers.

But we will not worry or complain or ridicule. We hope for the best.

China's political and financial condition could hardly be worse than it is or has been for some weeks. This war declaration is only a ripple on the waves.

Having declared war, China should now get ready; she should get her house in order. Having the German and Austro-Hungarian Ministers out of the way, the house-cleaning should be easy.

Appendix III

THE VERSAILLES TREATY CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN MISSIONS OF GERMANY

Article 438—The Allied and Associated Powers agree that where Christian religious missions were being maintained by German societies or persons in territory belonging to them, or of which the Government is entrusted to them in accordance with the present treaty, the property which these missions or missionary societies possessed, including that of trading societies whose profits were devoted to the support of missions, shall continue to be devoted to missionary purposes.

In order to ensure the due execution of this undertaking the Allied and Associated Governments will hand over such property to boards of trustees appointed by or approved by the governments and composed of persons holding the Christian faith. It will be the duty of such boards of trustees to see that the property continues to be applied to missionary purposes.

The obligations undertaken by the Allied and Associated Governments in this article will not in any way prejudice their control or authority as to the individuals by whom the missions are conducted.

Germany, taking note of the above undertaking agrees to accept all arrangements made or to be made by the Allied or Associated Governments concerned for carrying on the work of the said missions or trading societies, and waives all claims on their behalf.

Article 439—Without prejudice to the provisions of the

present treaty, Germany undertakes not to put forward, directly or indirectly, against any Allied or Associated Power, signatory of the present treaty, including those which, without having declared war, have broken off diplomatic relations with the German Empire, any pecuniary claim based on events which occurred at any time before the coming into force of the present treaty.

The present stipulation will bar completely and finally all claims of this nature, which will be thenceforward extinguished, whoever may be the parties in interest.

Appendix IV

THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN MISSIONS

Some Personal Impressions from a Recent Visit to Holland and Germany

By Rev. Arthur J. Brown, D.D., LL.D.
(*Christian Work,* May, 1920)

Imagine, however, what it means if the major Powers are to deal in a nationalistic spirit with the hundreds of millions of people that they directly or indirectly rule in Asia and Africa, and hold that missionary work for the evangelization and moral uplifting of these vast populations must be conducted with supreme reference to the political plans of the ruling government. Only a small fraction of the non-Christian world would be left for free missionary work.

Let us bear in mind that if this principle is to be recognized and acquiesced in it will almost certainly react upon ourselves. Why should not France adopt the same policy toward British and American missionaries? Instructive from this viewpoint is the French dealing with British missionary work in Madagascar and American missionary work in West Africa and Indo-China.

At this moment a new danger is threatening in Syria. During the dark days of the war Great Britain entered into an agreement with France that, in the event of the victory of the Allies, French claims in Syria would be recognized. In accordance with that agreement, France is now administering that country. A French official has intimated to a

representative of the Paris Missionary Society that he hoped that the society would prepare itself to take over the Protestant missionary work in Syria, as the French authorities do not like to have missionary work in that country conducted by American and British Protestants. Some irritation has recently developed between the British and French Governments. The former views with concern the pushing of a French wedge across the road to Britain's interests in Mesopotamia, and the French allege that the British military and civilian officials, connected with and following General Allenby's expedition, have made the French task harder by words and acts which have tended to prejudice the minds of the Syrian people against their new masters. The French involve the American Presbyterian missions and the faculty of the Syrian Protestant College in their irritation, believing that their use of the English language and their English ancestry and sympathies make them a hindrance to the French plans. It is not at all improbable at this writing that both the mission and college, as well as the British missions, may face in the near future very serious difficulties from the disposition of the French authorities to regard Syria as their national preserve in which it is deemed undesirable that American Protestant Christians should continue to conduct the extensive missionary work which they have been doing for generations, unless they strictly conform to French ideas and methods as interpreted by authorities on the ground, who will probably get their advice in religious matters from the French Roman Catholic bishops.

What France is inclined to do in Syria she may do in other non-Christian lands under her control, so that British and American missionaries may either be excluded or so hampered that they will be crippled and ultimately forced out, just as they were forced out of the valley of the Gaboon river in West Africa. One of the French Protestant mis-

sionary leaders said, in our conference in Paris, that he believed that the French Government was disposed to be more friendly than formerly to the missionary work of the French Protestant Society and to appreciate the value of its work; and he thought that this more liberal attitude might be extended to British and American missionaries, if they are careful and tactful. The trouble in the past, however, has not been so much with headquarters in Paris as with local officials on the field. Another member of our Paris conference, good-naturedly but with undoubted meaning, gave us of other lands food for thought by remarking that Anglo-Saxon missionaries, both British and American, take Anglo-Saxon ideas with them to a greater extent than they realize, and he evidently had some sympathy with the feeling which, he said, prevailed in the French Government, that the average British and American missionary fails to adapt himself to the legitimate point of view of another governing power, and that his effort, perhaps unconsciously, is to Anglicize the native population with the result that the Government regards him as a disturbing factor. One is reminded of the remark of a Norwegian delegate at the Edinburgh Conference, that many American and British missionaries apparently imagine that what our Lord actually commanded His disciples to do was to go into all the world and teach the English language to every creature.

And why should not Japan follow the example of Western Powers? Every well-informed student of the Far East knows perfectly well that the Japanese authorities regard the large American and British missionary work in Korea as an obstacle to their plans for the amalgamation of that country with Japan. I am aware that responsible officials of the Japanese Government are not likely to say this publicly, and when spoken to on the subject will suavely and courteously deny it. I am also aware that the statement is absolutely true, and that Japan would like nothing better

than to have the confessedly Christian Powers of the West set the example of regarding foreign missionary work as a political instrument to be utilized or eliminated as the furtherance of a government's political plans may require. A foretaste of what may be expected is seen in the fact that last May the Japanese, assigning Section 438 of the Peace Treaty as their reason, expelled all the German missionaries, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, from the Caroline Islands, although some of them had been allowed to remain throughout the war.

The instances cited do not by any means exhaust the list of probabilities. China is rapidly falling under Japanese influence, and the Japanese attitude toward American and British missionary work in certain sections, notably the great province of Shantung, finds open expression in the Japanese vernacular press, in which the writers do not hesitate to demand the expulsion of American missionaries as an alleged hindrance to Japan's program. In Siam the king is energetically trying to develop the nationalistic spirit of the Siamese, and is using Buddhism, the State religion, as one of the most effective agencies to accomplish his purpose. In spite of all the personal kindness of officials to the American missionaries, some of them feel that the large American missionary work in Siam does not fit in well with the king's policy of nationalization, and a veteran missionary has recently said that there is more active opposition to Christianity in Siam today than there has been for thirty years.

There is danger that, in dealing with a temporary exigency regarding German missions, we may see war animosities and restrictions projected into the period of peace reconstruction; government inspection and supervision of mission schools established in ways that exacting or hostile officials may render oppressive; the freedom of unselfish missionary work for the evangelization and moral uplift

of non-Christian people subordinated to the nationalistic political program of a ruling power, and principles adopted which will ere long be turned with disastrous effect against British and American missionary work in several important fields.

The Church cannot always take her orders from Caesar, nor can her missionary work wait indefinitely upon political considerations. The notion that the State is certain to be right and that its officials are infallible was the heresy of the Hohenzollerns. Let us who fought against it be careful how we fall into it ourselves. If the followers of Christ in England and France had not withstood their governments in former centuries Protestantism in these countries would have been strangled at its birth. From the days of Peter and John to the present, Christian men have sometimes found it necessary to say: "We ought to obey God rather than men." A Christianity which stands for universalism inevitably collides at times with politics which stand for nationalism. Christian obligation cannot always be defined in terms of governmental expediency. There are times when we must obey the higher law, in the spirit of Lord Hugh Cecil, who is reported to have said recently: "I am a Christian first and an Englishman afterwards."

Appendix V

CONVERSATION OF PRESIDENT WILSON AND U. S. SENATORS AUGUST 19, 1919

Senator Borah—When did the secret treaty between Great Britain, France and the other nations of Europe with reference to certain adjustments in Europe first come to your knowledge? Was that after you had reached Paris also?

The President—Yes, the whole series of understandings was disclosed to me for the first time then.

Senator Borah—Then we had no knowledge of these secret treaties so far as our Government was concerned until you reached Paris?

The President—Not unless there was information at the State Department of which I know nothing.

Senator Borah—Do you know when these secret treaties between Japan, Great Britain and other countries were first made known to China?

The President—No, sir; I do not. I remember a meeting of what was popularly called the Council of Ten, after our reaching Paris, in which it was first suggested that all these understandings should be laid upon the table of the conference. That is some time after we reached there, and I do not know whether that was China's first knowledge of these matters or not.

Senator Borah—Would it be proper for me to ask if Great Britain and France insisted upon maintaining these secret treaties at the Peace Conference as they were made?

The President—I think it is proper for me to answer that

question, sir. I will put it in this way: They felt that they could not recede from them, that is to say that they were bound by them, but when they involved general interests such as they realized were involved, they were quite willing, and indeed I think desirous, that they should be reconsidered with the consent of the other parties. I mean with the consent so far as they were concerned of the other parties.

Senator Swanson—Can you tell us, or would it be proper to do so, of your understanding with Japan as to the return of Shantung—a question which has been very much discussed?

The President—I have published the wording of the understanding, Senator. I cannot be confident that I quote it literally, but I know that I quote it in substance. It was that Japan should return to China in full sovereignty the old province of Shantung so far as Germany had had any claims upon it, preserving to herself the right to establish a residential district at Tsingtao, which is the town of Kiaochow Bay; that with regard to the railways and mines she should retain only the rights of an economic concession there, with the right, however, to maintain a special body of police on the railway, the personnel of which should be Chinese under Japanese instructors nominated by the managers of the company and appointed by the Chinese Government. I think that is the whole of it.

Senator Borah—Was that understanding oral?

The President—Senator Borah asked whether this understanding was oral or otherwise. I do not like to describe the operation exactly if it is not perfectly discreet, but as a matter of fact this was technically oral, but literally written and formulated, and the formulation agreed upon. . . .

. . . . . .

Senator Pomerene—Mr. President, if I may, I should like to ask a question or two along that same line. If this treaty should fail of ratification then could not the oppor-

tunity be opened to Japan to treat the Shantung question just as she has treated the Manchurian situation?

The President—I think so; yes.

Senator Pomerene—So that if the treaty should fail of ratification China, so far as Shantung is concerned, would be practically at the mercy of Japan, whereas if the treaty is ratified then at least she will have the benefit of the moral assistance of all the other signatory Powers to the treaty to aid in the protection of Chinese rights.

The President—Senator, I conceive one of the chief benefits of the whole arrangement that centres in the League of Nations to be just what you have indicated; that it would bring to bear the opinion of the world and the controlling action of the world on all relationships of that hazardous sort, particularly those relationships which involve the rights of the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come are most likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. Without the League of Nations they have no buttress or protection. With it, they have the united protection of the world, and inasmuch as it is the universal opinion that the great tragedy through which we have just passed never would have occurred if the Central Powers had dreamed that a number of nations would be combined against them, so have I the utmost confidence that this notice beforehand that the strong nations of the world will in every case be united will make war extremely unlikely.

Senator Johnson—Mr. President, I am quite hesitant about asking certain questions which I wish to ask. I apologize in advance for asking them and I trust you will stop me at once if they are questions which you deem inappropriate or that ought not to be asked.

The President—Thank you.

Senator Johnson—I think the question I am about to ask you answered to Senator Borah, so pardon me if it is re-

petitive. The question is, Was the United States Government officially informed at any time between the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany and the signing of the armistice of agreements made by the Allied Governments in regard to the settlement of the war?

The President—No; not so far as I know.

Senator McCumber—Senator Johnson, may I ask the President right here whether or not any treaties were made after we entered into the war between any of our co-belligerents that were not given to us?

The President—No, sir. I do not know of any.

Senator Johnson—When our Government, through you, Mr. President, in January, 1918, made the fourteen points as the basis for peace, were those points made with the knowledge of the existence of the secret agreements?

The President—No; oh, no.

Senator Johnson—It was not intended, then, by the expression of those fourteen points, to supplant the aims contained in the secret treaties?

The President—Since I knew nothing of them, necessarily not. . . .

Senator Johnson—You would have preferred, as I think most of us would, that there had been a different conclusion of the Shantung provision, or the Shantung difficulty or controversy, at the Paris Peace Conference?

The President—Yes; I frankly intimated that.

Senator Johnson—Did it require the unanimous consent of the members of the Peace Conference to reach a decision like the Shantung decision?

The President—Every decision, yes, sir. . . .

Senator Johnson—May I ask one or two more questions concerning Shantung which I omitted or forgot?

The President—Certainly, Senator.

Senator Johnson—First: Did Japan decline to sign the award as made or provided in the peace treaty?

The President—Her representatives informed us, Senator, that they were instructed not to sign in that event (the refusal to award Shantung to Japan).

Senator Johnson—Was the decision reached, if you will pardon the perfectly blunt question, because Japan declined to sign unless that decision was reached in that way?

The President—No, I do not think it would be true to say "Yes" to that question. It was reached because we thought it was the best that could be got, in view of the definite engagements of Great Britain and France, and the necessity of a unanimous decision, which we held to be necessary in every case we have decided.

Senator Johnson—Great Britain and France adhered to their original engagements, did they not?

The President—They said that they did not feel at liberty to disregard them.

Senator Johnson—Do you mind stating, or would you prefer not, what it was that caused you ultimately to accede to the decision that was demanded by Japan?

The President—Only the conclusion that I thought it was the best that could be got under the circumstances.

Senator Brandegee—May I interpolate there without disturbing you, Senator Johnson.

Senator Johnson—Yes, sir.

Senator Brandegee—In Part VI of the hearings before our committee on page 182, Senator Johnson of California asked Secretary Lansing: (Reading.)

Was the Shantung decision made in order to have the Japanese signatories to the League of Nations?

Secretary Lansing—That I cannot say.

Senator Johnson—In your opinion was it?

Secretary Lansing—I would not want to say that, because I really have not the facts on which to form an opinion along that line.

Senator Johnson—Would the Japanese signature to the League of Nations have been obtained if you had not made the Shantung agreement?

Secretary Lansing—I think so.

Senator Johnson—You do?

Secretary Lansing—I think so.

Senator Johnson—So that even though Shantung had not been delivered to Japan, the League of Nations would not have been injured.

Secretary Lansing—I do not think so.

Senator Johnson—And you would have had the same signatories that you have now?

Secretary Lansing—Yes, one more—China.

Senator Johnson—One more—China. So that the result of the Shantung decision was simply to lose China's signature rather than to gain Japan's?

Secretary Lansing—No, that is my personal view, but I may be wrong about it.

Senator Johnson—Why did you yield on a question on which you thought you ought not to yield and that you thought was a principle?

Secretary Lansing—Because naturally we were subject to the direction of the President of the United States.

Senator Johnson—And it was solely because you felt that you were subject to the decision of the President of the United States that you yielded?

Secretary Lansing—Yes.

Senator Johnson—The decision is his?

Secretary Lansing—Necessarily.

Now I wondered whether Secretary Lansing was well informed about this question or not?

The President—Well, my conclusion is different from his, sir.

Senator Brandegee—You could not have got the signature of Japan if you had not given Japan Shantung.

The President—That is my judgment.

Senator Brandegee—You say you were notified to that effect.

The President—Yes, sir.

Senator Swanson—As I understand, you were notified that they had instructions not to sign unless this was included.

The President—Yes.

Senator Borah—And was it your judgment that after the treaty had been ratified, China's rights would be protected and Japan would surrender to China what she said she would?

The President—Yes.

Senator Swanson—As I understand it you considered this verbal agreement effective as relating to Shantung, and you understood that this conveyance would be followed by a conveyance to China.

The President—Not to supersede it, but the action by Japan is to follow.

Senator Johnson—Yes. But, Mr. President, you would have much preferred to have a different disposition notwithstanding the promise of Japan in the treaty, would you not?

The President—Yes, sir.

APPENDIX VI

CHINA'S ATTITUDE TO THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

PEKING, June 6, 1920.—The Foreign Office has handed to Reuter's Agency the following statement of the position China has taken up in matters arising out of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance:

Three months ago the attention of the Chinese Government was drawn to statements appearing in the world's press regarding the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Inasmuch as an important element in the text of both of the 1905 and 1911 Agreements was Section B of the Preamble which treated of matters affecting China's international standing and international relations without the prior assent of China having been obtained, and inasmuch as public opinion throughout the Republic had long shown deep resentment at this condition of affairs, the Government decided that the time has arrived to address representations to the British Government.

Instructions were consequently sent to the Chinese Minister in London to make formal inquiries regarding the reports appearing in the press and to point out that while obviously the international arrangements of other Powers did not in the ordinary course of events concern others than the High Contracting Parties, the treatment of China merely as a territorial entity in the written text of any such agreements would no longer be tolerated by the public opinion of the country and would indeed be viewed by all as an unfriendly act.

To these first inquiries China received the following

verbal reply: First that the question of the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had not yet come up for consideration; secondly, that inasmuch as the successive Agreements had been couched in the same language, it would naturally follow that if the Alliance were renewed it must follow the same lines.

In consequence of this reply a memorandum was prepared analysing the three successive Alliance instruments and establishing clearly: (a) that the original instrument of 1902 was radically different from the 1905 Agreement in that the independence of Korea was specifically guaranteed in the first; (b) that the second Agreement of 1905 far from being identical included India for the first time within its scope, whilst Korea was relegated to a subordinate position and clearly earmarked for annexation; (c) that the third Agreement introduced into the Preamble the definite statement having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation, etc., and then definitely dropped all reference in the numbered articles to either Korea or the Indian frontier, because the act to which Russia's assent had been obtained had made mutual pledge regarding these matters superfluous.

In view, then, of the fact that beneath the framework of what is on the surface a self-denying ordinance, vital and far-reaching changes have acquired the sanction of the High Contracting Parties, Chinese opinion is not unnaturally distrustful of any renewal of this agreement, all men holding that China has suffered enough from its operation during the World War in the matter of Shantung.

Furthermore, as the formal ratification of the Austrian Treaty has made China a member of the League of Nations, which she assumes was created in good faith, she is advised that a contract regarding her affairs between other members of the League cannot be entered into without her prior

consent has been obtained, Article 10 being a sufficient guarantee that her territorial integrity will be respected.

So far China has not received from Britain a reply to her memorandum. She is anxious for that reply so that she may address an identical note to Japan and establish definitely the national attitude on a question vital to the peace and prosperity of her people.



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